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Abstract 
 
The aim of the thesis is to provide a fresh look at the beginning of the British analytic 
tradition, represented by early G. E. Moore and B. Russell and later by a young L. Wittgenstein, 
and emphasize especially the way in which this tradition was influenced by Kant’s 
transcendental-idealistic epistemology in general, and the notion of judgment in particular. In 
doing so, I open my account by focusing on how Moore’s ground-breaking notion of a 
“proposition” as a mentally-independent entity emerged out of his critical reflections on Kant’s 
account of judgment as a mental activity of bringing representations under the unity of 
transcendental apperception. Subsequently, I present Russell as adopting this notion of a 
proposition, providing a thoroughgoing analysis of it and, after discovering its philosophical 
shortcomings, finally abandoning it in favour of his multiple relation theory of judgment. Based 
on the detailed description of the nature and changes within Russell’s multiple relation theory, 
I then attempt to disentangle Wittgenstein’s famous, oft discussed argument against it and 
introduce the notion of a “proposition” from the Tractatus as Wittgenstein’s attempt at the more 
appropriate theory of judgment. Eventually, I illuminate how the approaches to judgement and 
proposition under consideration may all be considered particular responses to Kant’s 
transcendental-idealistic epistemology, something I do by paying attention in particular to the 
notions of unity of single propositions and judgments as opposed to the overall unity within the 
body of all propositions or judgments. 
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Introduction 
 
When analytic philosophy emerged at the turn of the 20th century, it was a radically new 
and innovative successor to the centuries-old metaphysics that preceded it; or at least so the 
Viennese logical positivists thought. However, no philosophy has ever emerged out of the blue; 
every philosopher has had one way or another to answer questions that were circulating in 
philosophical debates a long time before him. We may even say that philosophy revolves 
around several basic puzzles which have been and will probably forever be the same. The 
question concerning the nature of judgement is definitely one of those old, ever newly emerging 
questions – how is it possible that we make judgements about the world? How do these 
judgements bear the possibility of being true or false? What is the truth or falsity of judgement? 
And what is judgement itself – a mental act by which we interpret the world or alternatively 
something non-subjective? 
When Russell begins his early book on Leibniz by saying “[t]hat all sound philosophy 
should begin with an analysis of propositions, is a truth too evident, perhaps, to demand a 
proof”1, we may wonder why he considered this so apparent. Peter Hylton explains that the 
problem of the unity of the proposition, which emerged at the onset of the analytic tradition, is 
essentially the same as the problem of the unity of judgement, which could be traced back to 
Leibniz and Kant.2 In turn, we may notice that questions about the nature of judgement had 
been widely discussed even prior to the modern era (although it is also true that Descartes, 
Leibniz, Locke, Hume and other “moderns” definitely gave them a new shape). 
The aim of my thesis is not to cover this whole tradition – a task probably too big for a 
whole lifetime. Rather, I will concentrate on a much narrower question of whether – and if so, 
how – the beginning of the British analytic tradition (represented by early Moore and Russell 
and later by a young Wittgenstein) was influenced by Kant’s conception of epistemology and, 
specifically, by the conception of judgement – as an activity of mind – which stands at the 
centre of it. I have chosen this approach because it seems to me relatively neglected – while the 
                                                 
1 Russell, B. (1992). A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz. London and New York: Routledge, 
p. 9. 
2 Hylton, P. (1984). The Nature of the Proposition and the Revolt against Idealism. In: R. Rorty, ed., 
Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
375–97, p. 375. 
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role played by the specifically British form of idealism in the philosophies of young Moore and 
Russell has already been examined, most famously and comprehensively by Hylton,3 such 
extensive scholarly attention has not yet been given to the influence of Kant’s transcendental 
idealism. 
What account of judgement does Kant put forward? I will offer here a few introductory 
remarks. According to Mark Textor, at the heart of Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique 
of Pure Reason) lies “the synthetic model of judgement”, in which Kant describes judgement 
as the synthesis of representations into a unity (in Kantian terms the “transcendental unity of 
apperception”).4 In a similar vein, Artur Rojszczak and Barry Smith claim that Kant’s 
epistemology presents what they call the “combination theory of judgement”, a theory in which 
the act of judgement, conceived of as a process of combining or separating variously described 
mental entities (concepts, representations or ideas), is given central importance.5 
Even before Moore’s and Russell’s criticisms, philosophical opposition to idealism in 
general, and Kant’s transcendentalism in particular, had begun gradually to emerge on the 
Continent. Responding to Kant’s epistemology, theories of judgement appeared during and 
especially at the end of the 19th century which from various perspectives cast doubt on Kant’s 
synthetic or combination model of judging activity. On the Continent, Brentano was essential 
in paving the way towards a new theory of judgement subsequently elaborated by his 
followers.6 Brentano’s theory of judgement represented an alternative to the Kantian synthetic 
model of judgement since Brentano did not conceive of judgement as a predication (which is 
for Kant an important form of synthesis), but rather as an acknowledgement or rejection of the 
                                                 
3 Hylton, P. (1990). Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
4 Textor, M., ed. (2013). Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, Introduction, p. 1. 
5 Rojszczak, A. and Smith, B. (2003). Theories of Judgement. In: T. Baldwin, ed., The Cambridge History 
of Philosophy 1870-1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 157–173, p. 157. 
6 However, were it not for the debates with neo-Kantians, who in many aspects reformulated Kant’s 
epistemology, discussions about the nature of judgement would not have had the particular shape we know from 
the history of philosophy. Thus, for instance, Adolf Reinach from the Münich phenomenology school opened the 
debate which became prominent after Russell’s work: he confronted Brentanians with a question concerning a 
false judgement – does a false judgement also have a referent or not? See Reinach, A. (1911). Zur Theorie des 
negativen Urteils. In: A. Reinach (1921). Gesammelte Schriften. ed. by his students. Halle: Max Niemeyer. Trans. 
as On the Theory of Negative Judgement, in B. Smith, ed., (1982). Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and 
Formal Ontology. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. pp. 315–377. And debates over the nature of referents of 
judgements took place as well: Reinach, Stumpf and Lotze insisted that referents of judgement are always states 
of affairs (Sachverhalten), while Brentano supposed (at least according to Reinach) that any object can be judged, 
see Reinach, 1911 and Textor, 2013, Introduction, p. 3. 
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object given in presentation.7  
Brentano himself, famous for characterizing mental phenomena as bearing 
“intentionality” (i.e. being related to something other than themselves), conceived of the object 
of judgement as mentally inexistent.8 However, his disciples generally refused this part of his 
theory and elaborated views in which they distinguished the act of judging, the content of 
judgement (Brentano’s mentally inexistent object) and the external, non-mental object towards 
which judgement is directed (apart from when we carry out a judgement about our own mental 
phenomena). Most notably, this conception was thoroughly elaborated by the Polish 
philosopher and logician Kazimierz Twardowski in his famous little book Zur Lehre vom Inhalt 
und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen (On the Content and Object of Presentations).9 Here, 
Twardowski formulated claims that had already appeared in the accounts of some of his 
contemporaries, but which he described with unprecedented clarity and underpinned for the 
first time with precise argumentation.10 He distinguished the act, content and object of 
judgement, and defined content as the link between the act and the object of judgement by 
means of which an act intends this particular and no other object.11 
Twardowski’s explicit distinction between the act, content and object (of judgement) 
can be seen as a stepping stone towards the subsequent ontologies of objects of judgement in 
Meinong, Ehrenfels and others.12 While Brentano focused on the subjective side of judgement 
(the judgmental act and content), his followers turned their attention more to the external objects 
of our judgemental activity and devoted special attention to their internal complexity and unity 
(independent of our judgemental activity). Thus, the Austrian philosopher Christian von 
Ehrenfels enriched the philosophical vocabulary with the word “Gestalt quality” 
(Gestaltqualität), referring to what he proposed was the quality of the external objects of 
judgement. Those objects typically consist of several parts, and their unity cannot be explicated 
                                                 
7 Textor, 2013, Introduction, pp. 1-2. 
8 However, some commentators claim that Brentano did not conceive of objects as being immanently 
present in our mind, see e.g. Dummett, M. (1994). Origins of Analytical Philosophy. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard 
University Press. p. 31ff. 
9 Twardowski, K. (1894). Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, eine psychologische 
Untersuchung. Wien: A. Hölder. English translation: Twardowski, K. (1977). On the Content and Object of 
Presentations: A Psychological Investigation. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 
10 See Betti, A. We Owe It to Sigwart! A New Look at the Content/Object Distinction in Early 
Phenomenological Theories of Judgment from Brentano to Twardowski. In: Textor, 2013, pp. 74-96, p. 75.  
11 Twardowski, 1894, p. 7 (“When the object is presented and when it is judged, in both cases there occurs 
a third thing, basides the mental act and its object, which is, as it were, a sign of the object: its mental ‘picture’ 
when it is presented and its existence when it is judged.”) 
12 Rojszczak and Smith, 2003, p. 167. 
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without taking into account a special quality over and above their particular parts that joins 
them all together. Ehrenfels’ considerations regarding the complexity of judgement’s objects 
were further developed by his teacher, an Austrian philosopher renowned for his ontology of 
non-existent objects, Alexius Meinong.13 
Meinong proposed that judgement is distinctively related to a special kind of object: an 
“objective”, one of the representatives of Meinong’s “objects of higher order”.14 While in 
representation we relate ourselves to a simple object or quality (an apple, a red colour etc.), in 
judgement we are directed towards particular fact about these objects or qualities (that the apple 
is red etc.). Objectives are composed of several elements, but they are not reducible to their 
sum, since they are in possession of a special complexity. Objectives consist of so called 
“founding objects” and “founded objects”, comparable to Ehrenfels’ “Gestalt qualities”. The 
former present the basic elements on which the later are built. (Thus, in our example, on the 
simple objects apple and red, the relation of predicating “the apple is red” is erected). 
For both Ehrenfels and Meinong, complex objects, in spite of their complexity, possess 
a unity. They are not merely the sum of their constituents, but are also necessarily endowed 
with uniting elements of a special kind which bind them into complex wholes: in Ehrenfels, the 
Gestalt quality, the quality of the whole, takes this role, while in Meinong it is a relation which 
binds all other elements of the complex together. Turning our attention to the potential influence 
of the Brentanian tradition on young Moore and Russell, it is these two interrelated 
philosophical issues, complexity and its unity, that are likely to have had the greatest 
importance. 
When we now turn our attention to work happening in Britain, we find young Russell 
and Moore beginning their studies at Cambridge in a philosophical environment in which 
British idealism was the predominant force. That part of their philosophical background has 
been already examined in detail.15 Of the first generation of British idealists (those active in the 
                                                 
13 See Meinongian ontology in: Meinong. A. (1899). Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren 
Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung.  Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, pp. 182—
272. And Russell’s discussion in: Russell, B. (1904a). Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (I.). 
Mind, 13(50), pp. 204-219; Russell, B. (1904b). Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (II.). Mind, 
13(51), pp. 336-354 and Russell, B. (1904c). Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (III.). Mind, 
13(52), pp. 509-524. 
14 See the discussion later, section 3.2.1.  
15 See e.g. Hylton, 1984; Hylton, 1990; Griffin, N. (1991). Russell’s Idealist Apprenticeship. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press or Baldwin, T. (1984). Moore’s Rejection of Idealism. In: Rorty, 1984.  
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mid-nineteen century), it was T. H. Green who most notably incorporated German idealism into 
British philosophy, criticising British empiricism and associanism from a “broadly Kantian 
point of view”.16 He insisted that explaining cognition requires accounting for the conditions 
under which cognition is possible, which he called “formal conceptions” or simply (under 
Kant’s influence) “categories”.17 It is probable that neither young Moore nor young Russell 
devoted much effort to arguing against empiricism since they took it to have already been 
refuted by Green.18 
It was an idealist of a more Hegelian fashion who was initially the most lauded by young 
Moore and Russell, namely F. H. Bradley. Russell reported that G. F. Stout, an entirely non-
idealistic philosopher with an avid interest in psychology, “thought very highly of Bradley; 
when Bradley’s Appearance and Reality was published, Stout said it had done as much as is 
humanly possible in ontology”.19 And Russell personally “read Bradley at this time with 
avidity, and admired him more than any other recent philosopher”.20 In an essay from this time, 
he even called Bradley’s major philosophical contribution, Appearance and Reality, an “epoch-
making work”.21 
The young Moore was similarly enthusiastic about Bradley. In his 1897 Dissertation he 
claimed that he shared “by far greater agreement with Mr. F. H. Bradley’s general philosophical 
attitude” than with Edward Caird, an interpreter of Kant whose philosophical approach seemed 
to him overly subjectivistic.22 Most strikingly, Moore said that “[i]t is to Mr. Bradley that I 
chiefly owe my conception of the fundamental problems of Metaphysics”.23 For some time, 
Bradley’s philosophy of absolute idealism provided Moore with a viable alternative to what 
seemed the overly subjectivistic Kantian philosophy, emphasizing as it did the non-subjective 
nature of the absolute spirit.24 The enthusiasm for Bradley’s absolute idealism did not, however, 
                                                 
16 Green, T. H. (1906). Prolegomena to Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 35. 
17 See e.g. Green, T. H. (1894). The Works of Thomas Hill Green, 3 Vols. London: Longman, p. 207 ff. 
18 See Hylton, 1990, p. 22. 
19 Russell, B. (1944). My Mental Development. In: J. G. Slater, ed., (1997). The Collected Papers of 
Bertrand Russell, Volume 11: Last Philosophical Testament 1947-68. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 5-
17, p. 10. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Russell, B. (1895). The Free-Will Problem from an Idealist Standpoint. In: K. Blackwell, ed. (1983). The 
Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell – Volume 1: Cambridge Essays, 1888-1899, London and New York: Allen 
& Unwin, p. 230; dated by Russell, 8 June 1895. 
22 Preti, C. (2013). The Origin and Influence of G. E. Moore’s ‘The Nature of Judgment’. In: Textor, 2013, 
pp. 183-205. 
23 This claim is included in the first version of the Dissertation from 1897, see Moore, G. E. (2011). Early 
Philosophical Writings. Baldwin, T. and Preti, C. eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 4. 
24 Preti, 2013, p. 189. 
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last long. Both Moore and Russell gradually came up with their own, in essential respects anti-
idealistic, notions of judgement and concepts. 
Apart from the British idealists, there was also another important figure in Britain who 
exerted considerable influence on both Moore and Russell: G. F. Stout, an editor of Mind from 
1892 to 1920 and a philosopher deeply interested in psychology, acknowledged for introducing 
Brentano’s philosophy of psychology to the English-speaking world. Stout was even more 
influenced by Brentano’s followers, perhaps most notably Twardowski, of whose On the 
Content and Object of Presentations he probably wrote an anonymous review for Mind.25 When 
young Russell and Moore studied at Cambridge as undergraduates, Stout’s lectures on the 
history of philosophy were part of their curriculum, and they must therefore have been at least 
partially familiar with his views on philosophy and psychology.26 His main theoretical work is 
a voluminous, two-part Analytic Psychology with the subtitle The Scope and Method of 
Psychology.27 
It is primarily in its first part of this book that we once again encounter questions about 
the complexity and unity of the object of judgement. The notion of an “analytic psychology” 
was Stout’s translation of Brentano’s “descriptive psychology”, a term Brentano coined to 
describe the investigation of the mind’s most basic psychic components, as opposed to 
empirical psychology which focuses on the genesis of our actual psychic processes.28 The 
subject matter of analytic psychology is consciousness in general, which Stout described as 
“every possible kind of experience”,29 and like his contemporaries in the field of psychology 
he distinguished its various modes, e.g. apperception, belief, imagination, pleasure or pain.30 
Stout emphasized, as instructed by Brentanians, that investigations into the nature of judgement 
must also include scrutiny of the object of judgement. The object of judgement is for Stout a 
                                                 
25 For this conjecture see Schaar, M. S. van der (2013). G.F. Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic 
Philosophy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 66. 
26 For this historical evidence, see Preti, C. (2013). The Origin and Influence of G. E. Moore’s ʻThe Nature 
of judgement’, in: Textor, 2013, pp. 183-205, p. 191. 
27 Stout also wrote an article on Bradley’s theory of judgement and on Russell’s multiple relation theory of 
judgement: Stout, G. F. (1914). Mr. Russell’s Theory of judgement. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 15, 
pp. 332-352; Stout, G. F. (1902-1903). Bradley’s Theory of Judgement. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
3, pp. 1–28. See section 3.3.2 of the thesis for discussion of Stout’s criticism of Russell’s multiple-relation theory. 
28 For the elaboration of this distinction see e.g. Brentano, F. (1892). Deskriptive Psychologie. Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner Verlag. Trans. as Descriptive Psychology (1982, 1995). London: Routledge. For Stout’s account see 
Stout, G. F. (1896). Analytic Psychology. In 2 Volumes, Vol. 1, London: Sonnenschein, p. 36. 
29 Stout, 1896, p. 19.  
30 Ibid. For further discussion see Preti, 2013, pp. 192-193. 
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complex object, composed of various parts attainable by analysis,31 external to consciousness,32 
whose complexity is mind-independent and which possesses its own mode of unity. This “form 
of unity” or “form of combination” is for Stout, as the Gestalt quality is for Ehrenfels, a separate 
object of apprehension.33 
As students, Moore and Russell thus came under the influence not only of British 
idealism, but also the emerging Brentanian tradition. Neither philosopher actually began his 
university studying philosophy (or “moral sciences” as it was called at that time at Cambridge). 
Russell began in 1890, studying mathematics, and G. E. Moore a year later, studying classics. 
Both were soon, however, elected members of Cambridge Conversazione Society (the 
Apostles) at which they took part in philosophical discussions. At the end of the 19th century, 
between 1895 and 1899, a young Russell was immersed in his so called “Tiergarten 
programme”, an attempt to provide a unified dialectical account of the sciences, influenced by 
Bradley and another idealistic philosopher, McTaggart.34 
As for Moore, he focused not on the philosophy of sciences, but ethics. During 1897, 
he began composing a dissertation on Kant’s account of ethics, will and pure practical reason, 
which he went on to submit for the Trinity Prize Fellowship. He wasn’t awarded the fellowship 
at this first attempt, but published a paper derived from the dissertation, “Freedom”, which 
appeared in Mind in 1898.35 Although he later called the paper “absolutely worthless”36, it 
usefully illuminates how his philosophical views developed in the course of a year – a year 
later, his “The Nature of Judgement” appeared37, this time derived from a second, rewritten 
dissertation with which he successfully won the Fellowship. 
                                                 
31 Schaar, 2013, p. 73: “In 1896 Stout does already acknowledge a special object of judgement: a complex 
object with a unity independent of the act of judgement, whose independent and dependent parts can be obtained 
by analysis.” 
32 “We may, I think, confidently affirm that the object of thought is never a content of our finite 
consciousness. If the object exists at all in the sense in which the thinker refers to it, i.e. means or intends it, it 
exists independently of this consciousness […]” (Stout, 1896, p. 40). 
33 The similarity of Stout’s form of unity (or a form of combination) with Ehrengels’ “Gestalt quality” is 
not coincidental. As Schaar emphasizes, Stout intended his notion of a “form” to be a translation of Ehrenfels’ 
“Gestaltqualität”, see Schaar, 2013, p. 54; Stout, G. F. (1896). Analytic Psychology. In 2 Volumes, Vol. 1, London: 
Sonnenschein, p. 65.  
34 See Griffin, 1991, pp. 204-207 and Preti, 2013, pp. 195-197. “Tiergarten” since it allegedly came to his 
mind while walking in Berlin Tiergarten park (in 1895), see Griffin, N. (1991). Russell’s Idealist Apprenticeship. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 204–7. 
35 Moore, G. E. (1898). Freedom. Mind, 7, pp. 179-204. 
36 Moore, G. E. (1942). An Autobiography. In P. Schlipp, ed., The Philosophy of G.E. Moore. Evanston: 
Open Court, p. 21.  
37 Moore, G. E. (1899). The Nature of Judgment. Mind, 8, pp. 176–193. 
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The year of 1898 was decisive for Moore’s farewell to idealistic philosophy, since it 
was during his rewriting of the dissertation that, while pondering upon Kant’s notion of pure 
theoretical reason and transcendental idealistic epistemology, he arrived at “a perfectly 
staggering doctrine”. On 14 August 1898, he wrote to his friend Desmond MacCarthy, also a 
member of Apostles Society: 
“I have arrived at a perfectly staggering doctrine: I had never seen where my 
principles would lead me. An existent is nothing but a proposition: nothing is 
but concepts. There is my philosophy... I am pleased to believe this is the most 
Platonic system of modern times [...]”38 
Based on his investigation of Kant’s view of judgement as the activity of unifying 
representations under the unity of transcendental apperception, Moore reached the conclusion 
that judgement is very different than Kant construed it to be: neither a mental activity, nor a 
mental entity of any kind. Under the more fitting title of “propositions”, Moore proposed that 
judgements are completely independent of consciousness; they are parts of the world and as 
complexes are composed of similarly mind-independent concepts. Russell, when he finished 
reading Moore’s dissertation, swiftly recognized the game-changing character of Moore’s 
ideas, and from that time on applauded his colleague many times for freeing them both from 
the spell of British idealism: 
“...with Moore, British philosophy returned to the kind of work in which it had 
been pre-eminent in former centuries. Those that are too young to remember 
the academic reign of German Idealism in English philosophy after T. H. 
Green can hardly appreciate what Moore achieved in the way of liberation 
from intellectual fetters. All honor and gratitude are due to him for this 
achievement.”39 
“It was towards the end of 1898 that Moore and I rebelled against both Kant 
and Hegel. Moore led the way, but I followed closely in his footsteps. I think 
that the first published account of the new philosophy was Moore’s article in 
Mind on ‘The Nature of Judgement’.”40 
When we look back to the philosophical background in which young Moore and Russell 
formulated their early philosophical views, we may recognize that they distanced themselves 
radically from the conception of judgement propounded by idealists, for whom it always was 
(in one way or another) “the work of the mind”. Moreover, Moore’s concept of judgement was 
                                                 
38 See Preti, 2013. In: Textor, 2013 for further details. The letter can be found among Moore’s manuscripts 
at Cambridge University’s Manuscripts Reading Room at MS Add.8330. 
39 Russell, B. (1959b). The Influence and Thought of G.E. Moore: A Symposium of Reminiscence by Four 
of his Friends. In: The Listener, April 30 1959, LXI, No. 1570, pp. 755-756. 
40 Russell, B. (1959a). My Philosophical Development. London: Allen & Unwin. 
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distinctive even if compared with the Brentanian strand of philosophical and psychological 
investigations mentioned above, though it also concentrated on the issues concerning unity and 
complexity of an object of judging (or a proposition, as Moore called it). While Brentano’s 
followers – including Stout in Britain – conceived of a judgement as a tripartite relation between 
the act of judging, content and object of judgement41, Moore’s account effectively reduced this 
account to a simpler schema in which judgement consists merely of an act of judging and an 
object about which it is judged. Moreover, the act of judging was clearly unsubstantial to 
Moore, since the truth or falsity of a proposition (as an object of judgement) does not depend 
on whether it is judged by us or not.42 Thus, we may agree with Moore’s commentator Consuelo 
Preti’s claim that in Moore “[t]he metaphysical nature of judgement is accounted for entirely 
by way of the object of judgement”.43 
While Moore approached the notion of judgement from within the field of ethics, 
Russell, initially a student of mathematics, took a journey through what we would now call 
philosophy of mathematics. In 1898, preparing a manuscript titled An Analysis of Mathematical 
Reasoning (Being an Inquiry into the Subject-Matter, the Fundamental Conceptions, and the 
Necessary Postulates of Mathematics)44, he paid more and more attention to the notion of 
relations. When he read Moore’s Dissertation, it was precisely Moore’s notion of “necessary 
relations among concepts” which he pinpointed as a ground-breaking discovery.45 In his letter 
to Moore, he approved Moore’s stance whole-heartedly: “I agree most emphatically with what 
you say about the several kinds of necessary relations among concepts, and I think their 
discovery is the true business of Logic (or Meta[physics] if you like)”.46 
The most significant upshot of Moore’s notion of relations is that since they are 
necessary connections between concepts, they are not created by the mind. Moore’s discovery 
                                                 
41 Stout, 1896, p. 52; Preti, 2013, p. 48. 
42 “Concepts are possible objects of thought; but that is no definition of them. It merely states that they may 
come into relation with a thinker; and in order that they may do anything, they must already be something. It is 
indifferent to their nature whether anybody thinks them or not” (Baldwin and Preti, 2011, p. 179).  
43 Preti, 2013, p. 194. Preti even suggests that the fact that Moore used the notion of a “proposition” instead 
of a “judgement” is probably due to the influence of Stout’s writings (Ibid.). For a similar interpretation see also 
Schaar, M. S. van der (2013). G. F. Stout and Russell’s Earliest Account of Judgement. In: Textor, 2013, p. 146. 
44 Russell, B. (1898). An Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning. Manuscript. In: N. Griffin and A. C. Lewis, 
eds. (1990), The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell – Volume 2: Philosophical Papers: 1896–99. London: 
Unwin Hyman, pp. 163–222. 
45 Moore, G. E. (1898). The 1898 Dissertation. The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics. In: Baldwin and Preti 
(2011). G. E. Moore: Early Philosophical Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 173.  
46 Russell to Moore, September 13, 1898. The original letter to be found at Cambridge 
University’s Manuscripts Reading Room at Add.8330 8R/33/8; quoted in Preti, 2013, p. 202. 
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paved the way for understanding concepts, and relations amongst them, as mind-independent, 
and therefore for a departure from idealism in all its variants. In his first famous work in the 
philosophy of mathematics, The Principles of Mathematics from 1903, Russell postulated that 
there are various kinds of relations and that relations and predicates are just as ultimate, 
fundamental and self-subsistent as substances.47 By claiming this, however, Russell again 
brought to the fore the question concerning the notions of unity and complexity: if any 
unificatory work of the mind is ruled out (as it indeed is in Russell’s and Moore’s accounts), 
how are the mutually independent entities (substances, relations and predicates) related into one 
unified whole, a meaningful proposition? 
Moore’s and Russell’s notion of a proposition, an essential tool in their revolt against 
idealism, represents the beginning of my investigation. As the thesis unfolds, I will investigate 
Moore’s, Russell’s and, later in the story, Wittgenstein’s theories of judgement, viewing them 
as reactions to the issues that arose within the field of – especially Kantian, transcendental – 
idealism. I will begin my inquiry, in the first chapter, by briefly introducing the basics of Kant’s 
epistemology with a special emphasis laid on the role of the act of judging witihin our cognition. 
I will not get into specific details of the Kantian scholarship and will not tackle the controversial 
issues discussed within it. Rather, I wish to come up with a basic picture of what Kant’s 
epistemology amounts to and of the essential role judgement plays within it. 
In the second chapter, Moore’s criticism of Kant’s epistemology will come to the fore. 
Firstly, in order to provide a broader background from which Moore’s rethinking of the nature 
of judgement and proposition is comprehensible, I will look, in 2.1, into Moore’s criticism 
directed against various details of Kant’s description of the process of cognition – I will 
explicate the way in which Moore criticized the reputedly overly subjectivistic nature of Kant’s 
epistemological theory and how he attempted to discard Kant’s arguments for the subjective 
nature of space, time, categories and synthesis. 
Then, in 2.2, I will turn my attention to two arguments presented in Moore’s “The 
Nature of Judgment” which Moore employed to argumentatively ground his new notion of a 
proposition by which he intended to replace Kant’s notion of a judgement. The first argument, 
analysed in 2.2.1, which appears already at the very beginning of “The Nature of Judgment” is 
                                                 
47 Russell, B. (1903). The Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted 
in 2010, London: Routledge, p. 44.  
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directed against Bradley’s theory of ideas and meaning of a judgement and attempts to prove 
that a judgement, under a more suitable term “proposition”, must be considered completely 
mind-independent. The second argument, focused on in 2.2.2, is somewhat hidden in Moore’s 
finishing remarks in “The Nature of Judgment” and is quite difficult to entangle in its precise 
form. For that reason, I will use Frege’s more clearly stated (even if later published) argument 
against the possibility of the definition of truth from his article “Der Gedanke” (“The 
Thought”)48 to illuminate Moore’s own argument which I consider in many respects similar to 
Frege’s. 
Eventually, I will conclude that neither of these two arguments completely succeeds in 
backing up Moore's notion of a proposition. Also, I will point out that, apart from the difficulties 
with Moore’s arguments for his position, there is also a considerable vagueness in his account 
of a proposition – he merely claims that a proposition may be formed by any number of concepts 
together with a relation. However, it seems unpersuasive that there are no other constraints on 
the formation of meaningful proposition apart from those indicated by Moore.  
It was Bertrand Russell who clearly recognized the difficulties in Moore’s notion of a 
proposition and to whom I will thus turn in the third chapter. Russell himself, as I will explain 
in 3.1, embarked on the debates with German philosopher Hermann Lotze to argue that we need 
to admit the existence of mind-independent beings. It was then Moore who first labelled some 
of them as “propositions”, and then again Russell who not only attempted to provide more 
detailed account of a proposition’s composition (consisting of things, relations and predicates), 
but also pinpointed the essential issue the notion of mind-independent proposition necessarily 
raises: how to account for the fact that a proposition is not merely a collection of disunified 
elements, but rather a meaningful unity? 
While idealists may have found a shelter in the claim that it is the mind which ascertains 
the unification of the concepts within a judgement, both Moore and Russell, furiously denying 
any “work of the mind” present in the constitution of a proposition, did not have this kind of 
answer in store. It might be, however, that their notion of a proposition provided them with no 
alternative answer either, especially when Russell came up with the claims that a proposition 
consists of several self-sufficient “terms” and that it necessarily loses its unity after the analysis. 
                                                 
48 Frege, G. (1918-1919). Der Gedanke. Eine logische Untersuchung. Beiträge zur Philosophie des 
deutschen Idealismus, 1, pp. 58—77. Trans. as Frege, G. (1996). The Thought. In: M. Beaney, ed., The Frege 
Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 325-345. 
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In 3.2.1, I will attempt to shed some light on Russell’s persuasion about the loss of propositional 
unity by putting it into the context of the debates concerning complexes and relations which 
took place among Brentanian followers at the Continent, especially in the work of Christian 
von Ehrenfels and Alexius Meinong. In 3.2.2, I will suggest that there was a further influence 
on Russell’s persuasion concerning the loss of propositional unity after propositional analysis, 
namely Bradley’s notion of analysis as falsification. 
In 3.3, I will turn my attention to Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement which 
emerged as an alternative way to account for the nature of judgement after the difficulties with 
unity, truth, and falsity of propositions dissuaded Russell from advocating his initial account of 
propositions. In 3.3.1, I will summarize the changes which the multiple relation theory 
underwent in Russell’s work, while pinpointing both the essential differences and similarities 
of all renderings of the theory. In 3.3.2, I will introduce and argue against two objections raised 
against Russell’s theory (by G. F. Stout and S. Candlish) which, I presume, fall prey to the error 
of explicating a multiple relation theory in a misleading way as an example of a correspondence 
theory and derive from it unpersuasive consequences. When these objections fail, it is then 
logical to pay attention to probably the most famous criticism Russell’s multiple relation theory 
has even come under, i.e. that raised by young Ludwig Wittgenstein in 1913. 
It is the task of the fourth chapter, which begins by summarizing and evaluation of the 
traditional interpretation put forward by N. Griffin and S. Somerwille. After arguing against 
this rendering of Wittgenstein’s criticism in 4.1.1, I will concentrate, in 4.1.2, on its most recent 
interpretations. Nowadays, it is generally acknowledged amongst scholars that Wittgenstein’s 
objection centered around the “narrow direction-” and “wide direction problem” (in other 
words, the direction and unity problem). The first amounts to the claim that within Russell’s 
theory of judgement, there are some cases (namely so called permutative non-symmetrical 
complexes) in which the elements within a judgemental complex may be assembled in (at least) 
two possible ways. The wide direction problem is even more far-reaching and amounts to the 
problem of a judgemental unity: Wittgenstein’s objection is interpreted as claiming that 
elements within the judgment may be assembled in such a way that we may end up judging 
nonsense. 
I agree that the unity problem is indeed one of the points Wittgenstein wished to 
emphasize in his interpretation, but I am also persuaded that there is more to this objection. 
Therefore, I will attend to those interpretations which understand Wittgenstein’s objection as 
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concerning (also) some other issue(s) apart from the propositional unity: P. Hanks emphasizes 
the issue of propositional truth and falsity, C. Johnston the notion of a synthesis in thought and 
C. Pincock a correspondence between judgemental and worldly complexes. Drawing on the 
findings of these three commentators, I will come up, in. 4.2, with my own rendering of 
Wittgenstein’s objection which puts into its centre the difficulty with the general theory of 
complexes as a basis for Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement. 
Then, based on my interpretation of the core of Wittgenstein’s objection directed 
towards Russell’s multiple relation theory, I will eventually turn, in the fifth chapter, to the 
investigation as to which theory of judgement Wittgenstein himself put forward, taking the 
lesson from his criticism of Russell’s account. There, I will open the discussion by introducing, 
in 5.1, Wittgenstein’s earliest surviving theory of propositions and judgements, i.e. that founded 
in his Notes on Logic from 1913. I will suggest that Wittgenstein’s aim was primarily to account 
for propositional complexity and capacity to represent and indicate why he eventually ceased 
to believe that his theory from the Notes (based on the notion of propositions as bipolar) is 
capable of fulfilling this task.  
Then, in 5.2, I will finally turn my attention to Wittgenstein’s early master-piece, 
Tractatus Logico-philosophicus. In 5.2.1, my exegesis will centre around Wittgenstein’s 
famous picture theory which considers propositions as facts with a special feature: a capacity 
to represent things other than themselves. I will point out that Wittgenstein, in line with his 
motto that the correct theory of judgement must be grounded in an adequate theory of 
propositions, put into the centre of his theory of judgement exactly this notion of a proposition 
as a representing fact.49 By building the representative capacity right into the heart of the theory 
of propositions, Wittgenstein, in his own eyes, succeeded where Russell failed, i.e. in providing 
a correct theory of judgement.  
In 5.2.2, I will attempt to demonstrate that Wittgenstein’s oft-cited account of judgement 
ascriptions from 5.542 may be understood as an application of the theory of propositions and 
their representational capacity elaborated already in the early sections of the Tractatus. 
Subsequently, in 5.3, I will pinpoint the fact that Wittgenstein’s account of judgement 
ascriptions, which seems to provide a subjectless account of judgement, led several 
                                                 
49 “The epistemological questions concerning the nature of judgment and belief cannot be solved without a 
correct apprehension of the form of the proposition” (Wittgenstein, L. (1913). Notes on Logic, The Birmingham 
Notes, In: M. Potter (2008). Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press, §55, p. 283).   
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commentators to the persuasion that there must be hidden a subject nevertheless, namely a 
transcendental subject which endows language with meaning. Subsequently, I will closely 
examine two of these accounts (provided by A. Kenny and H.-J. Glock), ending by arguing that 
their accounts of the transcendental subject and his work of providing language with meaning 
are unpersuasive.  
Based on this denial of the role of transcendental subject in Wittgenstein’s account of 
judgement, I will ask, in 5.4, whether we may consider his account of propositions and 
judgement ascriptions as anyhow influenced by Kant’s philosophy. I will attempt to argue that 
we indeed may and that the central similarity can be found not primarily in the transcendental 
kind of philosophizing, but rather in both Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s persuasion concerning the 
intimate connection between the issue of the unity of a single judgement (or a proposition) and 
the overall unity in the body of judgements (or propositions). And finally, in the Conclusion of 
the thesis, I will take stock and explicate how my account of Moore’s, Russell’s and 
Wittgenstein’s theories of judgement put forward throughout the thesis renders these theories 
as particular responses to Kant's epistemology. 
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1. Kant’s Theory of Judgement 
 
In this chapter, my aim is to describe the very basics of the epistemology embedded in 
Kant’s transcendental idealism. This is essential for the subsequent sections of the thesis in 
which I will focus on the influence of transcendental idealism on the epistemology that was 
developed after Kant, especially in the works of Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein. In this 
section, I will briefly summarize Kant’s conception of the process of cognition and the 
conditions of its possibility, with emphasis on its major elements or stages, i.e. various kinds of 
syntheses, categories (as forms of judgment applied to sensibly given) and the unity of 
apperception, which serves as a highest point into which all representations need to be brought 
by means of syntheses and categories. 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant endeavours to describe the transcendental 
conditions necessary for the achievement of our cognition of an object.50 In this context, he 
enumerates several essential elements, namely syntheses of a sensible manifold, categories 
ordering representations which have been acquired though syntheses, and the unity of 
apperception into which all representations need to be eventually brought. In my exposition 
here, I will proceed in a bottom-up manner, first explaining the transcendental conditions of the 
possibility of cognition from their lowest stages, then moving to the unity of apperception as 
the highest condition of cognition, and ending up with the explanation of how the cognitive 
process achieves its ultimate goal, namely the cognition of an object. 
On the lowest level of the cognitive process, we need to synthesize the manifold of 
sensible intuition in order to be aware of the perception. This is achieved by means of the first 
form of synthesis introduced by Kant, namely by the synthesis of apprehension. At this point, 
perceptions are obtained, but they subsequently need to be somehow ordered, a task which is 
achieved by putting them into temporal relations of succession and simultaneity. This is carried 
out by the synthesis of imagination, which orders perceptions in the inner sense, or, more 
precisely, in time which functions as a form of inner sense. However, even if this synthesis 
generates the orderly combination of perceptions in the inner sense, their connection there is 
not yet a cognition, since to achieve cognition, we need to employ discursive cognitive 
                                                 
50 Kant, I. (1781, 1787). Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Trans. as Kant, I. (1998). P. Guyer and W. Wood, eds., 
Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, A99; B160. Further quoted as CPR.  
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capacities as well, i.e. forms of judgment in their application to sensible experience 
(categories).51 
A judgment clearly plays an essential role in Kant’s epistemology. The discussion which 
most clearly underscores its importance for cognition is included in §19 of the second version 
of the transcendental deduction of categories (B-deduction).52 Judgment is here presented as an 
essential part of the cognitive process since it is that by means of which perceptions, presented 
in the inner sense, are brought into the unity of apperception as to the highest point of our 
cognitive process in which all our representations need to be united: “[J]udgment is nothing 
other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception.”53 While 
within the transcendental logic, i.e. mainly in the §19 of the B-deduction, it is merely stated 
that judgment is supposed to bring perceptions into the unity of apperception, it is within the 
confines of general logic that we can obtain a clearer view of how this task is achieved in 
judgment.54 
General logic is supposed to describe the process of the subsumption of perceptions 
under the concepts, i.e. a process of analysis which succeeds their generation via the syntheses 
of apprehension and imagination. This process, even if it amounts to a mere analysis, is essential 
in the process of cognition since it explains how perceptions are subsumed under concepts in 
judgments and subsequently brought under the unity of apperception. Without going into details 
here, it is sufficient to note that this process of analysis is described in Kant’s lectures on logic 
as the process of comparison of perceptions, reflection on their differences and similarities and 
abstraction from their differences – at the end of this process, we arrive at a concept, containing 
                                                 
51 Cf. the famous formulation to this effect in the “Metaphysical deduction” (§10 of “On the Clue to the 
Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding”): “The first thing that must be given to us a priori for the 
cognition of all objects is the manifold of pure intuition; the synthesis of this manifold by means of the imagination 
is the second thing, but it still does not yield cognition. The concepts that give this pure synthesis unity, and that 
consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, are the third thing necessary for cognition of 
an object that comes before us, and they depend on the understanding” (Kant, CPR, A78-79/B104; emphases in 
the original).  
52 Ibid., B140-B142. 
53 Ibid., B141; emphasis in the original. Kant distinguishes the objective unity of apperception from a mere 
subjective consciousness of our representations in the inner sense which is, however, “itself dispersed and without 
relation to the identity of the subject” (Ibid., B133).  
54 In the CPR, we can find the notes concerning general logic within the section “On the Clue to the 
Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding” (particularly in A67/B92-B116); the more detailed account 
is provided within Lectures on logic edited by Jäsche, see: Kant, I. (1800). Logik. Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen 
herausgegeben bei Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche. Trasl. as. Kant, I. (1992). The Jäsche Logic. In: J. M. Young, ed., 
Lectures on Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; pp. 521-640, §§ 1-16, pp. 589-597. 
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the features (“marks”) common to all representations which are contained under it.55 
Subsequently, when we obtain concepts, those concepts themselves are put in the mutual 
relations within the judgments, while these relations are governed by the forms of judgements 
famously enumerated in the table of forms of judgements under the headings of quality, 
quantity, relations and modality.56 The role of forms of judgements is to mediate a unity 
between concepts and thus unified brought them into the unity of apperception. Categories are 
introduced in connection with the forms of judgements since categories are the forms of 
judgements as applied to the sensibly given57: e.g. if we arrange concepts in a judgment of the 
categorical form, we apply the categories of substance and attribute to the perceptions contained 
under concepts; in hypothetical judgements, those of cause and effect are applied, in disjunctive 
judgement, the category of community etc. Categories thus serve in their unificatory function 
both at the discursive level of judgement where they ensure the connection between concepts 
and at the level of synthesis, when they serve as a rule governing the unificatory function of 
syntheses (of apprehension and of imagination).58 
This whole process of various forms of unification is succinctly summarized in the final 
account of the first step of the transcendental deduction in §2059: The manifold of sensible 
intuition necessarily belongs to the synthetic unity of apperception; logical functions of 
judgment are actions by means of which the manifold of both intuitions and concepts is brought 
under the unity of transcendental apperception. Therefore, the manifold given in the empirical 
intuition is determined in regard to one of those logical functions, through which it is brought 
to the unity of transcendental apperception. And, finally, categories are those logical functions 
of judging as applied to the sensible manifold; and thus the whole manifold of sensible intuition 
stands under categories. 
So far, we have seen how the unity is achieved within consciousness by bringing various 
                                                 
55 Kant, 1800, p. 589ff. 
56 Kant, CPR, A70/B95. 
57 Ibid., A79/B105.  
58 This twofold unificatory role of categories is spelled out in the famous formulation in CPR, B104/105: 
“The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment, also gives unity to the mere 
synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of 
understanding. The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the very same actions through which 
it brings the logical form of a judgment into concepts by means of the analytic unity, also brings a transcendental 
content into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general, on account 
of which they are called pure concepts of the understanding that pertain to object a priori […]” (emphases in the 
original). 
59 Ibid., B143. 
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representations, by means of syntheses and categories, into the unity of apperception. However, 
it still seems that something is missing which is essential for the process of cognition, namely 
the relation to a cognized object. It is evident that this relation to an object is in a sense the point 
of the whole process of cognition, since by employing our cognitive capacities, we attempt to 
gain a correct cognition of an object. So far, however, we have been discussing the a priori 
conditions for the cognition of an object (i.e. syntheses and categories and their capacity to 
bring representations into the unity of apperception), without paying special attention to the 
particular role an object of cognition has in the picture, i.e. how it is constituted and which 
characteristics may be ascribed to it. 
As I have pointed out, the highest point toward which the unificatory process of 
cognition is directed and which is at the same time its utmost condition is the unity of 
transcendental apperception. As Kant famously declares at the beginning of the B-deduction, if 
I am to be aware of my representations as mine, it is not sufficient to accompany each of them 
with a particular (empirical) consciousness; I need to bring all of them into the unity of 
apperception (i.e. into the unity of consciousness).60 Unity of consciousness as a unity in which 
all my representations need to be united to substantiate a cognition is thus the “highest point of 
our understanding”, to which all the unification both through synthesis and in judgement is 
directed.61 This unity is supposed to enable the cognition of an object due to its ability to 
produce the unity within our representations. The cognition of an object as connected with the 
unification is described in the following concise paragraph from §17 of the B-deduction: 
“Understanding is, generally speaking, the faculty of cognitions. These 
consist in the determinate relation [bestimmte Beziehung] of given 
representations to an object. An object [Object], however, is that in the concept 
of which the manifold of a given intuition is united. Now, however, all 
unification of representations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis 
of them. Consequently, the unity of consciousness is that which alone 
constitutes the relation of representations to an object, thus their objective 
validity, and consequently is that which makes them into cognitions and on 
which even the possibility of the understanding rests.”62 
Our cognitions thus consist in the relation to an object and “an object” is defined by the 
role it plays in connection with our cognitive capacities, namely as “that in the concept of which 
the manifold of a given intuition is united”. The impact of the notion of an object resides in the 
unification of our representations in it: an object is something in which the manifold of intuition, 
                                                 
60 Ibid., B133. 
61 Ibid., B134. 
62 Ibid., B137; emphases in the original. 
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which was initially given to our cognitive capacities to be “processed”, is united.63 It thus seems 
that the unification is essential at both ends of the cognitive process, i.e. to obtain cognition, we 
have to unite representations under the synthetic unity of apperception and, at the same time, 
an object, as a resulting “product” of our cognitive process, is rendered as that in the concept 
of which the manifold of intuition is united. 
Even if the unity is thus two-sided (unity on the side of an object and on the side of our 
consciousness), it seems that it is the unity of apperception which serves as the ultimate basis 
for the unification since it is that unity “which alone constitutes the relation of representations 
to an object”. Synthetic unity of consciousness is thus “an objective condition of all cognition”, 
i.e. “something under which every manifold of intuition must stand in order to become an object 
for me, since in any other way, and without this synthesis, the manifold would not be intuited 
in one consciousness.”64 What is essential for us, however, it not which form of the unification 
is primary, but the fact that to represent an object at all, we have to achieve both the unity of 
consciousness in our representations, i.e. synthesize them in an orderly manner under the unity 
of apperception, and the unity in the concept of an object to which our cognition is related. 
To summarize thus, the final “story” about the unificatory process of the understanding 
tells us that to cognize an object, we need to begin with sensory givenness in sensible intuition, 
undertake several syntheses, and bring the product of those syntheses by means of categories 
into the unity of consciousness. By achieving this unification of representations in the unity of 
apperception, we cognize an object as a unified counterpart of our cognitive undertaking. In the 
next section, we will see how young G. E. Moore critically approached Kant’s transcendental 
epistemology and how his criticism of Kant gradually paved the way towards his new concept 
of a proposition.  
                                                 
63 An object however does not stand for the transcendent, unknown object, but for an object as an 
appearance, only disregarding its particular mode of givenness. For this account of an object in the context 
discussed see Allison, H. (2004). Kant´s Transcendental Idealism – Interpretation and Defense. Revised and 
Enlarged Edition. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 173-174 and related footnote 33, pp. 478-479. 
64 Kant, CPR,  B138, emphasis in the original. 
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2. G. E. Moore and New Concept of Proposition 
 
When we focus on Moore’s early interest in Kant, we will inevitably reach the 
conclusion that he paid attention mostly to Kant’s ethics, a fact suggested by the title of the two 
versions of the Dissertation he submitted for a prize fellowship at Cambridge, The Metaphysical 
Basis of Ethics.65 However, we may find several essential changes in the second version of the 
Dissertation, most importantly the occurrence of two completely new chapters – chapter one, 
“On the Meaning of ‘Reason’ in Kant” and chapter two, “Reason”, excerpts from which were 
subsequently used to compose Moore’s famous article “The Nature of Judgement”.66 It is quite 
clear that these two chapters are not concerned with ethical issues, but with Kant’s 
epistemology. As early as the introductory remarks in the first chapter of the second 
dissertation, “On the Meaning of ‘Reason’ in Kant”, Moore explains why he is interested in 
Kant’s theoretical philosophy: practical and theoretical Reasons are not distinct entities, but one 
and the same Reason applies in two distinct domains. It follows, Moore contends, that if we 
throw some light on the theoretical application of Reason, we will gain some knowledge about 
practical Reason as well.67 
This explanation is not in itself sufficient, however, considering that we could carry out 
some other investigations to throw some more light on the nature of practical Reason.68 In other 
words, there must be some other, additional motivation for Moore’s interest in the notion of 
theoretical Reason in Kant. My claim will be that the deepest motivation lies in Moore’s 
concern with the notion of a proposition and that Moore’s intention was, against a background 
of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, to elucidate the nature of a proposition as a mind-independent 
entity which forms the part of reality and for which truth is its internal property. Moore starts 
his investigations with the observation that there has to be a connection between Kant’s notion 
of Reason and that of truth. And the notion of a truth, in turn, led him to considerations 
                                                 
65 Both versions of the Dissertation are published in: Baldwin, T. and Preti, C., eds. (2011). G. E. Moore: 
Early Philosophical Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-94 and 115-242. 
66 Moore, G. E. (1899). The Nature of Judgment, Mind, 8, pp. 176–93. 
67 Baldwin and Preti, 2011, p. 133. 
68 Moore himself was keenly aware that despite the connection of the issues of theoretical and practical 
Reason, his inclusion of the considerations regarding the theoretical Reason made his dissertation less rather than 
more consistent, as he noted in the beginning of the letter to Russell from 11 September, 1898: “Almost all the 
addition to my dissertation was metaphysical, so that the whole does not hang together at all well”. Letter is to be 
found in the Russell archive at MacMaster University; quoted from Baldwin and Preti, 2011, Introduction, xxxiv. 
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concerning the truth (and falsity) of ideas and meanings, and their relations to reality: 
“In the second year’s work (1897–98) I got on to what I think was a much 
more proﬁtable line of inquiry, though one which had a much less direct 
connection with Kant’s Ethics – had, indeed, a more direct connection with 
the Critique of Pure Reason than with the Critique of Practical Reason. It 
seemed to me that it was extremely difﬁcult to see clearly what Kant meant by 
‘Reason.’ This was a term which occurred not only in the title of both these 
works, but also frequently in the text, and, as it seemed to me, in a very 
mystifying manner. What on earth did Kant mean by it? He must be referring, 
more or less directly, to something which was to be found in the world, and 
which could be described in other terms. But to what exactly? This was what 
I set myself to think about; and it led me to think ﬁrst about the notion of 
‘truth,’ since it seemed to me that, in some of its uses at all events, Kant’s term 
‘Reason’ involved a reference to the notion of ‘truth;’ and, in thinking about 
truth, I was led to take as my text a passage from the beginning of Bradley’s 
Logic, in which after saying that ‘Truth and falsehood depend on the relation 
of our ideas to reality,’ he goes on to say that the 'meaning' of an idea consists 
in a part of its content ‘cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from 
the existence’ of the idea in question […]”69 
Moore thus describes his journey from practical to theoretical Reason as involving, 
firstly, a curiosity about what Reason in itself is – i.e. whether it is something in the world and 
if so what in particular – and, secondly, his persuasion that the notion of Reason has something 
to do with the notion of truth. The notion of truth then subsequently led him to Bradley’s The 
Principles of Logic where Bradley claims, in the introductory remarks, that “truth and falsehood 
depend on the relation of our ideas to reality.”70 
With the benefit of hindsight, we also know that Moore’s engagement with Bradley’s 
notion of meaning resulted in the famous argument against Bradley in which Moore argues 
against what he considers a mentalistic conception of meaning: meaning cannot be, due to the 
looming infinite regress, rendered as a part of the content cut off from a mental idea. Rather, 
Moore will claim, meaning has to be conceived of as an internal property of a proposition which 
amounts to a mind-independent entity whose truth or falsity does not depend on its being 
judged. In this chapter, I will attempt to explain this innovative yet surprising notion of a 
proposition Moore put forward in his dissertation and in his article “The Nature of Judgment”. 
In doing so, I will proceed in several subsequent steps. 
Initially, I will attempt to explicate, in 2.1, the overall shape and main points of Moore’s 
criticism of Kant’s epistemology as he presented it particularly in the first chapter of the second 
                                                 
69 Baldwin and Preti, 2011, Introduction, xiii. 
70 Bradley, F. H. (1883). The Principles of Logic, 2 Volumes. London: Kegan Paul, Book I, Chapter I, §2, 
p. 6. 
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version of his Dissertation. I will attend primarily to his contention that Kant succeeded not in 
proving the subjective origin of the a priori elements, but merely in showing their logical 
priority. I will also point out how, based on this claim, Moore introduced his notion of “logical 
presuppositions” which he, however, swiftly abandoned in favour of his new concept of a mind-
independent proposition. In section 2.2, I will go on to evaluate two arguments which Moore 
put forward to ground this notion of a proposition – an argument against abstractionism and an 
argument against the possibility of defining truth using the notion of correspondence. Based on 
this, we should be in a position to see both how Moore arrived at his notion of a proposition 
and how persuasively (or not) he grounded it with appropriate philosophical arguments.  
2.1 Moore’s Criticism of Kant’s Epistemology 
Even if we restrict our attention to the field of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, and thus 
leave behind completely the realm of practical philosophy and ethics in his work, the criticism 
that young Moore put forward is manifold and scattered both in the second Dissertation and 
several related articles, i.e. “Necessity” (1900)71, “Kant’s Idealism” (1903-1904)72 and 
“Refutation of Idealism” (1903)73. Generally speaking, Thomas Baldwin is probably right in 
noting that most of Moore’s criticism is “not of great interest, since it rests on an excessively 
subjectivistic interpretation of Kant”.74 The excessive subjectivism and distorted interpretation 
of Kant’s idealism is clearly present, for instance, in the final sections of the article “Kant’s 
Idealism” where Moore attempts to engraft Kant’s theoretical philosophy into the Berkeleyan 
form by arguing, among others, that Kant denies the existence of matter.75 
Apart from these considerations, which are essentially misleading if taken as 
interpretations of Kant’s philosophy, it is however evident from many other places that Moore 
was well informed and erudite in Kant’s philosophy and that he took what he saw as Kant’s 
“too psychological standpoint”76 as a serious flaw in his philosophical edifice and was willing 
to provide more fitting arguments than the interpretative excesses he offers, for instance, in the 
                                                 
71 Moore, G. E. (1900). Necessity. Mind, 9, pp. 289-304. 
72 Moore, G. E. (1903a). Kant’s Idealism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 4, pp. 127-140. 
73 Moore, G. E. (1903b). The Refutation of Idealism. Mind, 12, pp. 433–453. 
74 Baldwin, T. (1999). G. E. Moore – The Arguments of Philosophers. London and New York: Routledge, 
p. 9. For similar interpretation with the emphasis on Kant’s reputedly too subjectivistic standpoint at the centre of 
Moore’s criticism see Baldwin and Preti, 2011, Introduction, xlvii. 
75 Moore, 1903a, p. 139. 
76 This term is introduced already in the first dissertation (Baldwin and Preti 2011, p. 62) as a “too 
psychological standpoint” and repeated in the second dissertation (Ibid., p. 192) as a “psychological standpoint”. 
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“Refutation of Idealism”.77 Moore’s objections to Kant’s philosophical position might not be 
always conclusive, but they nevertheless serve interestingly to elucidate the birth of his own 
theoretical stance. 
My purpose here is to provide an overview of the line of arguments, offered by Moore 
in his second Dissertation, against Kant’s epistemology. I will focus in particular on his 
emphatic claim that Kant did not provide sufficient grounding for his thesis that a priority is 
characteristic of our conditions of cognition, and the contention that by linking a priority with 
these conditions, Kant is guilty of confusing the correct logical considerations with mere 
psychological remarks about the mental processes of cognizing.78 
Moore recognizes that Kant provides, throughout the Critique of Pure Reason, several 
arguments for his “Copernican revolution” in epistemology, i.e. the claim that the cognition of 
an object requires that the object conforms to our cognitive faculties and not the other way 
round. Kant offers arguments for this revolutionary idea in the “Transcendental Aesthetic” and 
“Transcendental Analytic”, referring to the forms of intuition, i.e. space and time, and 
categories respectively.79 In addition to this, he also put forward an indirect argument in the 
“Transcendental Dialectic”, where he suggests that the truth of transcendental idealism follows 
from the impossibility of otherwise escaping the antimonies of pure Reason.80 
In the “Transcendental Aesthetic”, Kant comes up with the metaphysical and 
transcendental deductions of the a priority of space and time. In the metaphysical deduction, he 
claims that space cannot be derived from experience since it is already presupposed in 
distinguishing sensations as being different and at different places.81 Within the transcendental 
deduction, Kant establishes the a priori nature of space from the necessary status of geometrical 
propositions – space needs to be presupposed as a priori if the propositions of geometry are 
necessary.82 Addressing the first argument, Moore acknowledges that Kant indeed proved that 
                                                 
77 There, Moore describes the “modern idealism”, without any further specifications, broadly as a claim that 
“esse est percipi”, i.e. that being of something amounts to its being perceived, see Moore, 1903b, p. 436ff. 
78 It might be objected, though, from the perspective of Kantian advocates, that Moore is wrong in the very 
core of his criticism since the conditions of human cognition are not subjective in a sense of being merely 
subjective. They are supposed to be intersubjectively valid as well and in this sense, they are also objective, i.e. 
valid for all our possible cognition of the objects. 
79 For the metaphysical and transcendental arguments regarding the a priori character of space and time see 
“Transcendental Aesthetic” in CPR, §§1-8; for the argument regarding the application of categories to sensibly 
given see “Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding”, CPR, §§13-27. 
80 Ibid., A490/B518-A497/B525. 
81 Ibid., A23/B38. 
82 Ibid., B40-41. 
  
24 
 
“space is logically prior to the objects of experience”83 and this logical priority may be even 
equated with a priority, but, Moore claims, Kant did not succeed in proving that space is 
subjective, i.e. he did not prove that space is a condition of our possibility of cognition. 
In the argument from geometry, Moore distinguishes a similar slide from the logical 
priority to the subjective nature of space – it may be allowed that Kant proved that space is a 
logically prior condition of geometrical propositions, but he did not thereby prove that it is a 
condition of human cognition of geometrical propositions, i.e. that it “has the seat in the 
subject”.84 It is true, however, as Baldwin and Preti point out, that Moore does not go into much 
detail concerning Kant’s treatment of the notions of space and particularly of time and that his 
denouncement of Kant’s arguments is therefore “rather abrupt”.85 
As for the transcendental deduction of categories, Moore does not go into particular 
detail either, but he pays attention to the issue he is interested in, namely to the role of a priority 
and subjectivity in the deduction. In this context, he notes that the subjectivity of the categories 
is merely presupposed, and not proved, by the deduction, its aim being to prove that categories 
as subjective conditions of human understanding are also objective conditions for the cognition 
of an object.86 Therefore, both in the “Transcendental Aesthetic” and “Transcendental 
Analytic”, Moore concludes, Kant does not keep the promise from the “Preface” to the Critique 
of Pure Reason to argue for the subjectivity of our cognitive capacities.87 
Finally, Moore is persuaded that Kant does not score any better in the “Transcendental 
                                                 
83 Baldwin and Preti, 2011, p. 143. 
84 Kant, CPR, B41. 
85 Baldwin and Preti, 2011, Introduction, lx. Arguments concerning time are not discussed by Moore at all; 
however, in this approach he may be claimed to follow Kant himself who devoted more attention to the arguments 
concerning space even if time will become gradually essential, within the “Schematism of Pure Concepts of the 
Understanding” (A137/B176-A147/B187) in the treatment of the application of categories to the sensible manifold 
given in the inner sense. As for Moore, we may presume that he might have proceeded in a following fashion: the 
fact that time cannot be derived from experience since every experience is perceivable merely in time (A30/B46) 
and that the concepts of “alteration” and “motion” are possible merely “through and in the representation of time” 
(A32/B48) might be said to prove logical priority, but not the subjective nature of time (its seat in human 
subjectivity). 
86 Baldwin and Preti 2011, pp. 145-146. 
87 The place from the “Preface” to which Moore refers as the place where Kant puts forward the promise of 
explaining the possibility of a priori knowledge based on the contribution of our cognitive capacities is the section 
about metaphysics (Bxiv-Bxviii), and particularly Bxvi: “Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition 
must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that 
would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do 
not get further with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, 
which would agree better with requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish 
something about objects before they are given to us.” 
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Dialectic”. Kant there attempts to prove, in the “Antinomies of Pure Reason”, that 
contradictions in our conception of reality result from the fact that we apply the notion of 
unconditionality – which belongs properly only to things in themselves – to mere appearances.88 
Moore agrees that we may indeed make contradictory claims about the objects of our 
experience, but is unwilling to accept Kant’s diagnosis that we in that case confuse mere 
appearances with things in themselves. Instead, Moore argues, the confusion may simply arise 
from our predicating upon one object what is true of another. “Nothing”, Moore says, “is gained 
[…] by the assumption that the one sort [of things] is appearance, or conditioned by our 
subjectivity.”89 
Ultimately, however, Moore’s arguments against Kant’s “Copernican revolution” in 
epistemology do not seem to me to be satisfactory. This is largely because Moore only shows 
that Kant fails to provide proof for the transcendental nature of categories and forms of intuition 
and for the distinction between mere appearance and things in themselves, and not that such a 
proof cannot be provided.90 But it is obvious that Moore himself took his demonstrations as 
sufficient to show that categories and forms of intuition are indeed non-subjective and he 
proceeded to further undermine the foundations of Kant’s epistemology. 
In further demolishing these foundations, Moore pays attention to the most basic 
underpinning and the highest point of human cognition, namely the unity of transcendental 
apperception in which all representations must be encompassed if one is to obtain an objectively 
valid cognition of an object. Granting the denial of the subjectivity of supposed forms of 
intuition (space and time) and categories, an attack on the unity of apperception does not seem 
particularly arduous: to assert the existence and essential role of the unity of transcendental 
apperception seems appropriate only if we have initially established that representations are 
given to us merely by means of subjectively conceived forms of intuition and categories, since 
in this case, the unity of apperception may indeed serve as the highest point which unifies the 
representations into the cognition of an object.91 
Once the transcendental status of categories, space and time has been rejected, it is not 
surprising that also the notion of synthesis follows their lead – Moore criticises Kant for 
                                                 
88 Kant, CPR, A506/B534. 
89 Baldwin and Preti 2011, p. 152. 
90 For a similar observation see Hylton, 1990, p. 118. 
91 Baldwin and Preti, 2011, p. 147. 
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describing synthesis in active terms as an operation, since synthesis for Moore does not 
represent anything active, but amounts to “a mere name for the necessary connection of two 
disparate elements”.92 And similarly, Moore also considers it misleading to call understanding 
a “faculty” and categories “functions”.93 For him, the ideality of space and time, categories as 
functions of the understanding, synthesis which brings representations into the unity of 
apperception and this unity itself belong jointly to an explanation which is, at best, able to 
describe the process of cognition, but not its truth or falsity, which is the topic proper for 
epistemology.94 
The accusation of psychologizing instead of doing a proper epistemology is Moore’s 
final verdict on the reputedly unacceptable parts of Kant’s epistemological edifice: the unity of 
apperception, together with the transcendentally ideal nature of space, time and forms of 
judgment (categories) need to be rejected as of a merely marginal, psychological importance, 
while the acceptable epistemological considerations must be confined to categories, space and 
time as logically prior, yet non-subjective elements. “Epistemology” according to Moore 
amounts to “the science which investigates the nature of truth”, not a science concerning the 
process of cognition.95 Moore intends his epistemology proper, since it is not a theory of 
cognition, to avoid the irrelevant causal considerations he claims Kant focused on – which 
properly belong to “empirical psychology”96 – and to concern itself instead with the truth and 
falsity of mind-independent propositions. 
According to Moore, what Kant actually proved is that space, time and categories as 
logically prior elements are present in (almost) every proposition: “some categories”, namely 
the categories of substance and attribute or cause and effect, “are”, according to Moore, 
                                                 
92 Ibid., p. 153. Moore attempts to argue for this point even from within the Kantian framework, claiming 
that Kant cannot assert that synthesis may be described as an operation since operation (Handlung) is a conception 
deduced from a category of cause (CPR, B82) and cannot thus serve as a label for something prior to it, i.e. for the 
synthesis as an act which employs the categories. However, this accusation should also explain whether the dual 
use, i.e. both categorical and precategorical, is possible to be employed in the case of the “unity” (as a category 
and the unity of consciousness). 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid., pp. 147-148.  
95 Ibid., p. 150. As Moore points out, when we are interested in the truth of a proposition, we do not need 
to be concerned with the process of cognition at all: “But there remains a question which Kant does not seem to 
ask himself. Are we here concerned at all with knowledge? Will it not be sufficient for our purpose, if we can find 
out what is true?” (Ibid., p. 147). However, the accusation of the excessive psychologism which lies at the very 
bottom of Moore’s criticism need not be accepted by Kantians who may strike back by pointing out that 
transcendental philosophy is not a psychological explanation, i.e. it is not an attempt to explain our psychological 
processes, but the transcendental conditions of the possibility of knowledge. 
96 Ibid., p. 156. 
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“involved in every judgement”.97 And he adds that “[t]he validity and necessity of these 
[categories], as logically presupposed in empirical judgements, would seem to be capable of 
proof from the mere consideration of such judgements”, i.e. without the detour through the 
psychological, subjective explanations.98 
Within Moore’s epistemology of mind-independent propositions, the notion of logically 
prior elements initially plays an important role. However, the problem is that Moore never really 
explains what these “logically prior elements” actually amount to. Preti and Baldwin mention 
that the concept of logical priority “is not explained but seems to involve what Moore elsewhere 
calls ʻlogical presupposition’”.99 However, it might be objected that the notion of “logical 
presupposition” stays in the very same need of explanation as “logical priority”. The reluctance 
on Moore’s side to provide a definition of logical priority is evident also in his article 
“Necessity” from 1900 in which this notion reemerges. Here, Moore initially contends that it 
would be “desirable” to be clear about the notion of logical priority and he indicates that the 
relation of logical priority might be approached by the claim that “one proposition is 
presupposed, or implied, or involved in another”.100 But he subsequently gives up on definition, 
pointing out elusively that “it needs, I think, only to be seen in any instance, in order to be 
recognized”.101 
Eventually, it is merely clear that these logical prior elements or logical presuppositions 
are non-subjective components which are supposed to be present in most of the propositions 
and probably themselves have the shape of propositions.102 And we can also grasp from 
Moore’s discussion of these elements that they have a close relation to necessity: as evident 
from Kant’s famous distinction between empirical and a priori judgements in the 
“Introduction” to the Critique of Pure Reason, necessity is, together with strict universality, 
                                                 
97 Ibid., p. 147. “What Kant really shows [in the transcendental deduction] is that space and time and the 
categories are involved in particular propositions; and this work is of greater value than a deduction from the 
possibility of experience would have been” (Ibid., p. 171). 
98 Ibid. 
99 Baldwin and Preti, 2011, Introduction, ix. 
100 Moore, 1900, p. 300. 
101 Ibid., p. 301. 
102 This is indicated by the fact that Moore claims that any condition which would be necessary for the truth 
of some proposition would probably need to have a form of another proposition: “it is difficult to see that there 
can be any other condition for a true proposition than some other true proposition” (Baldwin and Preti 2011, p. 
156). Then, logical presuppositions could have, for instance, the form of “something is a substance, attribute, cause 
or effect”. Also, the notions of space and time would probably need to be formulated in the form of propositions. 
But Moore does not provide any details here. 
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defined as an unerring mark of a priori cognition.103 Considerations about necessity, and to a 
much lesser degree, of universality, also form a framework for Moore’s discussion of his 
logically prior elements.104 But again, in Moore’s discussion, the connection between logical 
priority and necessity offers more problems than solutions. 
Moore claims that logical presuppositions are contained in all propositions105 and he, 
surprisingly, proceeds to argue that this leads to all propositions themselves being necessary.106 
While initially this necessity is grounded upon the fact that all propositions include at least 
some logical presuppositions, Moore subsequently de-emphasises this point, claiming instead 
that propositions are necessary because they are atemporally, i.e. always, valid.107 And 
eventually, this feature of necessity loses its importance as well and Moore ends up contending 
that propositions are necessary because they include necessity as one of their elements.108 
Contrary to initial appearances, necessity based on logical presuppositions is thus eventually 
entirely unimportant to Moore’s project of proving the necessity of propositions. A partial 
evidence for this loss of importance may be gathered from the historical fact, brought to light 
by Baldwin, that Moore abandoned the notion of logical presuppositions almost immediately 
after submitting his dissertation.109 
Moore’s peculiar discussion of necessity can thus serve, rather than as a precisely 
defined argumentation, as a demonstration of his struggle to introduce, within the confines of 
Kantian epistemological framework, the notion of a proposition considered as a necessary 
connection of concepts, independent of being judged.110 The truth of thus conceived proposition 
                                                 
103 Kant, CPR, B3-B4. 
104 Baldwin and Preti, 2011, p. 135. The argument here is not very clear though. A more comprehensible 
rejection of universality as a distinguishing mark of a priority is provided in the article “Necessity” where Moore 
argues that some propositions, namely mathematical equations (“5+7=12”), are necessary but not universal 
(Moore, 1900, p. 298). 
105 More precisely, he argues that time is contained in absolutely all propositions, space in most of them and 
categories in many of them (see e.g. Baldwin and Preti, 2011, p. 172). 
106 “All that exists is thus composed of concepts necessarily related to one another in specific manners […]” 
(Ibid., p. 167).  
107 Ibid., p. 171.  
108 Ibid., pp. 171-173.  
109 Baldwin, T. (2014). Moore’s Rejection of Idealism. In: R. Rorty, ed., Philosophy in History: Essays on 
the Historiography of Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., pp. 357-374, pp. 362-363. 
110 The move from the notion of a “judgement” to that of a “proposition” is explained and justified at the 
beginning of the second chapter of the Dissertation where Moore notes that both “mental formulation” and “an 
actual expression in words” should be excluded entirely from the notion of a “proposition” (Baldwin and Preti, 
2011, p. 161). In this context, the notion of a “judgement” is discarded as useless straightaway since “it does not 
only denote a mental event, and hence implies activity still more openly, but is also commonly used as the name 
of a mental faculty” (Baldwin and Preti, 2011, p. 161).  
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should be independent of our knowing whether the proposition is true or not.111 So far, however, 
Moore does not provide us with any sufficient argument to support this contention. He does, 
however, attempt to do so in the second chapter of his Dissertation whose essential parts were 
used to put together the article “The Nature of Judgment”. There, Moore attempts to come up 
with at least two arguments for his notion of a mind-independent proposition which I will 
discuss in the following section. 
2.2 Proposition and Its Truth 
Moore employs several arguments which are supposed to ground his concept of a 
proposition. The first argument appears as early as the first page of his article “The Nature of 
Judgment” and is directed against Bradley’s conception of meaning of a judgement. I will 
attempt to demonstrate here that this argumentation is unsuccessful for two main reasons. Based 
on its failure, Moore is in need of a more convincing argument, and I will subsequently claim 
that this is hidden in Moore’s regressive line of argumentation from the end of the same article, 
which as I will explain revolves around the notions of truth and existence, and the criticism of 
a correspondence theory of truth. 
2.2.1 The Argument against Abstractionism 
While the first chapter of Moore’s Dissertation introduces the notion of a proposition as 
emerging from his criticism of Kant’s concept of a judgement, the second chapter is clearly 
devoted to the additional agenda of explaining the proper nature of the proposition. As Moore 
indeed claims in the very first sentence of the second chapter “[t]he present chapter is intended 
to expound and support the ultimate philosophical position, which was presupposed in the last 
chapter”.112 “Our object”, Moore adds, “will be now to show that, whatever name be given to 
it, that which we call a proposition is something independent of consciousness, and something 
of fundamental importance for philosophy”.113 
The position presupposed (but definitely not properly argued for) in the first chapter 
was not merely that the proposition is “something independent of consciousness”, but that it 
enjoys this independence because it is an entity located within the world. The first argument 
                                                 
111 Ibid., p. 148. For the importance of this point about the truth of a proposition being independent of 
proposition’s being an object of consciousness see also Ibid., Introduction, lxi. 
112 Ibid, p. 161. 
113 Ibid., pp. 161-162. 
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that Moore employs in the second chapter, which subsequently forms the famous opening of 
“The Nature of Judgment”, is the criticism of Bradley’s concept of ideas and meanings. I will 
look into it in more detail and investigate whether it presents a persuasive argument which may 
serve as a foundation for Moore’s intended conception of a proposition. 
Moore chooses for his analysis the introductory sentence from Bradley’s 1883 book The 
Principles of Logic, namely that “[t]ruth and falsehood depend on the relation of our ideas to 
reality”.114 He then goes on to introduce some details of Bradley’s conception of ideas and 
meanings in order to subject it eventually to the criticism related to incorrect abstractionism. 
Ideas as employed in judgements, Moore observes, do not amount in Bradley’s Principles to 
the ideas as mental occurrences, but to general, universal entities. However, these ideas used in 
judgement have initially been acquired from ideas as mental occurrences conceived by a 
process in which existence of the mental ideas was disregarded, and only (parts of) their 
contents were retained. Ideas in judgements are identified with meanings, “meaning” being 
famously defined by Bradley as consisting “of a part of the content [of mental idea] cut off, 
fixed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of a sign”.115 An idea in judgement 
thus consists in (part of) the content of a mental idea, disregarding its particular existence as 
mental occurrence. 
It has been observed that Bradley himself intended his theory of meaning to serve as a 
criticism and subsequent alternative to the empiricists’ conception of ideas and judgements, 
according to which judgement consists of ideas considered as mental phenomena, i.e. as 
occurrences which appear in a particular mind at a particular time.116 Bradley rejects this 
position, contending that ideas in judgement cannot be conceived of as particular mental 
occurrences, since they need to present something with universality and generality.117 On this 
basis, he introduces his previously summarized account of ideas in judgements as derived from 
mental ideas by disregarding their existence. Moore indeed acknowledges the legitimacy of 
Bradley’s criticism in this respect: Bradley’s notion of an idea in judgement as a “universal 
meaning” appears to Moore “conclusive, as against those, of whom there have been too many, 
                                                 
114 Bradley, F. H. (1883). The Principles of Logic, 2 Volumes. London: Kegan Paul, Book. I, Chapter I. §2, 
p. 6. 
115 Ibid., §4, 4. 
116 For further details concerning Bradley’s criticism of empiricist theory of judgement, see Hylton, P. 
(1990). Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 59-64. 
117 Bradley, 1883, §4, p. 7ff. An idea as a symbol “[n]o longer can be said to exist for its own sake, its 
individuality is lost in its universal meaning”, in: Ibid., p. 8. 
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who have treated the idea as a mental state”.118 However, Bradley is not finally safe from 
Moore’s criticism either, since despite his diagnosis of the empiricist view, Moore considers 
Bradley’s conception of ideas in judgements to be “infected by the same error as theirs [i.e. as 
empiricists’]”.119 
Moore’s criticism, based on which he denounces Bradley’s account as similarly liable 
to misconceived notion of meaning as empiricists’, targets the process by which the ideas as 
employed in judgements are gathered from the ideas as mental occurrences. In this process, 
Moore founds the infinite regress which in his eyes eventually discredits Bradley’s notion of 
ideas as meanings. This regress is generated, Moore contends, within Bradley’s above-
summarized description of ideas in judgments as universal meanings which are derived from 
ideas as mental occurrences. Regress arises, Moore is persuaded, in this process because in 
order to know the content of the idea employed in judgement, I already need to know the idea 
as mental occurrence from which this content is to be taken over into the idea used in judgement. 
However, and this is the crucial step of the argument, to know the idea as mental occurrence, 
from which the idea in judgement is derived, is to produce a judgement about this idea, i.e. I 
need to have some previous idea about this idea as mental occurrence.120 
Moore’s thought behind this is that I need to have some knowledge of the idea, from 
which I intend to preserve only (part of) its content in the idea within judgement.121 This step 
however leads according to Moore immediately to an infinite regress since in order to know the 
content of the initial idea as a mental occurrence, I need to employ another idea related to this 
content, while the content of this further idea is again only cognized by means of another idea 
etc. ad infinitum.122 Eventually, thus, I would need to be in possession of an infinite number of 
“psychological judgements”, i.e. judgements about my mental ideas, and the impossibility of 
this infinite “psychological knowledge” disproves the theory, since if accepted, we would need 
to claim that we have no knowledge at all, since we got stuck at the unattainable knowledge of 
judgements in the realm of mental ideas.123 
                                                 
118 Baldwin and Preti, 2011, pp. 162-163. 
119 Ibid., p. 163. 
120 Ibid., p. 164. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
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The regress Moore describes can be thus summarized as follows: 
1. In order to know the content of the idea in judgement (meaning), I need to know the 
 content of the mental idea (MI1) from which the idea in judgement has been derived. 
2. But to know the content of this mental idea, I need to produce another mental idea 
(MI2) about this content. 
3. But to know the content of this other mental idea (MI2), I need to produce another 
 mental  idea (MI3) etc. ad infinitum. 
Moore thus interpreters Bradley as advocating a “refined psychologism”124 and 
abstractionism, according to which the idea in judgement is an abstraction, cut off, and thus 
abstracted, from the mental idea. Based on that, Bradley is, according to Moore, susceptible to 
the same philosophical mistake of grounding his theory of judgment on the notion of mental 
ideas as the empiricists, who came under his own criticism. Moore’s commentators Preti and 
Baldwin present Moore’s argument as “a somewhat unsatisfactory episode”,125 which echoes 
Baldwin previous similarly dismissive treatment of Moore’s criticism.126 This may seem 
appropriate since Bradley himself expressly stated his discontent with Moore’s rendering of his 
argument in a letter to Moore. There, Bradley pointed out that he did not intend to claim that 
we are in need of a particular psychological judgement in our derivation of an idea in judgement 
from a mentally conceived idea.127 
On the other hand, I think that Moore is right in claiming that Bradley’s theory indeed 
is unintuitive: “[i]t is”, as he states, “difficult to suppose that knowledge can be explained as 
the attribution of a part of a content, of the whole of which I am ex hypothesi utterly ignorant”.128  
It is indeed difficult to imagine that we know the content of some idea, but not the idea from 
which it has been derived. However, Bradley still could have opposed that the exposition of 
                                                 
124  Baldwin, T. (1999). G. E. Moore – The Arguments of Philosophers. London and New York: Routledge, 
p. 14 
125 Baldwin and Preti, 2011, Introduction, xxviii. 
126 Baldwin, 1999, p. 14. 
127 In this letter, Bradley writes that “[t]he ﬁrst [argument] seems to be that the separation of meaning from 
existence required for judgement presupposes a previous judgement. Well certainly it may do so – a psychological 
judgement, that is, but then again it may not and often does not ... I suppose that my phrase ‘cut off’ etc. has been 
taken to imply a going about to cut off and therefore a previous idea. I never meant this ... But I admit my language 
was loose”. Bradley’s letter is to be found in Moore’s Archive in Cambridge University Library (Add. MS 8830 
8B/21/1) and is here quoted from Baldwin and Preti, 2011, Introduction, xxix. 
128 Baldwin and Preti, 2011, p. 164. 
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unintuitiveness does not amount to the refutation of the theory.129 
Essential, however, is the fact that even if Moore had succeeded in disproving Bradley’s 
theory, he would still had not achieved his main goal: to demonstrate that a proposition is a 
mind-independent entity located in the world. To arrive at this conclusion, he still is in need of 
an argument designed directly to ground this notion of a proposition. And it is precisely this 
kind of argument, I believe, that Moore presents in the concluding parts of “The Nature of 
Judgment”, toward which I will turn my attention now. 
2.2.2 The Argument Against Correspondence Theory 
To prove that “the world is formed of concepts”130, Moore employs an argument aimed 
at exposing the infinite regress involved in the attempt to define the truth of a proposition based 
on the relation of a correspondence. On the basis of this argument, he wishes to show that it is 
his own conception, i.e. the concept of a proposition as a part of the world, which presents the 
only correct way to account for the nature of a proposition and its truth. In many respects, 
Moore’s argument, and especially its first part, is strikingly similar to more famous, even if 
chronologically later argument against the possibility of defining truth which Frege formulated 
at the beginning of his article “Der Gedanke” (“The Thought”).131 I will here introduce Moore’s 
argument alongside Frege’s, mainly because Frege’s rendition of the argument is much more 
comprehensible than Moore’s quite obscure account. I hope that by using Frege’s rendition of 
the argument, I also will shed some more light on Moore’s version of it. 
In what follows, we will see that in both philosophers the argument has two parts. The 
first attempts to show that the truth of a judgement or a proposition is indefinable by means of 
the notion of a correspondence (of our ideas or judgements and their referents) and the second 
one is designed to prove that truth (of a judgement or a proposition) is not definable at all. 
While the first part of the argument is, I will claim, similar in Moore and Frege, in the second 
part, Moore proceeds in a radically different way than Frege to show that truth is an undefinable 
                                                 
129 The very same move, i.e. the reluctance to conclude from the difficulty of some theory to its inaccuracy, 
is employed by Moore when criticising Kant’s notion of space, see Baldwin and Preti, 2011, p. 144. And also, the 
same kind of objection may be used against Moore’s own criticism of Kant, since we may point out that the fact 
that Kant did not prove the subjective nature of a priori presuppositions does not automatically mean it cannot be 
proved. 
130 Baldwin and Preti, 2011, p. 168.  
131 Frege, G. (1918). Der Gedanke. Eine logische Untersuchung. Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen 
Idealismus, I, pp. 58—77. Trans. as Frege, G. The Thought. (1997). In: M. Beaney, ed., The Frege Reader, Oxford: 
Blackwell, pp. 325-345. 
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notion – for Moore, the notion of truth as undefinable is intertwined with the concept of a 
proposition as a part of the world. 
To begin with, let’s concentrate on what I take to be the first part of both Frege’s and 
Moore’s arguments, namely their criticism of the definition of truth in terms of a 
correspondence theory. At the beginning of the article “The Thought”, Frege considers whether 
it is possible to define truth of a thought based on its correspondence with reality, and proceeds 
by arguing against this possibility. To begin with, Frege claims that there is no such thing as a 
complete or perfect correspondence between a thought on the one side and reality on the 
other.132 If there were, the supposed correspondence would collapse into an identity.133 
Frege presumes here something which could be very well denied by the proponents of 
a correspondence theory, namely that correspondence allows gradation, i.e. that there can be 
less or more perfect level of correspondence, while there cannot be any levels of truth.134 On 
this assumption, it indeed seems that the truth of a thought cannot reside in its correspondence 
with reality, since the thought has to be true or false but, at the same time, it can only imperfectly 
corresponds to reality, since the complete correspondence would amount to its identity with 
reality. There is, however, another option to be considered, namely that truth of a thought would 
reside in a partial correspondence with reality – in this event, we could say that a thought is true 
if it corresponds to reality in a certain respect.135 And it is precisely this modified version of a 
correspondence theory that Frege attacks in his famous argument, which runs as follows: 
“Truth does not admit of more or less. – But could we not maintain that there 
is truth when there is correspondence in a certain respect [in einer gewissen 
Hinsicht]? But which respect? For in that case what ought we to do so as to 
decide whether something is true? We should have to inquire whether it is true 
that an idea and a reality, say, correspond in the specified respect. And then 
we should be confronted by a question of the same kind, and the game could 
begin again. So the attempted explanation of truth as correspondence breaks 
down.”136 
To summarize the argument, let’s begin with the presumption that we can define the 
                                                 
132 Frege initially (Ibid., pp. 326-327) formulates the argument for “an idea” or “a picture”, but he eventually 
adds that the same holds for a thought as well (Ibid., p. 328). 
133 Ibid., p. 327. 
134 For the possible criticism, see Dodd, J. (2000). An Identity Theory of Truth. London: MacMillan., p. 117. 
135 In this case, both truth and partial correspondence would be something that do not allow gradation and 
proposition’s truth could thus amount to this partial correspondence. 
136 Frege, 1918, p. 327; emphasis in the original. 
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truth of a thought and that we can do so in terms of a correspondence.137 In that case, the 
definition of truth of a thought would be as follows: “a thought is true iff it corresponds to 
reality (in a certain respect)”. Thus, to enquire whether a thought is true amounts to enquiring 
whether it corresponds to reality. But to enquire whether it corresponds to reality, we have to 
enquire whether it is true that it corresponds to reality, i.e whether the thought that the thought 
corresponds to reality corresponds to reality etc. ad infinitum. 
We may schematically summarize the argument as follows: 
Definition of truth of a thought: 
t is true iff t is C (“t” standing for a thought; “C” standing for “corresponding to reality”) 
(a) to decide whether t is true, one must decide whether t is C. 
(b) to decide whether t is C, one must decide whether it is true that t is C, i.e. whether 
the thought that t is C is C. 
(c) to decide whether the the thought that t is C is C is to decide whether it is true that 
the thought that t is C is C, i.e. whether the thought that the thought that t is C is C is C. 
etc. ad infinitum.138 
Alternatively, we may also render Frege’s argument as pointing out the circularity in 
the definition of truth. In this case, the argument states that when we accept the definition of 
truth of a thought in terms of correspondence, we can always ask, in any case in which this 
definition is used, whether it is true that this definition holds and, thus, we will be moving in a 
circle, since the definiendum (t is true) is presupposed in the definiens (t is C). 139   
                                                 
137 I switched here from the “idea” mentioned in the previous quotation to the “thought” – for the explanation, 
see note 132. 
138 For various renderings of this argument as regressive see Kremer, M. (2000). Judgment and Truth in 
Frege. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 38(4), pp. 549-581, p. 553; Dummett, M. (1973). Frege – Philosophy 
of Language. London: Duckworth, pp. 442-443; Carruthers, P. (1981). Frege’s Regress, Proceeding of the 
Aristotelian Society, 82, pp. 17-32, p. 17; Soames, S. (1999). Understanding Truth. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 25. 
139 This rending of the argument is less widespread, but is present, for instance, in the summary of the 
argument by Verena Mayer: “[w]hatever criterion of truth we would accept, in any special case we have to ask if 
it is true that the criterion can be applied and so ‘we should by going round in the circle’”; “if we would stipulate 
that truth consists in a congruence between thought and reality, or representation and represented object, we would 
have to decide in a concrete case if the congruence holds, and thus the definition would be circular” (Mayer, V. 
(2007). Evidence, Judgment and Truth. In: D. Greimann, ed., Essays on Frege’s Conception of Truth, Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, pp. 175-197, p. 178 and 193). 
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Schematically, the argument looks as follows: 
Definition of truth of a thought: 
t is true iff t is C (“t” standing for a thought; “C” standing for “corresponding to reality”) 
(a) in every particular use of this definition, we need to ask whether this definition holds, 
i.e. whether it is true that t is true iff t is C. 
(b) the definition is thus circular since the definiendum (t is true) is presupposed in the 
definiens (t is C). 
The presence of the regress or, in the alternative reading, of the circularity in the 
definition of truth leads Frege to the conclusion that the definition of truth in terms of 
correspondence is unattainable. But, moreover, he additionally claims that any attempt to define 
truth is bound to failure as well. For this, a slightly different argument is needed: 
“And any other attempt to define truth also breaks down. For in a definition 
certain characteristics [gewisse Merkmale] would have to be specified. And in 
application to any particular case the question would always arise whether it 
were true that the characteristics were present. So we should be going round 
in a circle [So drehte man sich im Kreise].”140 
Here again, let’s begin with the presupposition that we can define the truth of a thought. 
Now, we do not attempt to define it in terms of correspondence, but we only suppose that truth 
can be somehow defined by claiming that for a thought to be true, it has to have certain (further 
unspecified) characteristics. In that case, the definition of truth would be as follows: “a thought 
is true iff it has certain characteristics”. To inquire into whether a thought is true amounts to the 
investigation of whether it has those characteristics. But to inquire into whether it has those 
characteristics, we have to investigate whether it is true that it has those characteristics, i.e 
whether the thought that the thought has certain characteristics has certain characteristics etc. 
 
 
 
                                                 
140 Frege, 1918, p. 327, emphasis in the original. This argument is rendered as regressive by those who prefer 
the regressive reading of the first argument. Generally, also, both arguments are rendered as one argument or as 
the same reasoning (Dummett, 1973, pp. 442-443, Carruthers, 1981, p. 17).  
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Again, the argument may be summarized as follows: 
Definition of truth of a thought: 
t is true iff t has C (“C” standing for “certain characteristics”) 
(a) to decide whether t is true, one must decide whether t has C. 
(b) to decide whether t has C, one must decide whether it is true that t has C, i.e. whether 
the thought that t has C has C. 
(c) to decide whether the thought that t has C has C is to decide whether it is true that 
the thought that t has C has C, i.e. whether the thought that the thought that t has C has 
C has C etc. ad infinitum. 
Or again, if we interpret the argument as pointing out the circularity in definition, it 
states that when we accept any definition of truth of a thought, we can ask in any case of its 
usage whether it is true that this definition holds: 
Definition of truth of a thought: 
t is true iff t has C (“t” standing for a thought; “C” standing for “certain characteristics”) 
(a) in every particular use of this definition, we need to ask whether this definition holds, 
i.e. whether it is true that t is true iff t has C. 
(b) the definition is circular since the definiendum (t is true) is presupposed in the 
definiens (t has C). 
Thus, Frege concludes, based on the two arguments presented, that the content of the 
word “true” is unique and indefinable (einzigartig und undefinierbar).141 
There are thus two arguments in Frege against the possibility of defining truth – against 
its definition in terms of correspondence (of a thought with reality) and against its definition 
tout court. In Moore’s “The Nature of Judgement”, I will argue, we can find two arguments, or 
                                                 
141 Frege, 1918, p. 327. Frege’s arguments against the possibility of defining truth have been subject to many 
critical assessments. The main line of the interpretative engagement with the regressive form of the arguments is 
due to Dummett (1973, p. 443ff.) and is repeated, in a similar fashion, by Soames (1999, pp. 26-27) and Künne 
(2003, p. 131). Dummett claims that Frege’s regressive argument did not prove the impossibility of any definition 
of truth, but succeeded (only) in proving that any admissible definition of truth is subject to certain constraints. 
These constraints are, Dummett claims, encapsulated in the “equivalence thesis”, i.e. in the claim that “it is true 
that t” is equivalent to “t”. The point of this claim resides in the fact that “t” and “it is true that t” are considered 
as logically equivalent (i.e. as having the same sense) whereby the infinite regress is effectively avoided. 
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two sections of one argument, as well. I will attempt to show here that their intention may be 
comprehended as similar to Frege’s: both Frege and Moore proceed from the argument against 
a correspondence theory of truth to the critique of any attempt to define truth. The difference to 
be found in the arguments resides primarily in their second parts, which attempt to prove that 
truth is completely undefinable. Let’s thus proceed to an inquiry into both Moore’s arguments. 
The first argument reads as follows: 
“It is […] impossible that truth should depend on a relation to existents or to 
an existent, since the proposition by which it is so defined must itself be true, 
and the truth of this can certainly not be established, without a vicious circle, 
by exhibiting its dependence on an existent.”142 
What is discussed here is the impossibility of defining truth of a proposition in terms of 
the dependence of this truth on a relation to an existent or existents.143 And it is claimed that 
this truth is undefinable in this fashion since the proposition by which it would have been so 
defined would have needed, itself, to be true, while this truth cannot be further established 
without a vicious circle. Let’s thus again begin by asking what the definition would be if, per 
impossibile, truth of a proposition could be defined. Then, a proposition p would be true iff it 
had a relation to an existent. We thus have a definition of truth claiming that “p is true iff p has 
a relation to an existent (pRe)”. I suggest that the “it” in the sentence “the proposition by which 
it is so defined” amounts to the truth of p, while the whole “proposition by which it is so 
defined” amounts to the definiens “p has a relation to an existent”. If so, the subsequent step of 
the argument is very similar to Frege’s: the definiens (“p has a relation to an existent”) must 
itself be true. 
At this point, we may use Frege’s above-summarized argument to disentangle Moore's 
argumentation. Frege would conclude that the definition of truth (of a thought in his case, or of 
a proposition in Moore's) is circular, since the definiendum (“p is true”) is already presupposed 
in the definiens (“p has a relation to an existent”). Moore claims that definiens (pRe) must itself 
be true and that “the truth of this [definiens] can certainly not be established, without a vicious 
circle, by exhibiting its dependence on an existent”. Thus, Moore claims, it includes a vicious 
circle to define truth of the definiens (pRe) by exhibiting its dependence on an existent: it is 
circular to say that “it is true that pRe iff pRe”, since the definiens (pRe) is included in the 
                                                 
142 Baldwin and Preti, 2011, p. 167. 
143 In the context of the critique of correspondence theory, the existents amount to the parts of reality to 
which our judgements refer. 
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definiendum (it is true that pRe).  
Definition of truth of a proposition: 
p is true iff pRe (“p” standing for “a proposition”, “Re” for “having a relation to an 
 existent”) 
(a) to decide whether p is true, one must decide whether pRe. 
(b) to decide whether the proposition has a relation to an existent (pRe), one must decide 
 whether it is true that pRe, i.e. whether the proposition that pRe is itself R-related to e. 
(c) but to establish whether “the proposition that pRe is true” with reference to “pRe” is 
 circular. 
What we thus have so far is Moore’s contention that if we attempt to define the truth of 
a proposition in terms of its dependence on a relation to an existent, we are trapped in the 
circular definition; and therefore truth is not non-circularly definable in this way. I attempted 
to comprehend Moore’s reasoning against the background of Frege’s argument – their similarity 
can be also seen in the fact that Moore´s argument may be rendered as pointing out the regress 
in the attempted definition of truth: 
Definition of truth of a proposition: 
p is true iff pRe 
(a) to decide whether p is true, one must decide whether pRe. 
(b) to decide whether the proposition has a relation to an existent (pRe), one must decide 
 whether it is true that pRe, i.e. whether the proposition that pRe is itself R-related to e. 
(c) to decide whether the proposition that pRe is itself R-related to e, one must decide 
 whether it is true that pRe is itself R-related to e, i.e. whether the the proposition that the 
 pRe is R-related to e is itself R-related to e etc. ad inifinitum. 
 If we observe Moore’s argument from the viewpoint of comparison with Frege’s two-
step argument, we may also very well suppose that what we could expect to follow, if truth is 
to be absolutely undefinable, is the extension of the argument to the effect that no non-circular 
definition of truth is feasible. What Moore offers as the second step of his argument may be 
considered as this extension, but it differs essentially from Frege’s second step. Instead of 
Frege’s criticism of the definition “p is true if p has certain characteristics”, Moore introduces 
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a different kind of regress and circularity. The part of “The Nature of Judgement” which I label 
as the second step of Moore’s argument reads as follows: 
“Our result is then as follows: That a judgement is universally a necessary 
combination of concepts, equally necessary whether it be true or false. That it 
must be either true or false, but that its truth or falsehood cannot depend on its 
relation to anything else whatever, reality, for instance, or the world in space 
and time. For both of these must be supposed to exist, in some sense, if the 
truth of our judgement is to depend upon them; and then it turns out that the 
truth of our judgement depends not on them [on reality or world in time and 
space], but on the judgment that they, being such and such, exist. But this 
judgement cannot, in its turn, depend on anything else, for its truth and 
falsehood: its truth or its falsehood must be immediate properties of its own, 
not dependent upon any relation it may have to something else. And, if this be 
so, we have removed all reason for the supposition that the truth and falsehood 
of other judgements are not equally independent.”144 
What Moore claims here is that the truth (or falsity) of any proposition does not depend 
on reality, but on the proposition that reality exists.145 The truth of this proposition that reality 
exists, however, cannot depend on anything else; truth is rather an “immediate property” of this 
proposition. And all propositions are equally independent of reality, since they all depend only 
on this proposition (that reality exists) which is, in itself, independent of a relation to reality. 
Now an essential question arises about the nature and purpose of the introduction of this 
“ultimate” proposition “that reality exists”. It seems that we have here a regress which arises 
from the fact that even if the truth of any particular proposition does not depend on a particular 
existent, it may depend on reality as a complex of existents. Interpreted in this way, we may 
assert that the second argument serves as the extension of the first argument: we consider the 
truth of a proposition to be dependent on reality and we are thus in a position to have a definition 
“p is true if p depends on reality”. This definition is clearly analogous to the first attempted 
definition, only a particular existent is replaced by the whole of reality. Based on this similarity, 
the regress and also circularity in definition may be generated here: 
 
 
                                                 
144 Baldwin and Preti, 2011, p. 173. 
145 Moore returns here to the notion of a “judgement”, instead of a “proposition”. It may be due to the fact 
that he summarizes the stance he argued for in the whole article and compares it with the initially introduced 
treatment of judgement within an idealist tradition. Also, I render here, for the sake of simplicity, the “reality” and 
the empirical “world” in a space and time simply as broadly conceived “reality” (possibly including both existents 
and beings in Moore’s ontology). 
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Definition of truth of a proposition: 
p is true iff pRr (“Rr” standing for “has  a relation to reality”) 
(a) to decide whether p is true, one must decide whether pRr. 
(b) to decide whether pRr, one must decide whether it is true that pRr, i.e. whether the 
 proposition that pRr is R-related to r. 
Circularity: 
(c1) but to establish whether “the proposition that pRr is true” with reference to “pRr” 
is circular. 
Regress: 
(c2) to decide whether the proposition that pRr is R-relared to r is to decide whether it 
is true  that the proposition that pRr is R-related to r, i.e. whether the proposition that 
the that pRr is  R-related to r is R-related to r etc. ad infinitum. 
In the case of Moore´s first argument, the possibility of defining a proposition’s truth as 
its dependence on a relation to an existent was denied. However, this denial does not seem to 
be sufficient since we are led to another, structurally similar definition of truth (pRr) which 
again leads to circularity in definition and to the regress. Moore however claims that the regress 
and circularity ensuing from the fact that truth would be dependent on a relation to reality (as a 
whole) may be stopped since all propositions depend, in the end, not on reality but on a 
proposition that reality exists. The truth of this proposition (“that reality exists”), however, does 
not depend on anything else, since everything that could possibly ground its truth (the total 
reality) is already internal to it. Thus, the truth of this proposition cannot consist in a relation to 
anything else external to it. 
The crucial point of the argument resides in the startling claim that we may define the 
existence of reality as the proposition that reality exists. The reason for this surprising claim 
rests, in turn, in the fact that by formulating the existence of reality in the form of a proposition, 
we may claim that this proposition is true and that its truth cannot depend on anything else, 
simply because there is nothing left on which its truth would depend, since the whole of reality 
was already captured just by this proposition that reality exists. It is hardly necessary to stress 
that this move of identifying a proposition with reality would be question-begging against the 
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idealist conception Moore is here aiming to refute which distinguish firmly between truth-
bearers (propositions, or judgements) and what makes them true (reality). The identification 
would also be incomprehensible to Frege (as well as to many others). 
The comparison with Frege reveals an important point, namely that no similar 
interruption of an infinite regress seems to be possible within the Fregean framework of 
sentences and thoughts. There seems to be no way of asserting that we can interrupt an infinite 
regress because we have reached the totality of thoughts or sentences. Even if we entertain a 
thought or a sentence that reality exists we can still maintain that the truth of this thought 
depends on the thought that it is true that reality exists. In other words, there is no conceivable 
limit at which we could stop when the regress is generated in the realm of thoughts or sentences, 
simply because we do not consider those realms to be limited in the way we see the world as a 
limited whole. It is thus merely because we consider the world as a limited whole that there 
seems to be a conceivable limit of the regress in case propositions are identified with the 
constituents of reality in the Moorean sense: in this case, we may say that the proposition that 
reality exists almost literally includes the whole of reality and that there is thus nothing 
remaining to underpin the truth of this ultimate proposition that reality exists. Moore thus 
stopped the looming infinite regress by “transforming” reality into the proposition that “reality 
exists”. 
I attempted to summarize Moore’s two arguments which both have one identical aim: 
to prove that a proposition is to be conceived as a mind-independent entity which forms a part 
of the world (or, in the case of the all-embracing proposition that “it is true that reality exists”, 
the world as a whole). Were, however, these arguments persuasive? As I have already pointed 
out, the first argument against Bradley is rather weak: it does not conclusively prove that 
Bradley is wrong (but only that his account is non-trivial or counter-intuitive). Moreover, even 
disregarding this shortcoming, this argument could only show that a proposition is a mind-
independent object of judgement and not that it is to be conceived of as a part of the world. The 
second argument is more promising in this context, since it really ends up with the conclusion 
that a proposition is a worldly entity. Still, even if I consider the second argument as a stronger 
one, there remain difficulties in accepting it, namely the fact that it is very controversial to 
accept the step in which Moore claims that the existence of the world may be reformulated in 
the form of the proposition that the world exists. Moore only asserts that it is possible, but the 
question remains of why such a strange possibility should be allowed for. 
  
43 
 
 
Eventually, then, neither of Moore’s arguments for his notion of a proposition as a mind-
independent part of the world seems to me persuasive. Moreover, there are other problems 
surrounding this notion, most obviously that as Moore presents it, the notion of a proposition is 
extremely vague. What does Moore tell us about propositions? Little more than they may be 
either true or false and that their truth or falsity cannot be defined.146 It seems from Moore’s 
account that a proposition can be formed by any number of constituents (concepts) and a 
relation, while no further details of the propositional composition are provided.147 
This account is extremely undeveloped. We need to ask how it is possible to guarantee 
that the concepts, from which a proposition is composed, are “assembled” into a meaningful 
unity. This is the kind of question that is seriously taken over only by Russell with his 
considerations about propositional constituents (terms) and propositional unity. In the following 
section, I will thus turn to Russell, attempting to show how he enriched Moore’s notion of a 
proposition. I will explain the problems he took over in accepting this peculiar notion and how 
he attempted to overcome them with his gradually changing and evolving conception of 
propositions and judgements.  
                                                 
146 “What kind of relation makes a proposition true, what false, cannot be further defined, but must be 
immediately recognized” (Baldwin and Preti, 2011, p. 166). 
147 This is especially clear from Moore’s sentence to the effect that “[a] proposition is constituted by any 
number of concepts, together with a specific relation between them” (Ibid). 
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3. Russell’s Theory of Judgement 
 
When Russell, in his autobiography, describes his and Moore’s philosophical revolt 
against idealism, he writes that he “[f]elt it, in fact, as a great liberation, as if [he] had escaped 
from a hot-house on to a wind-swept headland”.148 The philosophical core of the revolt Russell 
and Moore initiated may be seen in their notion of a mind-independent proposition which forms 
a part of the world. This notion of a proposition represents a critical stance of both philosophers 
to what they considered an overly mentalistic notion of a judgment presented reputedly by Kant 
and his idealistic followers. The aim of this chapter is first to consider (in 3.1 and 3.2) the 
concept of a proposition Russell brought forward in his attack against idealism and the 
difficulties that it faced. Then secondly, in 3.3, I wish to illuminate the philosophical motives 
for Russell’s abandonment of his early theory of propositions and his subsequent move towards 
his famous multiple relation theory of judgment; and to indicate which difficulties this theory 
faces in turn; and finally to assess how it stands in comparison to Kant’s theory of judgement.  
3.1 Russell and Lotze – Being as Mind-Independent 
While Brentano and his disciples began levelling various criticisms against idealism on 
the Continent, Moore and Russell did the same in Britain. Moore wrote his Dissertation on – 
or rather against – Kantian idealism, while Russell addressed various topics from Kant, an 
absolute idealist F. H. Bradley or by Kantianism partially influenced German philosopher 
Hermann Lotze.149 In the opus magnum of his early period, the Principles of Mathematics, 
Russell, while presenting the German philosopher Hermann Lotze as a Kantian philosopher, 
criticised his concepts of being and existence for being overly mentalistic. 
                                                 
148 Russell, B. (1959a). My Philosophical Development. London and New York: Routledge. Repreinted in 
1995, London: Routledge, p. 48.  
149 For Russell’s discussion of Lotze, see chapter 51 (“Logical Arguments against Points”) in Russell, B. 
(1903). Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in 2010, London: 
Routledge, §§ 423-431; for Kant see Ibid., chapter 52 (“Kant’s Theory of Space”), §§ 432-436; for Bradley Ibid, 
e.g. §§ 47, 51.  However, it is misleading to describe Lotze simply as a Kantian philosopher; his philosophy is 
indeed rooted in the idealist tradition, but was also influenced by other figures, for instance German philosopher 
and psychologist F. Herbart. More precisely, we can define Lotze as an opponent of excessive naturalism popular 
in Germany around the 1950s and several subsequent decades. In it also in this context, that the significance of 
Lotze’s notion of an “objective validity” (die objektive Gültigkeit) becomes apparent; see also footnote 159. For a 
general overview of Lotze’s philosophy see Beiser, F. C. (1913). Late German Idealism: Trendelenburg & Lotze. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 127-131.  
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While Russell followed in Moore’s footsteps by accepting the latter’s notion of a 
proposition, he also offered his own argument against the idealistic account of being as mentally 
dependent. To this end Russell focused his attention on the account of being presented in  
Lotze’s Metaphysics150. There Lotze distinguished between three kinds of being. Firstly, there 
is a kind of being which belongs to the things which exist outside in the world and which interact 
with other things; this is “the existence of a thing which can act”. Secondly, there is a being as 
a “mere validity of truth”. And thirdly, there is being as “the mental representation in us”.151 
When Russell summarizes and argues against Lotze’s conception of being in the chapter 
“Logical Arguments Against Points” in The Principles of Mathematics152, he renders those 
three Lotzean types of being as follows:  
(1) “the being of things, which consists in activity or the power to produce effects”, 
(2) “the validity of a truth” and 
(3) “the being which belongs to the contents of our representations”.153 
In this summary, however, Russell misinterprets the Lotzean initial distinction between 
kinds of being. From many passages in Lotze’s Logic, we know that he ascribes “validity” to 
the contents of our representations.154 Thus, when Lotze labels the second kind of being as “the 
validity of truth”, he is pointing to the being which he ascribes to the ideal contents of our 
representations. Russell, on the other hand, presents the second kind of being vaguely as “the 
mere validity of truth”, while the being of ideal content – “the being which belongs to the 
contents of our representations”, in Russell’s words – is introduced only as the third kind of 
being which Lotze initially described as the being of “mental representation in us”. But Lotze’s 
                                                 
150 Lotze, H. (1879). System der Philosophie: Metaphysik: Drei Bücher. Transl. as Lotze, H. (1884). 
Metaphysics: In Three Books. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
151 Ibid., §109, p. 187. 
152 Russell, 1903, pp. 451-461. 
153 Ibid., §427, p. 455. 
154 See e.g. Lotze, H. (1874). System der Philosophie: Logik; drei Bücher, vom Denken, vom Untersuchen 
und vom Erkennen. Leipzig: Hirzel; transl. as. Lotze, H. (1884). Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, chapter “The 
World of Ideas” (Book III, Ch. 2), particularly §§ 316-321; chapter “Real and Formal Significance of Logical 
Acts” (Book III, Ch. IV), particularly §§338-345 and chapter “The A Priori Truths” (Book III, Ch. V), particularly 
§§346-349. Lotze also speaks about a proposition which is in the way that it holds, i.e. that is valid, see e.g. Lotze’s 
Logik, §316. p. 439. However, propositions are not for Lotze non-mental, objectively existing entities as they are 
for Russell and Moore. For Lotze, propositions are claims about the validity of ideal concepts, see e.g. Ibid., §321, 
p. 448. 
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“mental representation in us” is not supposed to be the ideal content of that representation, since 
that content was already connected with the being as validity. 
Instead the being of mental representations is for Lotze that of mere psychical 
appearances occurring within us. This reading is demonstrated by Lotze’s explicit claim that 
mental representation is “in us”, making it plain that “being in us” is for this kind of being an 
essential characteristic. The ideal contents, whose being was described in the second point, 
might also be described, in a different sense, as ‘in us’, since they are the contents of the 
representations which are “in us”. But this second kind of being (i.e. of the ideal contents) is 
rather peculiar in that even though it is “in us”, it nevertheless has a validity which is 
independent of the particular subjects in which it occurs.155 Thus, while Russell distinguished 
supposedly Lotzean beings (1) of things, (2) of truth and (3) of the contents of our 
representations, we should rather say that those beings are properly described as being (1) of 
things, (2) of the contents of our representations and (3) of the representations as psychological 
occurrences in us. 
The third Lotzean being, i.e. the being of mental representations, is not discussed by 
Russell at all but it is obvious that, if he accepts it at all, he does not ascribe any importance to 
it. Russell simply does not provide any account of the mental activity of judging; he passes over 
this issue in silence. Further on, he concentrates exclusively on a critique of the notion of the 
“content” of an act of judgement (i.e. on Lotze’s second kind of being). The supposed being of 
the contents of mental representations, as Russell introduces the discussion, is “a subject upon 
which there exists everywhere the greatest confusion”.156 The criticism Lotze comes under in 
connection to this is based on Russell’s symptomatic understanding of transcendental idealism 
as a doctrine which claims that we somehow endow with existence the contents of our own 
representations. 
Russell claims that every form of Kantianism includes a characteristic belief, also 
supposedly expressed by Lotze, that the “mind is in some sense creative”, i.e. “that what it 
intuits acquires, in some sense, an existence which it would not have if it were not intuited”.157 
Kantianism itself is therefore characterized by the general presupposition “that propositions 
which are believed solely because the mind is so made that we cannot but believe them may yet 
                                                 
155 Lotze, 1874, §338, p. 479. 
156 Russell, 1903, §427, p. 456. 
157 Ibid. 
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be true in virtue of our belief”.158 This account of transcendentalism is excessively 
subjectivistic, but Russell's arguments against it at least bring us straight to the point of his 
criticism of the Lotzean multivocal conception of being.  
What is essential is Russell’s conviction that the creativity or activity of mind 
emphasized within transcendentalism amounts to the assertion that what is intuited can acquire 
a special kind of existence just by being intuited. The consequence for Russell is that – since 
we can endow something with existence by thinking it – we can claim that what is intuited is 
entitled to the specific kind of existence peculiar to the intuited content. It is only by accepting 
this view, Russell supposes, that Lotze could have come to the conclusion that there is not only 
existence of things in the world, but also of the contents of our mental representations.159 
The core of Russell’s critique is that Lotze is imposing a purportedly exhaustive 
distinction between the temporal existence of real things and the existence of ideal contents 
which neglects what Russell describes as being simpliciter. Specifically, Russell imagines 
Lotze’s train of thought as follows: There is a being which is expressed in the existence of 
external things (Lotze’s first being). But then, we observe that there are some entities which 
nevertheless cannot be conceived of as things which have external, temporal existence: 
“numbers, relations, and many other objects of thought”.160 Since they do not have existence of 
external things, we are forced to suppose, if we want to account for the fact that we nevertheless 
can think them, that they have being due to the fact that we think them: 
“Misled by neglect of being, people have supposed that what does not exist is 
nothing. Seeing that numbers, relations, and many other objects of thought, do 
not exist outside the mind, they have supposed that the thoughts in which we 
think of these entities actually create their own objects.”161 
Russell is nevertheless convinced that this line of thought is unacceptable since the 
conclusion drawn from the temporal non-existence of some things to their mental existence is 
inadmissible – the non-existence of something as an external thing does not imply its 
                                                 
158 Ibid. Cf. also Russell, B. (1900). A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz. London and New 
York: Routledge, 1992, pp. 16-17: “The view, implied in this theory, and constituting a large part of Kant’s 
Copernican revolution, that propositions may acquire truth by being believed […]”. As Russell himself notes in 
the footnote to this summary, he is “aware that this is not an orthodox statement of the Kantian theory” (Ibid., p. 
17). 
159 Russell’s ascription of subjectivism seems to be inappropriate precisely against Lotze who introduced 
into the post-Kantian philosophical discussions to notion of “objective validity” (die objektive Gültigkeit) - see 
Lotze, 1874, especially Book III, chapters 2-4. For the same emphasis see also Schaar, 2013a, p. 9.  
160  Russell, 1903, §427, p. 457. 
161 Ibid., emphasis mine. 
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(in)existence “in the mind” as a (part of) mental content, created somehow by the mind itself. 
On the other hand, however, it is to be admitted that there somehow are such things as relations, 
numbers etc., i.e. entities which we are reluctant to count among “actually existing” things. 
With the introduction of being as an alternative to external existence, the importance of mental 
existence is lost: what does not exist, nonetheless is, and it is, Russell emphasizes, 
independently of our thinking it. This thinking does not add anything to things which either are 
or exist and there is thus only being simpliciter and existence simpliciter: 
“Whatever can be thought of has being, and its being is a precondition, not a 
result, of its being thought of. As regards the existence of an object of thought, 
however, nothing can be inferred from the fact of its being thought of, since it 
certainly does not exist in the thought which thinks it. Hence, finally, no 
special kind of being belongs to the objects of our presentations as such.”162 
However new Russell’s discussion might have been in Britain, it undoubtedly had its 
predecessors on the Continent. As far as the acknowledgement of the mind-independent being 
of objects of judgement is concerned, Alexius Meinong and his theory of objects is definitely 
the most famous example. Meinong not only admitted the being of mind-independent entities 
(and, also, the subsistence of non-beings), but also presented, even before Russell, almost the 
same argument for them as Russell would later. In like fashion to Russell, Meinong criticised 
the only apparent exhaustiveness of the distinction between mind-independent, external and 
“ideal”, mental existence. He supposes the idealists’ considerations proceed in the following 
lines: 
“[E]ither the Object to which cognition is directed exists in reality or it exists 
solely ‘in my idea’ (more briefly, it ‘pseudo-exists’). Perhaps nothing bears 
more eloquent testimony to the naturalness of this disjunction than the use of 
that word ‘ideal’. According to modern usage, without regard for its historical 
meaning, the word ‘ideal’ means the same as ‘thought of’ or ‘merely 
presented’; hence it pertains, apparently, to all of those objects which do not 
exist or which could not exist. What does not exist outside of us, so one 
automatically thinks, must at least exist in us.”163 
Like Russell, Meinong is convinced that this train of thought is wrong-headed, since 
there is a being – subsistence (Bestehen) in Meinongian terminology – which even non-existent 
                                                 
162 Ibid. By the “objects of our presentations”, Russell must have meant here the contents of our 
presentations. 
163 Meinong, A. (1904). Über Gegenstandstheorie. Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und 
Psychologie. Leipzig: Barth. Transl. as Meinong, A. (1960). The Theory of Objects. In: R. Chisholm, ed., Realism 
and the Background of Phenomenology, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, pp. 76-117. 
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objects possess.164 Since Meinong’s theory of objects preceded Russell’s discussion in the 
Principles, we may presume that Meinongian consideration at this point exerted an essential 
influence on Russell’s critique of Lotze’s notion of being and existence.165 Russell’s claim 
about mind-independent being and existence does not end up here, though. There is yet another 
essential step taken by Russell – he proposes that those non-mental beings, to which truth or 
falsity may be ascribed, are to be called propositions. As early as the “Preface” to the Principles, 
he clearly states: “Holding, as I do, that what is true or false is not in general, mental, I require 
a name for the true or false as such, and this name can scarcely be other than propositions”.166 
And later in Principles, he adds that “[b]eing is that which belongs to every conceivable term, 
to every possible object of thought – in short to everything that can possibly occur in any 
proposition, true or false, and to all such propositions themselves. […] Thus, being is a general 
attribute of everything, and to mention anything is to show that it is”.167 
This account of propositions and their parts, terms, is not only radical, but also 
ungrounded if based solely upon Russell’s criticism of Lotze and his introduction of mind-
independent being. Indeed there is no argument present in the Principles which would secure 
Russell’s contention that propositions and terms are non-mental beings. It is plausible, 
therefore, that Russell’s position was based upon the concept of propositions Moore presented 
in his Dissertation and “The Nature of Judgement”. While Moore’s account of propositions 
was, as I have noted, unsatisfactorily vague, Russell attempted in the Principles of Mathematics 
to fill in the gaps, particularly with regard to the issue of relations and the unity of the 
proposition. In what follows, I will attempt to explain his theory of relations and the way these 
relations are supposed to constitute the unity of a proposition. 
 
                                                 
164 Meinong did not distinguish merely objects which exist and which are, but also objects as non-beings 
which subsist, see: Meinong, 1904, p. 86. Objects themselves, Meinong claims, do not have intrinsically either 
being or non-being. As themselves, they are “outside the being”, ausserseind, or, in other words, their Sosein, i.e. 
their characteristics, are independent on whether they are or not (Ibid). This theory is summarized in what Meinong 
calls the “principle of the indifference of pure Objects to being” (der Satz vom Aussersein des reinen 
Gegenstandes). 
165 Russell devoted tree articles to Meinong’s philosophy: Russell, B. (1904a). Meinong’s Theory of 
Complexes and Assumptions (I.), Mind, 13(50), pp. 204-219; (1904b). Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and 
Assumptions (II.), Mind, 13(51), pp. 336-354 and (1904c). Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions 
(III.), 13(52), pp. 509-524. 
166 Russell, 1903, Preface, xlvii. 
167 Ibid., §427, p. 455, emphasis in the original. 
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3.2 Relations and Unities 
 
3.2.1 Russell, Meinong and Ehrenfels: Complexes and Their Unity 
Moore’s account of a proposition amounts merely to the claim that a proposition “is 
constituted by any number of concepts, together with a specific relation between them”.168 
However,  a proposition is to be something true or false, and plainly not every combination of 
concepts is true or false; so we are led to ask how it is guaranteed that a proposition, constituted 
by any number of further unspecified concepts and some relation, amounts to a meaningful 
unity. 
It is Russell, reacting to Moore’s account, who famously brought the problem of the 
unity of the proposition to the fore. He claims in the Principles of Mathematics that a 
proposition is “essentially a unity”169 and proposes that this unity is “embodied” in the verb 
which makes the proposition into a unity by unifying its remaining terms.170 It is precisely the 
issue of the unity of the proposition guaranteed by the relation occurring in it that will present 
a difficulty for the account of propositions in the Principles. The core of this problem, as I will 
decsribe in more detail below, resides in Russell’s struggle to explain that and how a relation is 
capable of relating or unifying a proposition, given that it is itself a self-standing element of the 
proposition and that it loses its relating nature upon analysis. 
The issue of the “twofold nature of relations”171, i.e. their possibility of appearing as 
relating and non-relating elements within a proposition is a philosophical evergreen in Russell-
studies. Even though it is acknowledged to be an essential issue in Russell’s theory of 
propositions, it seems to me that there has not been enough discussion of why Russell conceived 
of relations in this “twofold” way, i.e. as both relating and non-relating. I would like to present 
this issue here in the context which seems to me favourable for understanding Russell’s 
contention. Thus, before embarking on an investigation of Russell’s concept of relations, I 
would like to introduce those theories contemporary to Russell which claimed that relations 
always function in the complexes as relational, namely those from Christian von Ehrenfels and 
                                                 
168 Baldwin and Preti, 2011, p. 166. 
169 Russell, 1903, §54, p. 51. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid., §48, 46; §53, p. 50. 
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Alexius Meinong. 
The Austrian philosopher Christian von Ehrenfels is famous for his introduction of the 
notion of Gestalt Qualities (Gestaltqualitäten) whose subsequent elaboration in the work of 
other psychologists (Koffka, Köhler, Wertheimer at al.) led to the birth of the Gestalt theory in 
psychology.172 In psychology, Ehrenfels’ notion of a Gestalt quality is essential due to its 
emphasis, running counter to the atomistic strand elaborated by Wilhelm Wundt and others, 
that in perception, we perceive not the independent elements, but the structured whole of the 
perceptive field.173 The Berlin school of psychology later conducted several psychological 
experiments to prove this claim, and formulated many laws purporting to show that a perceptual 
field is organized as a unified, yet structured, whole.174 While generally known as a theory of 
perception, Gestalt theorists attempted to prove that the organization of elements into the 
wholes also plays an essential role in learning, thinking, remembering and other higher 
cognitive processes.175 Here, I wish to present Ehrenfels’ theory of Gestalt qualities as an 
alternative to Russell’s treatment of relations as having a curious twofold nature. 
Ehrenfels was clearly aware that the unification problem, since it concerns the way in 
which our perception of the world can issue in judgements, presented an essential issue for all 
theories of cognition and perception influenced by Kant’s transcendental-idealistic 
epistemology.176 When we see a figure (a spatial complex) or hear a melody (an aural complex), 
a Kantian would claim that the unity of the final impression does not ensue merely from the 
outside, but that, on the contrary, we need to activate our synthesizing capacity and integrate 
the initial sensations into the meaningful perceivable whole. Thus, Kantianism is well aware of 
the fact that in order to be in possession of a meaningful perception, we cannot do merely with 
many singular atomic sensations, as several early psychologists used to think. In the emphasis 
                                                 
172 There is also a Gestalt therapy in psychology; those two, however, do not coincide. 
173 See e.g. Freedheim, D. K. and Weiner, I. B., eds. (2003). Handbook of Psychology: Volume I, History of 
Psychology. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, p. 100. However, we should be careful not to overemphasize the 
atomistic interpretation of Wundt’s approach which has been rather adopted by his follower E. B. Titchener who 
interpreted Wundt’s theoretical stance in a simplified way (Ibid.).  
174 See e.g. Koffka, K. (1936). Principles of Gestalt Psychology. London: Kegan Paul; Kusch, M. (1995). 
Psychologism – A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge. London and New York: Routledge, 
pp. 262-263. 
175 Koffka, 1936, especially chapters 8-14, pp. 306-679. 
176 For Kant, the theories of perception and judgment are inseparably connected, since our experience is for 
Kant always judgmental in a sense that categories have been always already applied to sensibly given (before we 
may consciously experience anything). In his paper from 1890, Ehrenfels focuses exclusively on perception and 
does not tackle the issues concerning the nature of judgment. In this, he differs from Meinong who distinguishes 
referents of perception – objects – and referents of judgments – objectives.  
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laid on the necessity of the unification in our perception, Ehrenfels might be understood to be 
in agreement with Kant. But, importantly, he explains the unification not by means of the 
activity of our cognitive faculties, but with the aid of so called “Gestalt qualities” which are 
present in objects as we perceive them “without any activity of mind specifically directed 
towards them”.177 
As Ehrenfels himself emphasizes, the notion of the perceptual Gestalt was not original 
with him.178 Austrian physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach was probably the first to offer a 
systematic elaboration of the idea that when we have spatial or visual perceptions, we do not 
merely see or hear individual elements (elementary sensations or single tones), but perceive the 
object or melody as a whole – and for this, something has to be added.179 This addition, Mach 
postulated, is realized by a further element which ensures that our perception is unified and 
which is also directly perceived. Thus, in the case of visual perception, when we see an object, 
we see its colour and texture, but we also perceive the element which makes this object into a 
unity, namely into a spatial figure with several characteristics (shape, colour, texture etc.). 
In a similar vein, Mach analyses our aural perception of melody when he introduces, to 
describe the additional unifying element, his famous notion of Ton-Gestalt.180 When we hear a 
melody, we do not merely hear each tone in turn, but hear the melody as a whole – a result, 
according to Mach, of the additional element of Ton-Gestalt. Mach’s approach is peculiar, since 
despite pointing out that perception needs to be unified and non-atomistic, he insists that the 
unifying Gestalt (in both visual and aural perception) is just another perceived element 
alongside others.181 It seems obvious, then, that he could have been exposed to the very same 
objection Russell would be exposed several years later – how is it possible that the supposedly 
unifying element really provides a perceived object with the unity if it is on a par with their 
other non-unifying elements (e.g. particular visually perceived data or heard tones)? 
Ehrenfels suggests, correctly to my mind, that Mach’s main intention in introducing the 
additional element in perception was basically anti-Kantian – Mach wished to show that the 
                                                 
177 Ehrenfels, Ch. von. (1890). Über “Gestaltqualitäten”. Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche 
Philosophie, 14, pp. 249-292, transl. as Ehrenfels (1988). On “Gestalt Qualities” in: M. Smith, ed., Foundations 
of Gestalt Theory. Munich, and Vienna: Philosophia, pp. 82-117, p. 112. 
178 Ibid., p. 82. 
179 Mach, E. (1886). Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen. Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer, pp. 135-136. 
180 Ibid., p. 232. 
181 Ehrenfels 1890, p. 83. 
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unity of perceived wholes is not established by the mind, but is already “there”, in the objects 
as perceived, without our synthesizing or integrating activity.182 However, we need to turn to 
Ehrenfels for a more promising account of the unity of complex object as perceived by us. 
Ehrenfels, like Mach, was deeply interested in music and its psychological investigation 
and he also chose for his analysis an example which has gradually become paradigmatic 
amongst psychologists, i.e. that of hearing a melody. Melody is, metaphorically speaking, 
something over and above the sum of all particular notes from which it is composed. Like Mach, 
Ehrenfels points out that to experience hearing a melody is not to perceive only the particular 
tones in succession, but perceive a melody as a complex whole.183 Again like Mach, Ehrenfels 
observes that the same holds, probably even more straightforwardly, in the realm of visual 
perception. There, our final perceived whole is not a collection of elementary visual data, but a 
single unified and structured whole which we perceive in our visual field. The perception of 
figures serves as a good example, since seeing a figure in the visual field, like hearing a melody, 
is something more than the individual perceptual data from which our final perceived whole is 
created – we may have singular perceptions of colours, textures, shapes etc. in our visual field, 
but these particular elements in themselves do not constitute a particular spatial figure. So far, 
Ehrenfels’ discussion parallels Mach’s. 
It is in the account of the unity within the objects as perceived in which the two thinkers 
differ considerably. Mach supposes that perceiving the unity of the melody or the shape merely 
requires us to perceive an additional element to those perceived otherwise. By contrast, 
Ehrenfels explains the unity of perceptual whole by appeal to his notion of Gestalt quality. True, 
this Gestalt-quality is for him, as Ton-Gestalt was for Mach, “a new positive element of 
presentation” or “a positive content of presentation”.184 It is, however, not merely added to other 
elements, but founded on them, while correspondingly these elements provide a basis or 
foundation for the newly arising Gestalt quality. It is thus not something which may be 
conceived of as only lying side by side with other elements of the perceptual whole. 
As in the case of Mach, Ehrenfels’ account of Gestalt qualities is anti-idealistic – he 
                                                 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid, pp. 84-86, pp. 90-93.   
184 “By a Gestalt quality we understand a positive content of presentation bound up in consciousness with 
the presence of complexes of mutually separable (i.e. independently presentable) elements. That complex of 
presentations which is necessary for the existence of a given Gestalt quality we call the foundation [Grundlage] 
of that quality” (Ibid., p. 93, emphasis in the original). 
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points out that Gestalt-qualities are not created by the mind – they are instead given as further 
elements within the perceived content of presentation and without any special activity of our 
mind.185 Thus, when we perceive (visually, auditorily or in other way186),, the perceived object 
is composed of various elements of which at least some serve as the foundations for the qualities 
which unify (some of) the perceived elements into the (visual, tactual etc.) whole. Ehrenfels 
expressly admits that not all elements need to provide a foundation for some Gestalt qualities 
based on them. However, he presupposes that where the Gestalt-quality is present, some objects 
perform this founding role.187 Thus, for Ehrenfels, there are no non-relating Gestalt qualities – 
such as a Gestalt quality of a shape which actually does not form the shape of some object or a 
melody which in fact does not unify particular tones into a single whole.188 There may be 
elements not related by any Gestalt quality, but if there is this quality, it always relates the 
elements upon which it is founded. This will imply, as we will see, an essential difference from 
Russell’s account of relations. 
Before comparing Ehrenfels’ account with Russell’s, let’s turn our attention for a while 
to another important figure in the German-speaking milieu who has contributed a great deal to 
the discussion concerning the issue of complexes and their unities, namely the above-mentioned 
Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong. Meinong, the teacher of Ehrenfels in Prague, is known 
in philosophy primarily for his extravagant ontology of non-existent objects.189 However, we 
can also find in his writings the considerations related directly to our issue of objects’ elements, 
their relations and unities. Those are to be found especially in his early article “Über 
Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung” (“On Objects 
of Higher Order and their Relation to Inner Perception”) from 1899.190 His main concern here, 
                                                 
185 “[W]e can conclude that Gestalt qualities are given in consciousness simultaneously with their 
foundations, without any activity of mind specifically directed towards them” (Ibid., p. 112). 
186 Ehrenfels’ analysis includes much more than the examples of the simplest temporal and visual Gestalt 
qualities of melody and shape. He discusses temporal-visual qualities, tactual qualities, Gestalt qualities present in 
the sensations of motion, in colour harmonies and disharmonies or in the perception consisting from the fusion of 
touch, temperature, taste and smell sensations, Gestalt qualities of higher order (those built upon other Gestalt 
qualities) and Gestalt qualities present in the art and human actions. It is not of an importance for me to go into 
detail here. This list however shows how extensive the field where Gestalt qualities are to be found actually is. 
(See Ibid., p. 93ff.) 
187 Ibid., p. 92. 
188 Ehrenfels does not equate Gestalt qualities with relations, but it is obvious from his account they are very 
similar to them: he contends that relations within a perceived complex are determined by or founded in Gestalt 
qualities, see Ibid.   
189 In this, Meinong differs considerably from Ehrenfels who does not provide any ontology of objects, but 
is merely interested in how we perceive various objects. 
190 Meinong. A. (1899). Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren 
Wahrnehmung. Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, 21, pp. 182-272. Trans. as: 
Meinong, A. (1978). On Objects of Higher Order and Their Relationship to Internal Perception. In: M.-L. Schubert 
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indicated by the title, is with objects of higher order (Gegenstände höherer Ordnung) which 
are the objects based on simpler elements. According to Meinong, objects of higher order, 
among which relations belong, are characterized by a specific dependence and reliance the on 
objects of lower order on which they are founded.191 Or, in other words, objects of higher order 
are based on objects of lower order as on their necessary presuppositions (Vorraussetzungen).192 
The objects of higher order might be called superiora, while the objects of lower order 
are inferiora. Relations (as objects of higher order) are based on their relata (elements related 
by the relation as the objects of lower order) and complexes (objects of higher order which 
consist of several things) rely on the particular things included in them (objects of lower order). 
All relations have the status of relating relations, i.e. they are binding elements which “knit” 
the complexes together.193 “Any complex is composed of its component parts in virtue of a 
relation r in which they stand to each other”.194 A relation in the complex is not a further 
additional element, but that by virtue of which other elements are put together as organized 
constituents of the complex. The elements belong to the complex just by means of their mutual 
relatedness provided by the relation. Thus, once there is a relation, its elements may be given 
as the constituents of the complex. Eventually, a relation cannot be, for Meinong, actually 
considered apart from a complex, since once the relation relates its elements, we have the 
complex constituted by those related elements.195 Relations thus become the complexes as 
viewed from the point of related members of these complexes.196 A relation is dependent upon 
its relata, and the complex is dependent, in turn, upon the presence of the relation.197 
                                                 
Kalsi, ed., Alexius Meinong on Objects of Higher Order and Hussel’s Phenomenology, The Hague, Boston, 
London: Martinus Nijhoff. 
191 Apart from relations, Meinong recognizes also other types of objects of higher order which he calls 
“complexions”. Among these, there are, for instance, groups consisting of several elements (e.g. “four nuts”), 
melodies and spatial figures composed of colour, shape and other characteristics (see Ibid, p. 145).  
192 Ibid., p. 144. Meinong claims that the primacy in inventing the name and description of the objects of 
higher order is probably due to B. Fechner in his Vorschule der Ästhetik, see Fechner, G. T. (1876). Vorschule der 
Ästhetik, Erster Teil. Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von Breitkopf and Härtel. 
193 Meinong, 1899, p. 146. 
194 Ibid., p. 146. 
195 Meinong formulates this from the subjective side, i.e. from our having ideas about relations and 
complexes: “If we are about to have ideas a and b as standing in the relation r we can only do it by having idea of 
them in a complexion” (Ibid., p. 146). However, from the overall discussion surrounding this quotation, it is 
obvious that he would be willing to extend this assertion also to the objective side, i.e. to complexes and relations 
themselves. See e.g. immediately following: “The principle ‘where there is a complexion there is a relation and 
vice versa’ is a natural result holding for real things and those which are merely thought” (Ibid). 
196 Ibid., p. 147. 
197 Meinong calls this relation of dependency and partial identity (of a relation and complex) a “partial 
coincidence”. 
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Thus, for instance, in the complex of “four nuts” we do not simply have four elements 
(nuts) next to each other. But, we may add, we also do not have those elements and their relation 
simply put side by side. What we have from our subjective side is the collating (kolligierend) 
activity in which we put the complex together.198 And also, on the objective side, we have four 
nuts related by a relation into a unity.199 Similarly, a melody is not, as it also wasn’t for 
Ehrenfels, only “an objective collective of notes”, but a particular complex of mutually 
interconnected notes.200 Or in the case of any figure (considered as a connection of colour and 
shape), we do not simply have a shape and a colour, but we have “a certain togetherness or 
connectedness of colour and shape”.201 
Thus, both Meinong and Ehrenfels insisted, to use Russell’s vocabulary, that there are 
only relating relations. If there is a relation added to the terms of a complex, it always relates 
these terms. Russell, by contrast, argues that a relation is endowed with a mysterious “twofold” 
nature based on which it can occur both as relating and as non-relating. It is the aim of the 
subsequent section to investigate his reasons for insisting on this theory, and the consequences 
it had. 
3.2.2 The Mystery of Relating and Non-Relating Relation 
In the previous section, I introduced Ehrenfels’ and Meinong’s ideas concerning simple 
elements, their mutual relations and their eventual unity. The question yet to be tackled is 
whether we can consider those accounts suitable for comparison with Russell’s account of 
propositions and relations, since, while Russell analyses the notion of a proposition, Ehrenfels 
focused upon our perception of complex objects and Meinong primarily on the judgments about 
complex objects. Despite this difference, I believe that the intended comparison is apt, since 
Russell took over the notion of a proposition from Moore who did not assume a clear separation 
between propositions and complex (worldly) objects.202 
                                                 
198 This notion of a “collating activity in which we put the complex together” still resembles idealistic 
accounts in that it is us who unify the elements of the perceived complexes. Later in his work, Meinong abandoned 
this notion, emphasizing the complexity in the objects. For more details see Lindenfeld, D. F. (1981). The 
Transformation of Positivism: Alexius Meinong and European Thought, 1880-1920. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, p. 115ff. 
199 Ibid., p. 145. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid. In the case of melody, Meinong explicitly mentions Ehrenfels as a proponent of the similar theory 
(Ibid.); see also Ehrenfels, 1890, pp. 94-97. 
202 Since Russell, under the influence of Moore, insisted that a proposition as a referent of a judgment may 
be investigated without reference to our relation to it, he is philosophically closer to Meinong who, in contrast to 
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As I also pointed out, Moore sidestepped the main problem his new theory of 
propositions brought to light: the issue of the composition of a proposition. He simply never 
offered any detailed account of the way a proposition is composed from its constituents. This 
task was awaiting Russell, who acknowledged the problem as a critical issue to be accounted 
for within the theory of propositions and set up to elucidate how the unity of a proposition is 
constituted. 
Russell began to discuss propositions and their constituents in the fourth chapter of his 
Principles of Mathematics titled “Proper Names, Adjectives and Verbs”.203 From the title of the 
chapter we can immediately deduce that the elements from which propositions are composed 
will be at least equally important as propositions themselves, considering that there is in the 
first instance no remarks about propositions, but only about the names of their constituents. 
Proper names, adjectives and verbs are however only the guidelines to those constituents – they 
are the names of linguistic categories while we are interested in what they refer to.204 
Grammatical considerations proper are in the end almost entirely absent, since Russell 
immediately turns his attention to the referents of words: the substantives “humanity” or 
“sequence”, for instance, are not proper substantives (proper names) because they are logically 
derived, respectively, from the adjective “human” and the predicate “follow”. 205 All notions 
which may function as adjectives or predicates are labelled as adjectives and predicates, even 
though we may also encounter them in a form “in which grammar would call them substantives” 
(e.g. a predicate “love” may acquire a substantivized form “loving”).206 Thus Russell is not 
finally interested in grammatical, but in ontological distinctions between the entities which are 
in language represented by substantives, adjectives and verbs. 
An essential step Russell then takes is to introduce the all-embracing notion of a “term” 
under which everything represented by substantives, adjectives and verbs fall. “Term” is, in 
Russell’s words, “the widest word in the philosophical vocabulary”.207 A term is anything that 
                                                 
Ehrenfels, attempted to provide not only the description of our judgments and objects as judged by us, but also the 
ontology of objects. 
203 Russell, 1903, §§46-55, pp. 43-53.  
204 Ibid., §46, p. 43. 
205 “Proper names” are for Russell those substantives which may function in propositions merely as logical 
subjects about which propositions are. Proper names are thus not those which may also function as adjectives or 
verbs within proposition, i.e. a substantive “humanity” or “sequence” which are, according to Russell, logically 
derived from the adjective “human” and verb “follow” respectively (see Russell, 1903, §46, pp. 43, 44).  
206 Ibid., §46, p. 44. 
207 Ibid., §47, p. 44. 
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can be thought of, that can be counted as one and which has being. Most importantly, terms 
include anything which can occur in a true or false proposition; synonymous to the “term” are 
words “unit”, “individual” and “entity”.208 We may wonder why Russell decided to introduce 
such a general notion at all and the answer may be found in the context in which it is treated, 
namely in Russell’s discussing “familiar” distinctions made in philosophy: “the distinctions of 
subject and predicate, substance and attribute, substantive and adjective […]”.209 Thus, the 
notion of a term is supposed to present a critical contribution to a long-lasting philosophical 
tradition which treated judgements as divided into a subject and predicate, which corresponded 
to an ontological distinction between a substance and attribute. It was generally presupposed 
that while a substance is a self-standing entity, an attribute may exist only by being “in” some 
substance: a predicate is always predicated about subject; and a subject is always that about 
which something is predicated.210 
As opposed to this ontology and theory of judgement, Russell introduced his notion of 
a “term” which does not make the distinction between a self-standing substance and accidents 
dependent on it, but which asserts that anything which may be thought of and counted as one is 
a “term”. Among “terms”, there are both individual and abstract entities, classes, relations and 
even non-existing objects: “A man, a moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimaera, or 
anything else that can be mentioned, is sure to be a term; and to deny that such and such a thing 
is a term must always be false”.211 Everything which is a term is in possession of properties 
which were previously assigned merely to substances (ontologically speaking) or subjects (of 
judgements): within a judgement or a proposition, every term may function as a logical 
subject.212 Similarly to substances, “every term is immutable and indestructible”213, 
“substantial”, “self-subsistent” and “self-identical”.214  
Thus, we may summarize, it is only a superstition to suppose that only terms referred to 
by substantives are self-subsistent – by self-subsistence, Russell seems to mean that things are 
                                                 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid.  
210 For a summary of the treatment of substances and attributes in Western philosophical tradition see 
Grossmann, R. (1992). The Existence of the World: An Introduction to Ontology. London and New York: 
Routledge.  
211 Russell, 1903, §47, p. 45.  
212 Ibid. 
213 Ibid. 
214 “Thus the theory that there are adjectives or attributes or ideal things, or whatever they may be called, 
which are in some way less substantial, less self-subsistent, less self-identical, than true substantives, appears to 
be wholly erroneous, and to be easily reduced to a contradiction” (Ibid., §49, p. 47). 
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without being dependent on something other them themselves. Terms indicated by adjectives 
or verbs, which were supposed to be necessarily inherent in the substances which they reputedly 
characterized, enjoy the same level of self-subsistence: thus neither relations nor predicates 
exist merely as accidents of substances. This shared self-subsistence of all terms may be, 
however, considered the first step towards Russell's (in)famous difficulties with the question of 
how terms are put together to create a complex or, in other words, a proposition. For we may 
ask: If all terms are independent of each other, how does it come that they may be put together 
and form a unity? The formation of unity out of terms is for Russell however essential since a 
proposition amounts in the Principles exactly to the complex unity consisting of several terms. 
In the Principles, Russell claims that relations are able to unify terms into propositions. 
Among the terms, he claims, we may distinguish between things and concepts. Concepts are 
further divided into predicates indicated by adjectives (e.g. “human”) and relations indicated 
by verbs (e.g. “to love”).215 Eventually, however, Russell prefers to refer to both of them as 
“relations” since predicates may be understood as particular types of relations.216 The crucial 
difference between things and relations rests in that while things may only function as terms 
about which a proposition is (they may be merely logical subjects in a proposition), relations 
are endowed with “a curious twofold nature” due to which they may occur both as logical 
subjects and as that which relates other terms within a proposition.217 
Thus, Caesar is a thing since he may occur within a proposition merely as something 
about which something is predicated or which is related to other terms by means of a relation; 
never as something which itself predicates or relates other terms. Relations, on the other hand, 
may occur in two ways in a proposition: firstly, without a relating capacity, in which case a 
verb, which indicates the relation, occurs in the form of a verbal noun or present participle.218 
(Thus, for instance, in the proposition “Killing is wrong”, “killing” is a verbal noun and the 
relation of killing does not unify the remaining terms of a proposition into a unity: this is done 
                                                 
215 Ibid., §48, p. 45. 
216 Initially, Russell defines predicates as “concepts, other than verbs, which occur in propositions having 
only one term or subject” (Ibid., §48, p. 46). In “Socrates is human”, “is” amounts to the verb and “human” to 
predicate (Ibid). However, in §53 (p. 50), Russell adds that subject-predicate propositions may be “perhaps” 
considered as relational propositions, since the relation between subject and adjective (e.g. between “Socrates” 
and “human” in “Socrates is human” “is certainly implied” (Ibid.). We may thus describe them also as relational 
propositions in which an assertion does not concern (at least) two terms, but only one (Ibid). As the word “perhaps” 
suggests, Russell wasn’t completely persuaded at this point. But further on in the Principles, he refers merely to 
“relations” nevertheless. 
217 Ibid., §48, p. 46; §53, p. 50. 
218 Ibid., §52, p. 49.  
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here by another relation, indicated by the verb “is”. And secondly, the same relation may 
acquire a relational function. (It is the case, for instance, in the proposition “Roman senators 
killed Caesar”, where the relation of killing unifies a proposition which consists of the terms 
Roman senators, killing itself and Caesar.) To summarize, the twofold nature of relation 
amounts to the distinction between its use as a non-relating and as a relating relation or, in 
other words, between the relation in itself (non-relating) and the relation actually relating.219 
The official argument that Russell provides to justify his claim that relation must be able 
to perform both relating and non-relating role within a proposition draws on his critique of 
Frege’s conception of concepts. Since Frege insisted that concepts are always relational in 
nature (they are unsaturated, in need of completion), he was led to his “concept horse paradox” 
- it is impossible to make a meaningful claim that “the concept of being a horse is a concept”, 
since I cannot put the concept into a subject-position in the sentence and retaining its predicative 
nature.220 To this, Russell objects that we have to be in a position to assert something about a 
relation (in his case, or about a “concept” in Frege’s case) and to do this, we must be able to put 
it into a subject position. Used in this way, however, it does not have a relational function.  
It may seem that the fact that a verb must be capable of staying in the subject position 
(in which instance a relation is non-relational) does not in itself endanger a propositional unity: 
when a verb is in the subject position and relation is non-relational, there is another relation 
which binds the proposition together. Thus, for instance, in “Killing is wrong”, the relation of 
killing does not relate the remaining terms of the proposition but is rather itself related to them 
by the relation indicated by “is”. But we may ask: if any relation can function as non-relational 
within a proposition, what will guarantee that there remains any relational relation in a 
proposition? It seems to me that Russell’s worries concerning the “disappearance” of relations 
in their relating function is, at least partially, due to the above presented, general notion of a 
“term” under which all things, concepts and relations fall.221 Russell’s emphasis on the equal 
self-subsistence of all terms seems to imply that any relation may be considered apart from the 
                                                 
219 Ibid., §54, p. 50. Russell also called relating relation as an “actual verb” (Ibid.).  
220 Frege, G. (1892). Über Begriff und Gegenstand. Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 
16, pp. 192-205. trans. as Frege, G. (1997). On Concept and Object. In: M. Beaney, ed., The Frege Reader. Oxford: 
Blackwell, pp. 181-193; p. 185. 
221 For a similar interpretation see also Leonard Linsky who claims that it is just the all-encompassing notion 
of a “term” which lies at the bottom of Russell’s struggles with the unity of the proposition: “Russell’s idea of the 
single, all inclusive, ontological category of terms makes the problem [of the unity of proposition] both inevitable 
and intractable for him” (Linsky, L. (1992). The Unity of the Proposition. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 
30(2), pp. 243-273, p. 262). 
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terms it relates, and that “in itself” it is thus non-relational. And, apart from that, there is yet 
another issue which may illuminate Russell’s concern about relations: from Russell’s 
exposition, it appears that the problem of propositional unity arises when the non-relational use 
of relation ensues from proposition’s analysis:  
“The twofold nature of the verb, as actual verb and as verbal noun, may be 
expressed, if all verbs are held to be relations, as the difference between a 
relation in itself and a relation actually relating. Consider, for example, the 
proposition “A differs from B”. The constituents of this proposition, if we 
analyse it, appear to be only A, difference, B. Yet these constituents, thus 
placed side by side, do not reconstitute the proposition. The difference which 
occurs in the proposition actually relates A and B, whereas the difference after 
analysis is a notion which has no connection with A and B. […] A proposition, 
in fact, is essentially a unity, and when analysis has destroyed the unity, no 
enumeration of constituents will restore the proposition. The verb, when used 
as a verb, embodies the unity of the proposition, and is thus distinguishable 
from the verb considered as a term, though I do not know how to give a clear 
account of the precise nature of the distinction.”222 
The supposed loss of the relational nature of a relation after analysis persuaded Russell 
that analysis is at least a partial falsification since it destroys the initial unity of the 
proposition.223 It is mysterious why he adopted such a view, though. I consider it probable that 
he was influenced by the notion of analysis offered by his older, highly respected colleague F. 
H. Bradley. Bradley, as a monist, claimed that every analysis amounts to a falsification because 
there is, in fact, only one all-embracing entity which cannot be further analysed.224 
According to Bradley, when we judge, the true subject of our judgement is not the 
grammatical subject of the judgement (e.g. “Tom” in “Tom runs”), but the whole reality from 
which we, so to say, inserted into a judgement only some arbitrary parts or aspects (here Tom 
and the act of running). This reality, “the real”, is the whole which we encounter not in 
judgements, but in feelings or perception.225 Judgement is thus not to be conceived of as a 
synthesis of ideas (e.g. the ideas of “Tom” and of “running”), but as the reference of these ideas 
– the “ideal content” of judgement – to reality.226 
In making judgements, we always analyse reality and distinguish arbitrary parts which 
                                                 
222 Ibid. §54, p. 51; emphases mine. 
223 Ibid. 
224 “It is wholly unjustifiable to take up a complex, to do any work we please upon it by analysis, and then 
simply predicate as an adjective of the given these results of our abstraction. These products were never there as 
such, and in saying, as we do, that as such they are there, we falsify the fact” (Bradley, F. H. (1883). The Principles 
of Logic, 2 Volumes. London: Kegan Paul., B. I, Ch. II, §64, p. 94). 
225 Ibid., §4, p. 45. 
226 “Judgment is not the synthesis of ideas, but the reference of ideal content to reality” (Ibid., §15, p. 56). 
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do not exist on their own.227 What really exists is merely the reality as a whole. Thus, judgement 
as an analysis and distinguishing enterprise is always a distortion of reality. By making these 
arbitrary selections by means of our judgements, “we have mutilated the given”.228 However, 
if every judgement is merely an arbitrary assemblage of in themselves non-existing, arbitrarily 
chosen parts of the real, “how can it any longer lay claim to truth?”, Bradley asks.229 And this 
is, obviously, from his part merely a rhetorical question: it cannot. Every judgement is 
irrevocably false not because it goes beyond the facts and claims something which is not true 
about them, but because it comes short of them, i.e. does not describe the reality as a whole (bur 
merely its arbitrary parts).230 “A fraction of the truth, here as often elsewhere, becomes entire 
falsehood, because it is used to qualify the whole”, Bradley concludes.231 
Russell is of course far from embracing this absolute-idealistic view, but he nevertheless 
insists on analysis really being – even if only partially – a falsification, since after the analysis 
is carried out an initially relating relation loses its relational power and ends up as a non-relating 
element.232 In other words, the unity of a proposition is lost on analysis – “the constituents of 
the initial proposition are only placed side by side and do not reconstitute the initial 
proposition”233; “a proposition, in fact, is essentially a unity, and when analysis has destroyed 
the unity, no enumeration of constituents will restore the proposition”.234 This conclusion, i.e. 
                                                 
227 Ibid., §62, p. 93. 
228 Ibid. “It is a very common and most ruinous superstition to suppose”, Bradley asserts, “that analysis is 
no alteration, and that, whenever we distinguish, we have at once to do with divisible existence. It is an immense 
assumption to conclude, when a fact comes to us as a whole, that some parts of it may exist without any sort of 
regard for the rest” (Ibid., §64, p. 93). 
229 Ibid., §62, p. 93. 
230 Ibid., §61, p. 92. 
231 Ibid., p. 180. Bradley’s famous analysis of relations, which postulated the existence of an infinite regress 
in an attempt on their definition, is an application of this general idea of analysis as falsification. We suppose there 
are relations and units, which are related by them. However, for Bradley both units and relations are merely non-
existent parts of the real. “They are fictions of the mind, mere distinctions within a single reality, which a common 
delusion erroneously takes for independent facts” (Ibid., p. 79). He explicitly mentions Russell as maintaining the 
opposing view: “Relations exist only in and through a whole which cannot in the end be resolved into relations 
and terms. ‘And’, ‘together’ and ‘between’, are all in the end senseless apart from such a whole. The opposite view 
is maintained (as I understand) by Mr. Russell […]” (Ibid.). 
232 As he describes his position in the article “Some Explanations in Reply to Mr. Bradley”, “I do not admit 
that in any strict sense unities are incapable of analysis; on the contrary, I hold that they are the only objects that 
can be analysed. What I admit is that no enumeration of their constituents will reconstitute them since any such 
enumeration gives a plurality, not a unity”; in: Russell, B. (1910b). Some Explanations in Reply to Mr. Bradley. 
Mind, 19(75), pp. 373-378, p. 373; emphasis in the original. 
233 Russell, 1903, §54, p. 50. 
234 Ibid., §54, p. 51. We could potentially mention the positions which the constituents should occupy, but 
even then, Russell insists, we will end up with a – even if longer – list of constituents, e.g. A, referent, love, B, 
relatum; see Ibid. In his article on Meinong, Russell describes the “special and apparently indefinable kind of 
unity” and claims that the inadequacy of analysis resides in that “propositions are true or false, while their 
constituents, in general, are neither” (Russell, 1904a, p. 210). For a similar view, see also Russell, 1904b, pp. 348, 
350. It is also interesting that similar claim that the unity of a proposition is taken away by the analysis is present 
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that analysis at least partially equates to falsification235 is never really argued for in the 
Principles, but simply presupposed. This is probably because Russell, whether he 
acknowledged it or not, was influenced by Bradley on this point. However, the fact that analysis 
provides us with such an unsatisfactory result – with merely non-relating relation – was surely 
hardly acceptable and only sadly acknowledged by Russell in the Principles. The non-relational 
nature of relation, which manifested itself already in the inclusion of relations under the general 
notion of a “term” and was finally decided upon with the loss of relational nature of relation 
after analysis, may be thus considered to be the first pressing issue Russell encountered with 
the Principles’ notion of a proposition. 
A second closely related difficulty within the philosophical framework presented in the 
Principles is that of false propositions. For Russell, a proposition is a unified complex of terms. 
However, there need to be both true and false propositions since we obviously can judge 
falsely.236 But a unified complex of terms seems to amount to a true proposition, i.e. to a state 
of affairs which appears in the world. What does a false proposition then amount to? It cannot 
be a mere aggregate of elements, precisely because it is a proposition, i.e. a unified complex of 
terms. Thus, a false proposition needs to be something which is unified and false at the same 
time. Many commentators, including Russell himself, pointed out how unintuitive or even 
contradictory such a notion of a false proposition is.237 
The problem concerning false propositions is not tackled in the Principles, but appears 
in “The Nature of Truth”, an article published in 1905, only two years after the composition of 
the Principles.238 In this article, there remains the Principles’ notion of a proposition: 
propositions are mind-independent, complex entities.239 Their independence of our act of 
judgement is emphasized by the claim that even if we are concerned with the propositions in 
their relation to judgement, it is potentially misleading to describe them primarily as the objects 
                                                 
already in Russell’s earlier A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Lebniz, only he uses there the term of a 
“judgement”, not yet a “proposition”: “[...] the constituents [of a judgement] have a certain kind of unity – the kind 
always involved in enumeration, or in assertions of a whole – which is taken away by analysis” (Russell, 1900, 
§11, p. 26). 
235 Russell, 1903, §439, p. 473. 
236 See e.g. Russell, B. (1905). The Nature of Truth. In: A. Urquhart, ed. (1994). The Collected Papers of 
Bertrand Russell, Volume 4: Foundations of Logic 1903-1905, London: Routledge, pp. 492-506, p. 503. 
237 According to Linsky (1992, p. 254), for instance, we would need to, in order to account for false 
propositions, destroy the unity of propositions – which is just another way to assert that unity and falsity of a 
proposition are incompatible. 
238 Russell, B. (1905). The Nature of Truth. In: Urquhart, 1994. 
239 Ibid., p. 503. 
  
64 
 
of judgement.240 True, they may be judged, but they are in their nature wholly independent of 
being the objects of our mental acts. It would be more accurate to describe them as complex 
entities whose complexity is fully independent of our ability to judge them.241 We by no means 
create this complexity; rather it is already “there” in the propositions and we apprehend it in 
our acts of judgement. 
Propositions are thus here still identified with complexes and the peculiarity of 
complexes depicted in the Principles is, again, accepted, rather than elucidated: propositions 
are specific unities whose particularity resides in their unity being realized by means of the 
relation. But, Russell bravely admits that he is not sure “how to describe this kind of 
complexity”.242 And the perplexing nature of false propositions is emphasized here as well. 
False propositions are peculiar entities since they should represent complexes which are both 
unified (since every proposition is supposed to be a unity) and false. 
But the existence of false propositions, however curious they may seem, has according 
to Russell to be admitted, since we can also judge falsely. Like true judgement, Russell claims, 
false judgement stands in need of some object: “Since false propositions can be judged as well 
as true ones, they too are entities”.243 Here Russell, similarly to Twardowski and others, 
presupposes that even false judgements need to be in possession of some object to which they 
refer.244 The reason behind it is that for Russell judging about something that has no being 
would amount to not judging at all.245 
Moreover, there is yet another serious difficulty surrounding false propositions, namely 
that if both true and false propositions amount to unified complexes in the world, we seem to 
be unable to spell out the difference between truth and falsity. As Russell famously formulates 
                                                 
240 Ibid. 
241 Ibid. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Ibid. 
244 For Twardowski, see Betti, A. (2013). We Owe It To Sigwart! A New Look at the Content/Object 
Distinction in Early Phenomenological Theories of Judgment from Brentano to Twardowski. In: Textor, 2013, pp. 
74-96, pp.  76-79. For Russell see e.g. Russell, 1904a, pp. 218-219; 1904c, p. 510.  
245 “If it [object of judgement] did not subsist, I should be believing nothing, and therefore not believing” 
(Russell, 1904c, p. 510; see also Russell 1904a, p. 219). Also, Russell adds, we cannot admit the being of true 
propositions and deny it in the case of false ones – as Russell formulates it, propositions cannot differ intrinsically 
(“It is obvious that what we call believing or understanding a proposition is a fact of the same logical form whether 
the proposition is true or whether it is false; for if this were not so, there would be an intrinsic difference between 
true and false beliefs, and mere attention to the mental fact would be capable of showing whether the belief was 
true or whether it was false” (Russell, 1913, p. 109). 
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it in his article about Meinong, “some propositions are true and some false, just as some roses 
are red and some white”.246 He initially attempted to sidestep this suspicious conclusion by 
claiming that the inability to mark a difference between true and false propositions proves that 
“there is no problem at all in truth and falsehood”.247 This difference is unanalyzable,  but is 
one that we can directly apprehended.248 But, obviously, this escape manoeuvre couldn’t satisfy 
Russell. He immediately admits that on this account, our preference for true propositions 
remains a sheer mystery, “a mere unaccountable prejudice”.249 
It is then not surprising that the notion of false propositions soon began to strike Russell 
as so dubious and plagued with inner contradictions that he eventually voted for rejecting both 
the being of false and true propositions – since it is equally unpersuasive to admit merely the 
being of true, but not false propositions.250 The perplexing nature of false propositions thus 
gradually became the main driving force behind Russell’s abandonment of the theory of both 
true and false mind-independent propositions and behind his gradual acceptance of his famous 
multiple relation theory of judgement. 
3.3 Russell’s Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgement 
Due to the inner tensions in the notion of false propositions, Russell became more and 
more persuaded that he must inevitably abandon the whole concept of a proposition as a 
complex entity in the world. In its place, a different theory has to be introduced which will not 
leave the difference between true and false propositions an unexplainable mystery and which 
will explicate how we can make judgements about the complexes in the world without the 
necessity of postulating objective falsehoods. It is Russell’s famous multiple relation theory of 
judgement which eventually replaced the concept of propositions from the Principles. 
However, there emerged, as time went on, several versions of this theory in which Russell again 
                                                 
246 Russell, 1904c, p. 523. 
247 Russell, B. (1913). Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript. In: E. R. Eames, ed. (1992). Theory of 
Knowledge, London and New York: Routledge, p. 109. 
248 Russell, 1904c, p. 524. If the difference cannot be analysed, the distinction between true and false 
propositions remains inexplicable. And then, also our preference for true propositions is unaccounted for. Russell 
proposes that it would need to be conceived of not epistemologically, but ethically: we would be left merely with 
the feeling that “it is good to believe true propositions, and bad to believe false ones” (Ibid). See also Russell’s 
article “On The Nature of Truth” where he claims that truth and falsity are ultimate notions and “no account can 
be given of what makes a proposition true of false” (Russell, B. (1906-1907). On the Nature of Truth. Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society, 7(1), pp. 28–49, p. 48). 
249 Russell, 1904c, p. 523. 
250 Russell 1904a, p. 219. 
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and again attempted to solve difficulties he discovered in his previous theories. 
3.3.1 Changes in the Theory of Judgement 
The expressly admitted serious doubts about the mind-independent nature of 
propositions appeared only two years after a previously discussed article, i.e. in the 1907 article 
“On the Nature of Truth”.251 Here, Russell discusses again his notion of a false proposition, 
already much less persuaded about its tenability. Even if he leaves the issue, strictly speaking, 
unresolved here, he already introduces the basic elements of his newly invented multiple 
relation theory of judgement in which truth is relegated from a proposition as a complex object 
in the world into the judgement itself. Propositions are gradually disappearing from the 
discussion – objects of judgements are further referred to as complexes and Russell introduces 
his multiple relation theory of judgement as an attempt to explicate differently and more 
compellingly what it means – now for a judgement, not a proposition – to be true or false. 
But if we suppose that we encounter here a “classical version” of Russell’s multiple 
relation theory, we will be surprised. This is not just because the theory is here less elaborate 
than it will be in its final version in 1913, but – much more importantly – because Russell 
describes here the judgment fact differently. While his classical multiple relation theory is 
peculiar in its expounding the fact of judgement as consisting of the objects the judgement is 
about, this earliest version of the theory postulates that a judgement consists simply of ideas. It 
almost seems as if Russell would have forgotten Moore’s and his own passionate critique of 
judgement consisting of mental representations. 
As in all later accounts of multiple relation theory, Russell presents it as an answer to 
his problematic notion of false propositions: to avoid the necessity of accepting such dubious 
entities, we may attempt to conceive of judgement not as an act in which the subject is related 
to a single object, but as a multiple relation by which the subject is related to various objects. 
In terms of the 1907 theory, a judgement is not “a single state of mind” or “one idea with a 
complex object”, but “several related ideas”.252 If we, for instance, believe that a is related to 
b, we are in possession of distinct ideas of a, b and a relation. On the side of the objects, we 
have the objects a, b and the relation. 
                                                 
251 Russell, B. (1906-1907). On the Nature of Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 7(1), pp. 28–
49. 
252 Ibid., p. 46; emphasis in the original. 
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If the judgement is true, there is, at the level of objects, a complex of objects “a’s being 
in relation to b”. This complex corresponds to our mutually related ideas “a’s being in relation 
to b”. If judgement is false, we judge that “a is in relation to b” but there is no corresponding 
complex “a’s being related to b”. The objects of a, b and relation all exist (or have being), but 
they are not mutually related. So, for instance, if we judge that “Leonard loves Penny”, our 
judgement is true if there is a complex in the world in which the relation loves unifies the objects 
of Leonard and Penny.253 And, conversely, this judgement is false, if Leonard and Penny are 
not related by the relation of loving: 
“In the event of the objects of the ideas standing in the corresponding relation, 
we shall say that the belief is true, or that it is belief in a fact. In the event of 
the objects not standing in the corresponding relation, there will be no 
objective complex corresponding to the belief, and the belief is the belief in 
nothing, though it is not ʻthinking of nothing’, because it is thinking of the 
objects of the ideas which constitute the belief.”254 
Judgements, to summarize, are “complexes of ideas to which complexes of the objects 
of ideas may or may not correspond”.255 If a judgement is understood as a relation of several 
ideas to several objects, then in the event of a false judgement, we do not judge nothing, but we 
judge falsely about the various objects of our ideas. Even if we acknowledge that a false 
judgement must have an object, meaning that it cannot be “of nothing”, we are not forced to 
accept the existence of “objective falsehoods” i.e. false propositions. The objects about which 
we judge are always there, although they may not be assembled into a complex which 
corresponds to the complex of our ideas in a judgment. In these terms, Russell secured the result 
that all judgements are about something, in the sense that they are related to objects, without 
committing himself to the being of false propositions. 
As I noted above, the puzzling feature of this version of a multiple relation theory is that 
                                                 
253 I do not discuss here the so called “problem of order”, i.e. the fact that from the elements a, R and b, I can 
compose two meaningful judgements: aRb and bRa. On various occasions, Russell attempted to solve this issue 
differently. Initially, in the Principles of Mathematics, he insisted that it is the relation which put the related 
elements in the proper order: “[i]t is a characteristic of a relation of two terms that it proceeds, so to speak, from 
one to the other. That is what may be called the sense of the relation, and is, as we shall find, the source of order 
and series” (Russell 1903, §94, pp. 95-96; emphasis in the original). In the Theory of Knowledge, however, he 
changed his mind and asserted that relations themselves are “neutral with regard to ‘sense’” (Russell, 1913, p. 88): 
“whatever a relation is, it must be symmetrical with respect to its two ends. It must not be pictured as having a 
hook in front and an eye behind, but as having a hook at each end, and as equally adapted for travelling in either 
direction” (Ibid, p. 86). 
254 Russell 1906-1907, pp. 46-47, emphasis in the original. Russell did not admit the existence of 
particularized relations (see e.g. Russell, 1903, §55, pp. 51-53). Thus, if the proposition that “a loves b” is false, 
there are in the world the entities a, b and relation of loving, not the particularized relation “a's love for b”.    
255 Ibid., p. 49. 
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Russell introduces here judgement as consisting of several ideas. It is surprising since Russell 
argued and would argue again later against the notion of ideas being employed in the theory of 
judgement. 256 The unfitting nature of this theory in Russell’s thought is evident from the fact 
that in the subsequent versions of multiple relation theory (from 1910, 1912 and 1913), Russell 
already formulates his theory of judgement with worldly entities as constituting the fact of 
judgement.257 
This familiar form of the multiple relation theory is first presented already in a clear-cut 
form, in Russell’s 1910 article “On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood”.258 The being of false 
propositions is here rendered not as peculiar and suspicious, but simply as unpersuasive and 
unacceptable – it is “almost incredible” for Russell, since it is almost impossible to believe that 
there could be objective falsehoods without minds judging falsely.259 And if there are no false 
propositions, Russell repeats his argument, there are no true ones either since true and false 
judgements cannot differ intrinsically, i.e. in that one has an object and while the other 
doesn’t.260 And finally, the difference between truth and falsity remains unexplained if both true 
and false propositions are mind-independent self-subsistent entities.261 
The outcome of the denial of propositions is the same as in 1907: a judgement cannot 
be rendered as a dual relation to a single object (a complex or a proposition) since then, it would 
be, in the case of false propositions, in possession of no object and, therefore, true and false 
judgements would differ intrinsically. And, moreover, if false judgement lacks an object, it is 
not for Russell a judgement at all. Therefore, similarly as in 1907, Russell opts for another 
alternative: for conceiving of a judgement as a multiple relation in which a judging person is 
related to every constituent of the complex about which it is judged (i.e. to what was previously 
called a proposition). But now, Russell presents his conviction that judgement is not composed 
                                                 
256 See e. g. Russell, B. (1910a). On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood. In: Philosophical Essays. London: 
Longman, pp. 170-185, pp. 170-171; Russell 1913, pp. 139-140.  
257 Russell, 1910a; Russell, B. (1912). The Problems of Philosophy. Reprinted in 2008, Rockville: Arc 
Manor, chapter XII (Truth and Falsehood), pp. 56-61; Russell, B. (1913). Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 
Manuscript. In: E. R. Eames, ed. (1992). Theory of Knowledge, London and New York: Routledge. 
258 Russell, B. (1910a). On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood. In B. Russell, Philosophical Essays, London: 
Longman, pp. 170-185. 
259 “Thus, there will be in the world entities, not dependent upon the existence of judgements, which can be 
described as objective falsehoods. This is in itself almost incredible: we feel that there could be no falsehood if 
there were no minds to make mistakes” (Russell, 1910a, p. 176). However, we may point out, as I did in the case 
of Moore and as Moore himself did in criticizing Kant (see footnote 129), that the improbability of some theory 
does not prove its incorrectness.  
260 If they do, it would “enable us (which is obviously impossible) to discover the truth or falsehood of a 
judgement merely by examining the intrinsic nature of the judgment” (Russell 1910a, p. 177). 
261 Ibid., p. 176. 
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of ideas, but of objects in the world. Based on that, he is also in need of a modified version of 
a multiple relation theory. 
Still, it holds that judgement amounts to a multiple relation related to objects, but now 
objects serve both as the components of the fact of judgment and as that about which judgement 
is (a referent of judgement). Thus, if we bring in again the previous example of “a loves b”, 
now the theory holds that within a judgement, the objects a, love and b are unified by a 
judgmental relation, while at the level of objects about which we judge, we have – if the 
judgement is true – the unified complex “a loves b”. If the judgement is false, we encounter 
only a, b, and love, but they are not related by the relation of “love” and do not form a unified 
complex. 
As for the relation within the judgement, if we say, for instance, “Leonard loves Penny”, 
we have a judgement composed of the judging subject and the term Leonard, the relation love 
and the term Penny. These components are, however, not related by the relation love, but by 
the judgemental relation – it is the act of subject’s judging that takes up the role of a relating 
relation within the judgement. As Russell notes in his summary of multiple relation theory in 
the Problems of Philosophy, within the judgement the relation of love is not a “cement” which 
binds the elements – it does not function as a relating relation. It is rather only one of the 
“brick[s] in the structure”262, i.e. it is at the same level as the objects Leonard and Penny. 
Now let’s have a look at the level of objects about which we judge. There are the same 
objects as the objects in the judgment (only in judgment, there is also present a judging subject), 
but when they are related, it is the relation of love which unites them into the complex which is 
the object of judgement. The relation love thus clearly has a relating role here. If the judgement 
is true (Leonard really loves Penny), the components of judgement (the judging subject and the 
objects Leonard, love, and Penny) are put together by means of the judgemental relation and at 
the same time the objects as referents of judgement are related by the relating relation of loving 
into the worldly complex of Leonard’s loving Penny. If, on the other hand, the judgement is 
false, the judging subject and objects Leonard, love and Penny are related within the judgement 
by the judgemental relation, but as referents of judgement, they are not related by the relation 
of loving – there is not a corresponding complex Leonard’s loving Penny, but only disconnected 
                                                 
262 Russell, 1912, p. 60. 
  
70 
 
elements of Leonard, Penny and loving. 
In the manuscript The Theory of Knowledge from 1913, which we will focus on in more 
detailed in the next chapter, Russell introduces yet another element into the judgment: a form. 
According to the explanation which Russell provides here, this new element is necessary to 
explain how the objects within a judgment may be arranged in a proper order. This clarification 
is reputedly needed since Russell is now persuaded that the “relation of understanding alone”, 
i.e. the judgemental relation, does not suffice to bring together the objects in the judgment in 
the correct order. Thus, we are in need of a form to explain how it happens that we may arrange 
the objects in judgment in a proper way. In addition to the judgmental relation, we need to 
understand how objects may be arranged – which is achieved precisely by putting them into the 
appropriate places within the form.263 In the next section, I will attempt to explicate whether 
and how the objections against Russell theory of judgment are (also) applicable to this last 
account including the notion of a form.264 
3.3.2 Russell’s Correspondence Theory  
Russell’s multiple relation theory can be presented as a special version of a 
correspondence theory: on the one hand, there is a judgmental complex, and on the other, a 
worldly complex to which the judgment does or does not correspond, and is accordingly true 
or false. There are two objections which treat differently the issue of correspondence in 
Russell’s theory and which both end up condemning the theory as a flawed account of 
judgement. However, as I will attempt to show now, they both are based on a misreading of 
Rusell’s account. 
                                                 
263 “In an actual complex, the general form is not presupposed; but when we are concerned with a proposition 
which may be false and where, therefore, the actual complex is not given, we have only, as it were, the ‘idea’ or 
‘suggestion’ of the terms being united in such a complex; and this, evidently, requires that the general form of the 
merely supposed complex should be given. More simply, in order to understand ‘A and B are similar’, we must 
know what is supposed to be done with A and B and similarity, i.e. what it is for two terms to have a relation; that 
is, we must understand the form of the complex which must exist if the proposition is true” (Russell, 1913,  p. 
116); “It is difficult”, Russell claims, “to see how we could possibly understand how”, for instance, “Socrates and 
Plato and ‘precedes’ are to be combined unless we had acquaintance with the form of the complex” (Ibid, p. 99).  
264 Apart from more general objections to Russell’s multiple relation theory which treat the notion of a form 
as part of broader complications of the theory, the notion of a form, as introduced in the Theory of Knowledge, is 
complicated in itself – once, Russell denies it is a thing and another constituent of a judgement complex ([i]t is not 
a ‘thing’, not another constituent along with the objects that were previously related in that form”; Russell 1913, 
p. 93); later it is also defined as “something exceedingly simple” (Ibid., p. 113) and as “the fact that there are 
entities that make up complexes having the form in question” (Ibid., p. 114). How to put all these descriptions of 
the form together? It is not, for instance, explained how something may be a fact and something “exceedingly 
simple” at the same time. 
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The first objection comes from Russell’s contemporary, G. F. Stout, the other from a 
recent interpreter of Russell’s philosophy, Stewart Candlish. In 1914, G. F. Stout published an 
article “Mr. Russell’s Theory of Judgement” where he wholly devoted himself to the analysis 
and criticism of Russell’s multiple relation theory.265 Stout points out here that Russell acts as 
if he is an advocate of a correspondence theory of truth, but he actually shouldn’t be allowed to 
do so, since the judgement complex (composed of a judging subject, judgmental relating 
relation and objects) and the complex of objects which forms the referent of judgement do not, 
so to say, correspond enough.266 
The internal problem, which Stout identifies in Russell’s theory, resides in the fact that 
two complexes which should correspond actually contain such entities that the relation of 
correspondence cannot be realized. Not only does the judgement complex contain also a judging 
subject but also, and more importantly, a relating relation, which relates terms in the 
corresponding complex in the world (if the judgment is true), is not relating in the judgmental 
complex – instead there is a judgmental relation which relates objects within judgemental 
complex.267 Complexes are thus not similar enough since the judgement complex includes more 
elements than the complex referred to and since within it, the role of relating relation is taken 
over by the judgemental relation. 
Candlish, on the other hand, endeavours to argue that Russell’s two complexes 
correspond, so to say, too much – they are so similar that they actually coalesce into one 
complex. When judgement is true, Candlish claims, “judgement and judged fact coalesce, the 
former absorbing the latter as proper part”.268 The image Candlish has in mind is that there are 
two complexes while the one of them (actual complex) eventually amounts only to the part of 
the latter (judgement complex): the judgement complex contains judging subject and the 
worldly objects while the complex about which is judged contains only these objects. Thus, we 
may supposedly conclude, the complex as a referent of judgment is actually a mere part of the 
judgement complex. 
                                                 
265 Stout, G. F. (1914). Mr. Russell’s Theory of Judgment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 15, pp. 
332-352. 
266 Ibid., p. 344; see also Schaar 2013a, p. 103. 
267 “[t]he belief […] corresponds with the fact when there is an actual complex comprising all the constituents 
of the judgement complex except the mind, and unified, not by the judgement-relation, but by the relation of 
loving” (Stout, 1914, p. 341).  
268 Candlish, S. (2007). The Russell/Bradley Dispute and its Significance for Twentieth-Century Philosophy. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 65. 
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Both Candlish’s and Stout’s accounts clearly put forward the criticism to the effect that 
Russell’s theory cannot be accounted for a correspondence theory of truth even if they think so 
for contrasting reasons: i.e. because two entities which should correspond coalesce (Candlish), 
or are too dissimilar to really correspond (Stout). Since Russell’s multiple relation theory rests 
on the claim that judgement complex is composed of the objects about which it is judged (with 
the addition of the judging subject), it is undeniable that the presented correspondence theory 
differs from the more traditional versions of it in which the relation of correspondence holds 
between mental phenomena (ideas, mind-dependent concepts etc.) and the objects in the world.  
The specificity of Russell’s correspondence theory leads, according to Candlish, to the 
coalescence of judgmental and worldly complex: since the judgement complex contains 
worldly objects and the judging subject, the worldly complex, which should correspond to the 
judgmental complex, is actually contained in it as its part, since it consists merely of the worldly 
objects. However, I don’t think that Russell’s theory is susceptible to this objection. He indeed 
holds that, when a judgement is true, some of the elements within judgmental and worldly 
complex are the same: If I judge that “a loves b” and my judgment is true, there is in the world 
complex “a’s love for b” and my judgment consists of the same objects a, love and b and the 
judging subject. But still, there are two complexes – the judgmental and the actual complex – 
and there is no need to suppose that they collapse into one complex. 
For Stout, on the other hand, the complexes can correspond only if they are similar 
enough which, in Russell’s case, Stout understands as meaning that these complexes are 
composed only of the same elements. But, contra Stout, it may be objected that complexes don’t 
need to be composed only of the same objects to correspond. If I judge that “a loves b”, my 
judgment “a loves b” corresponds, if it is true, to the worldly complex “a’s love for b”. The fact 
that objects are put together, within a judgmental complex, by the relating relation performed 
by judging subject does not preclude the possibility of correspondence: complexes don’t need 
to be, or even may not be, completely identical to stay in a relation of correspondence. 
To conclude this chapter, it is appropriate to return to the broader topic of the thesis and 
pose the question of whether, by accepting that truth and falsity apply only to judgements, of 
which a judging mind is a component – and therefore that in a world without minds there would 
no truth or falsity –, Russell did not reassess the transcendental idealists’ persuasion about the 
crucial role of judgmental act and the judging subject. However, it seems to me that a closer 
investigation of Russell’s multiple relation theory does not reveal this influence. It is not merely 
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that Russell still considers judgement to be composed of worldly objects rather than 
representations, but more importantly that a judging subject does not actually play any 
substantial role in the multiple relation theory. True, the subject is the actor who carries out the 
judgmental relation which binds the elements of judgmental complex together. But eventually, 
it is neither the subject, nor the judgemental relation which guarantees the proper arrangement 
of terms in the judgement complex. A judging subject provides the judgment with no rules and 
restrictions which would guarantee that we will not end up judging nonsense or that we will 
assemble the terms in a judgment in a correct order. With these considerations, we are already 
approaching the objection which a young Wittgenstein raised against Russell’s multiple relation 
theory of judgement in 1913. Let us thus move to this objection.  
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4. The Russell-Wittgenstein Debate 
 
In 1911, Wittgenstein arrived at Cambridge to work under Russell and soon came to be 
considered by him a prodigious young man and potential disciple. At that time, the most recent 
contribution Russell made to the theory of judgement was the section concerning truth and 
falsehood in his 1912 The Problems of Philosophy where he repeated the substantial parts of 
his 1910 article “On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood”.269 When he began to write the 
manuscript named Theory of Knowledge in the spring of 1913,270 his overall intention was to 
write a book divided into an analytic and a constructive part. The former was intended to single 
out and enumerate basic elements of knowledge, while the latter part, drawing on the first, 
should have contained the account concerning the construction of moments of space, time and 
matter.271  
The theory of judgement was needed in the analytic part in order to explain how we 
make judgements about elementary and more complex (“molecular”) complexes. In the Theory 
of Knowledge Russell came up with a revised version of the multiple relation theory which 
included the new notion of a form inserted into the judgement complex. The first reference to 
Wittgenstein’s reaction to Russell’s working on the Theory of Knowledge is to be found in 
Russell’s diary dated 14 May 1913.272 On 21 May, Russell wrote in his letter to Ottoline Morell 
that Wittgenstein came last night (thus on 20 May) with “a refutation of the theory of judgement 
which I used to hold”: 
“Wittgenstein came to see me last night with a refutation of the theory of 
judgement which I used to hold. He was right, but I think the correction 
required is not very serious. I shall have to make up my mind within a week, 
as I shall soon reach judgement.”273 
In this comment, Russell does not expressly mention which of the theories he “used to 
                                                 
269 Russell, B. (1912). The Problems of Philosophy. Reprinted in 2008, Rockville: Arc Manor, chapter 12 
(“Truth and Falsehood”).  
270 Russell’s manuscript was named by its editors, but Russell himself mentioned this title in his letters and 
on other occasions. For more details see Russell, 1913, Introduction from Elizabeth Ramsden Eames, xiv. 
271 Ibid., Introduction, xv. Russell to Morrell, #768, 8 May 1913. The originals of all Russell’s letters to 
Ottoline Morrell quoted here are at the Humanities Research Center, University of Texas at Austin, and a microfilm 
copy is in the Bertrand Russell Archives, McMaster University. In citing from the letters, I quote from the 
Introduction to Russell, 1913. 
272 Russell, 1913, Introduction, xix. 
273 Ibid., Russell to Morrell, #782, 21 May 1913. 
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hold” he has in mind. However, it is plausible that he refers to a version of a multiple relation 
theory as presented in the 1910 article. (1912’s The Problems of Philosophy was downplayed 
by Wittgenstein as a popular book and probably wasn’t mentioned in the discussion with 
Russell at all.274) Then, during late May and the beginning of June, several other exchanges 
between Russell and Wittgenstein took place. Russell was initially concerned, but nevertheless 
persuaded that he would be able to avoid Wittgenstein’s objections with a relatively easy 
correction to his theory. As he mentioned in the comment quoted above, “I think the correction 
required is not very serious. I shall have to make up my mind within a week, as I shall soon 
reach judgement.” 
For the next week, Russell was indeed rewriting the theory of judgement, probably 
producing the one we know from the Theory of Knowledge, i.e. the account of judgement that 
includes the notion of a form. However, in that short period of time he became gradually more 
and more disquieted by Wittgenstein’s criticism. After another discussion (on 26 May), he 
concluded that he couldn’t really make sense of Wittgenstein’s comments – since Wittgenstein 
was quite “inarticulate” – but he also felt “that he [Wittgenstein] must be right”: 
“Wittgenstein came to see me – we were both cross from the heat – I showed 
him a crucial part of what I have been writing. He said it was all wrong, not 
realizing the difﬁculties – that he had tried my view and knew it wouldn’t 
work. I couldn’t understand his objection – in fact he was very inarticulate – 
but I feel in my bones that he must be right, and that he has seen something I 
have missed. If I could see it too I shouldn’t mind, but as it is, it is worrying, 
and has rather destroyed the pleasure in my writing.”275 
On 31 May, Russell informed Ottoline Morrell that he could “circumvent Wittgenstein’s 
problems” if he couldn’t solve them and that “he had recovered from the criticisms”.276 
However, it wasn’t probably quite true, since around 7 June he stopped working on the 
manuscript for good, leaving it unfinished with as much as 350 pages written.277 Later, on 19 
June, Wittgenstein eventually came up with what he – at least – considered to be an absolutely 
clearly stated objection against Russell’s theory: 
 
                                                 
274 Russell, 1913, Introduction, xix. 
275 Russell to Morrell, 27 May 1913; in N. Griffin, ed. (2002). The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, 
London: Routledge, p. 446. 
276 Russell to Morrell, #791, 3 May 1913; in: Russell, 2013, Introduction, xix. 
277 See Russell, 1913, Introduction, xvii.  
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“I can now express my objection to your theory of judgement exactly: I believe 
it is obvious that, from the proposition ʻA judges that (say) a is in a relation R 
to b’, if correctly analysed, the proposition ‘aRb v ∼ aRb’ must follow directly 
without the use of any other premiss. This condition is not fulﬁlled by your 
theory.”278 
This is probably Wittgenstein’s final word on Russell’s manuscript Theory of 
Knowledge from that time since he was assured now that he had expressed his objection exactly. 
Russell eventually wrote to Ottoline that his conversation with Wittgenstein and the objection(s) 
Wittgenstein put forward presented “an event of the first rate importance” in his life and that he 
could no longer hope to do any more “fundamental work in philosophy”, i.e. nothing concerning 
logic or epistemology.279 Wittgenstein acknowledged that his objection(s) presented a serious 
attack on Russell’s theory, mentioning that he was “very sorry to hear that my objection to your 
theory of judgement paralyses you”.280 Though sorry, Wittgenstein was persuaded that the 
criticism was necessary, since Russell had omitted an essential foundation for a correct theory 
of judgement, namely “a correct apprehension of the form of the proposition”.281 For some time, 
Russell was at a loss as to what to do with his theory of judgement, turning his attention to the 
preparation of his USA lectures for which another topic was chosen.282 
If we wish to account for Wittgenstein’s criticism, it is important to add that, apart from 
the previous comments on Russell’s theory of judgement, we also have two additional 
formulations of this criticism, namely those included in the Notes on Logic and in the Tractatus: 
“Every right theory of judgement must make it impossible for me to judge that 
this table penholders the book. Russell’s theory does not satisfy this 
requirement.”283 
                                                 
278 Letter to Morrell, 19 June 1913; in: Griffin 2002, p. 448; emphasis in the original. 
279 “Do you remember that at a time […] I wrote a lot of stuff about Theory of Knowledge, which 
Wittgenstein criticized with the greatest severity? His criticism […] was an event of first-rate importance in my 
life, and affected everything I have done since. I saw he was right, and I saw that I could not hope ever again to 
do fundamental work in philosophy” (Russell to Ottoline Morrell, 4 March 1916, quoted in Russell, B. (1975). 
Autobiography. London: George Allen & Unwin. Reprinted in 1998, London: Routledge, p. 282).  
280 Wittgenstein. L. (2008). Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 1911-1951. London and 
New York: Routledge, p. 42. 
281 “The epistemological questions concerning the nature of judgment and belief cannot be solved without a 
correct apprehension of the form of the proposition” (Wittgenstein, L. Notes on Logic, The Birmingham Notes. 
In: Potter, 2008, B55, p. 283. When I refer to the Notes on Logic further in the text and footnotes, I will use the 
abbreviation NL, together with the B (Birmingham version of the Notes) or C (Cambridge version) and a number 
of the remark.  
282 For more details concerning Russell’s American lectures (Lowell Lectures held during the spring term 
1914 at Harvard University) see Russell 1913, Introduction, xiv. 
283 Wittgenstein, NL, B33, in Potter, 2008, p. 280. 
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“The correct explanation of the form of the proposition ʻA judges p’ must 
show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not 
satisfy this condition.)”284 
4.1 Standard and Other Interpretations of Wittgenstein’s Criticism 
 
4.1.1 Standard Interpretation 
In order to come to terms with Wittgenstein’s objection, let’s initially look at the various 
interpretations of it offered within Wittgensteinian scholarship. To begin with, there is a reading 
of the objection which Peter Hanks dubbed as “standard”285 and whose classical formulation is 
attributed to Stephen Somerville and Nicolas Griffin.286 In a nutshell, this objection points out 
the mutual dependence of Russell’s theory of judgement and his theory of types. The theory of 
types presupposes the multiple relation theory of judgement while the multiple relation theory 
in turn presupposes the theory of types. Without going into technical details, let’s look at why 
these theories are supposed by Somerville and Griffin to be mutually required. 
Under Russell’s theory of judgement, the judgement that “a loves b” has the form J(S, 
a, R, b) or, with the addition of the form in the Theory of Knowledge, J(S, a, R, b, xθy), i.e. it 
includes the judging subject (S), the elements a, R, b and the form.287 However, Somerville and 
Griffin insist, it cannot be assured that this judgement is significant without employing further 
premises. To be specific, we need to stipulate that a and b are individuals, R is a first-order 
relation and xθy is the general form of a dual complex. However, to introduce these stipulations 
would require further judgements – that a is an individual, R is a relation etc. If we wish to 
assert that a and b are suitable arguments for the first-order relation (here loving), we need to 
                                                 
284 Wittgenstein, L. (1921). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. by C. K. Ogden (1922, London: 
Routledge) and later by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. (2001, London: Routledge). I will mostly refer to Pears 
and McGuinness’ translation; if I quote Ogden’s translation, I will mention it explicitly. Further I will refer to the 
Tractatus merely as TLP; 5.5422. 
285 Hanks, P. W. (2007). How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment. 
Synthese, 154(1), pp. 121-146, p. 122ff. 
286 Somerville, S. (1980). Wittgenstein to Russell (July, 1913). ʻI am Very Sorry to Hear… My Objection 
Paralyses You’. In: R. Haller and W. Grassl, eds., Language, Logic, and Philosophy: Proceedings of the 4th 
International Wittgenstein Symposium, Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, pp. 182-188 and Griffin, N. (1985). 
Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment. Philosophical Studies, 47, pp. 213–247. 
287 In this case, the form is the general form of dual complexes which Russell most often symbolizes “xRy” 
(Russell, 1913, p. 98ff, 113ff, 129ff.). In words, we may formulate this form as “something has some relation to 
something” (Ibid., p. 114). A “dual complex” is an atomic complex which contains one relating relation and two 
other terms (see Ibid., p. 80). Similarly, relations which can be relating in dual complexes may be called “dual 
relations” (Ibid). 
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make a judgement of higher than first-order.288 
However, Russell and Whitehead insist in Principia Mathematica that higher-order 
judgements need to be defined cumulatively on lower-order judgements.289 Thus, we cannot 
presuppose the higher-order judgements in the analysis of lower-order ones. In our case, we 
cannot presuppose the ability to carry out e.g. a judgement that “a is an individual” to guarantee 
the significance of the judgement that “a loves b”. If however, the argument continues, Russell 
cannot use these higher-order judgements, then nonsensical judgement becomes possible since 
we may put into the empty places in the form something not suitable to these positions (e.g. 
another form). But, the argument unfolds, if there can be nonsensical judgements, the 
propositions which emerge cannot be regimented by type theory.290 
There are several objections against this “classical” reading which mostly put an 
emphasis on the paucity of both Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s remarks about the theory of types 
in their correspondence in 1913, where they discussed Russell’s theory of judgement. In this 
context, it is often noted that any reference to the theory of types is missing from almost all 
letters dealing with the theory of judgement Wittgenstein addressed to Russell, as well as from 
his formulation in the Notes on Logic and Tractatus.291 In the Notes on Logic, theory of types 
is mentioned, but appears in a different place and context from the objection concerning the 
possibility of judging nonsense.292 In the Tractatus, the claim about the possibility of judging 
nonsense within Russell’s theory is numbered 5.5422 which makes it a comment to 5.54, 
namely to a section devoted to the issue of general propositional form. On the other hand, 
Wittgenstein only alludes to theory of types in the remarks 3.3s, a completely different part of 
the Tractatus. 
A sole exception to this absence of a connecting link between the theory of judgement 
and the theory of types in Wittgenstein’s writings occurs in his oft-cited letter from January 
                                                 
288 Somerville, 1980, p. 187; Griffin, 1985, p. 242. If we wish to assert that a and b are suitable arguments 
for the first-order relation (here loving), we need to make a judgement of higher than first-order. 
289 Whitehead, A. N. and Russell, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica I. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. Reprinted in 1997, Principia Mathematica to *56, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Book I, ch. 2, 
III (Definition and Systematic Ambiguity of Truth and Falsehood), pp. 41-47.  
290 Griffin, 1985, p. 145. 
291 Hanks, 2007, pp. 134-135. 
292 The objection concerning possibility of judging nonsense appears in NL, B39/C33, while the “theory of 
types” is mentioned in NL, B76/C46 where it concerns the fact that “a proposition cannot occur in itself” (Potter, 
2008, pp. 288-289).  
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1913.293 There, he proposes an analysis of atomic (elementary) complexes in which all qualities 
and relations are considered “copulae”. The reasoning behind this proposal is that “there cannot 
be different Types of things. In other words, whatever can be symbolized by a simple proper 
name must belong to one type”.294 And, Wittgenstein immediately adds, “every theory of types 
must be rendered superﬂuous by a proper theory of symbolism”.295 Thus if, for instance, the 
proposition “Socrates is mortal” is analysed into Socrates, mortality and (∃x,y)∈1(x,y) (intended 
to represent the copula of a subject-predicate proposition, with the verbal form “Something is 
predicated of something”), there needs to be an additional “theory of types” which can 
demonstrate that “Mortality is Socrates” is a nonsensical proposition, i.e. in the words of 
Principles of Mathematics, that Socrates is a non-relating term and mortality is a verbal noun 
formed from potentially relating term “to be mortal”. In contrast, if the same proposition is 
analysed, as Wittgenstein here proposes, into Socrates and an intrinsically copulative form 
(∃x)φx. I cannot assemble these components so that nonsensical proposition “Mortality is 
Socrates” could possibly ensue. 
When we attend to the example provided, however, we will eventually have to conclude 
that what Wittgenstein describes here as a “theory of types” is not identical to what Russell 
gives the label to. While Russell’s theory of types deals with the discriminations of judgments 
on the higher level, Wittgenstein’s example focuses on the discrimination of terms on the 
elementary level of judgment. To this essential difference, we may also add that Wittgenstein 
works here with the analysis of propositions which he soon abandoned296, namely one which 
analyses a subject-predicate proposition into the subject and a subject-predicate form. And, 
finally, while the discussion between Russell and Wittgenstein regarding the theory of 
judgement does not take place until May and June 1913, the cited letter containing the remark 
about types dates from January that year, meaning there is almost a half year gap between the 
events. This further supports my conviction that Wittgenstein’s “theory of types” from the 
January letter does not coincide with Russsell’s theory of the same name and that it therefore 
cannot serve as a counterexample to the absence of to the theory of types related discussion 
between Russell and Wittgenstein. 
                                                 
293 Wittgenstein, 2008, p. 38. 
294 Ibid. 
295 Ibid. 
296 And which is very similar to Russell’s analysis of a form in the Theory of Knowledge; see Potter, 2008, 
p. 110. 
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The last thing to add, even if it is not a direct proof, may be that the discussion of the 
theory of types is also completely missing from Russell’s letters to Ottoline Morrell. In itself, 
this is hardly surprising – even philosophers are probably able to realize that to charm a woman 
you should choose other topics than highly technical discussions on the foundations of logic. 
However, the fact is that Russell did mention to Ottoline several details concerning his theory 
of judgement, even if he mostly commented on the emotional devastation Wittgenstein’s rather 
incomprehensible criticism left him in. In this respect, I would be inclined to believe that if the 
essential point of Wittgenstein’s criticism was (or at least had been understood by Russell to 
be) an incompatibility of theories of types and of judgement, Russell would have at least 
mentioned the theory of types by name. 
Finally, there is an objection raised by Michael Potter based on his thorough 
investigations not only of Wittgenstein’s philosophy itself, but also his style of work and the 
general features of his arguments. In this context, Potter points out that it is extremely 
improbable that Wittgenstein would ground his argument against Russell’s theory of judgement 
on technical issues concerned with its relation to the theory of types.297 Wittgenstein was, 
according to Potter, “neither competent with the formal details of Russell’s theory of types nor 
much concerned at any point in his career to offer complex technical arguments of the kind 
Griffin suggests”.298 Also, Potter adds, the mere fact that the criticism of Russell’s theory of 
judgement is repeated in the Tractatus suggests that the argument has never been concerned 
with the technicalities of the theory of types. I find these suggestions and Potter’s discussions 
of Wittgenstein’s argumentative style persuasive and I consider them as additional evidence 
against the Somerville-Griffin interpretation. For all these reasons, I believe that the mutual 
dependence of the theory of types on one side and the theory of judgment on the other wasn’t 
the underlying reason behind Russell’s shelving of his multiple relation theory.299 This 
                                                 
297 Potter, 2008, pp. 193-195. I mention here only the fact that according to classical interpretation, 
Wittgenstein’s objection was to the effect that Russell’s theory of judgement and theory of types are mutually 
circularly dependent on each other. However, both Griffin and Somerville go into very precise details of how 
higher order judgements are implemented into elementary ones to show why exactly these theories presuppose 
each other. Potter’s point is that Wittgenstein was never concerned with those very technical details of the theory 
of types. I do not mention here these technicalities. Even if so, I believe Potter’s argument regarding Wittgenstein’s 
style of criticism (not concerned with technical details of philosophical theories) is still comprehensible. 
298 Potter, 2008, pp. 129-30; also mentioned in Johnston, C. (2012). Russell, Wittgenstein and Synthesis in 
Thought. In: J. L. Zalabardo, ed., Wittgenstein‘s Early Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 15-36, 
pp. 24-25.  
299 The last thing worth adding is that Russell mentions in his own remarks the theory of types in connection 
with the debates with Wittgenstein only once, namely in the unpublished, handwritten notes titled Props (i.e. 
“Propositions”) which were found along with the manuscript of the Theory of Knowledge (Blackwell, K. and 
Eames, E. R., eds. (1984). The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. Volume 7: Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 
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inevitably leads us to the question of what the true reason was. It will be the aim of the next 
section to answer this question. 
4.1.2 Other Interpretations – Problems of Truth, Correspondence and Synthesis 
Apart from the “standard” interpretation of the Russell-Wittgenstein debate, there is a 
second style of interpretation that is nowadays widespread and generally accepted. Most 
interpreters now agree that Wittgenstein’s objection to Russell’s theory of judgement has 
something to do with what is called a “narrow-” and “wide-direction problem”. The narrow 
direction problem (also referred to simply as the “direction problem”) is the objection that 
Russell is unable to ensure, in the case of so-called non-symmetrical permutative complexes 
(those which allow more than one non-equivalent combination of their terms) that we will end 
up judging one thing rather than the other (e.g. that we will judge “that a loves b” and not “that 
b loves a”).300 It is referred to as the “narrow-direction problem” because the judgements it 
refers to at least make sense. The “wide-direction problem” (also called the “unity problem”) 
is even more far-reaching, since it points out that Russell’s theory allows us to assemble the 
elements of a judgement complex non-meaningfully – i.e. we may not only judge that “a loves 
b” or “b loves a” (as in the narrow-direction problem), but also that “a bs love” or “Love as b” 
etc. 
My further discussion of Wittgenstein’s objection will focus on these issues, but 
indirectly. What I wish to do is pick out those interpretations of the authors who assert that the 
core difficulty that Wittgenstein pointed out to Russell resided neither in the direction- nor the 
unity problem, but in a deeper difficulty inherent in the multiple relation theory – while each of 
these authors locates this central difficulty in a slightly different place. This approach arises 
                                                 
Manuscript. London and New York: Routledge, Appendix BI, pp. 195-199). As editors note (Ibid., p. 195), it is 
probable that this manuscript was written almost immediately after the discussion with Wittgenstein in late May. 
Here, Russell introduces a highly controversial and never really accepted notion of a “neutral fact” – every 
judgement, whether true or false, includes a neutral fact which replaces the form introduced in the Theory of 
Knowledge. In the concluding remark, Russell states that “[t]here will only be a neutral fact when the objects are 
of the right types” (Ibid., p. 199). However, the sketchiness of the remarks as well as the absence of the notion of 
neutral fact from any other writings is probably a sufficient reason for not putting an excessive interpretative 
weight on these remarks. 
300 In the Theory of Knowledge, Russell distinguishes three types of complexes: non-permutative, 
permutative symmetrical and permutative non-symmetrical (Russell, 1913, pp. 122-123). Non-permutative are 
those complexes in which there is only one way to assemble their elements, e.g. “a is an element of A”. Permutative 
complexes, on the other hand, allow at least two combinations of their elements. Within them, symmetrical are 
those complexes in which all ways of elements’ composition produce the complex with the same meaning, e.g. “a 
is similar to b” and “b is similar to a”. And, finally, permutative, yet non-symmetrical are those complexes whose 
various compositions of elements generate complexes with different meanings, e.g. “a is bigger than b” and “b is 
bigger than a”. It is those last ones which present a difficulty for Russell’s theory. 
  
82 
 
from my impression that Wittgenstein didn’t only wish to persuade Russell that his theory 
allowed incorrectly assembled judgement complexes, but also that this was a symptom of its 
being based, in all its variants, on essentially flawed foundations.301 
I will therefore attend here only to those interpretations which seem to recognize that 
Wittgenstein’s objection not only targeted the direction and unity problems but that it also 
alluded to other, additional, and potentially more serious difficulties. In what follows, I will 
concentrate on the exposition and critical evaluation of three interpretations which I take to 
surpass the wide- and narrow-direction problems, namely that of Peter Hanks, Colin Johnston 
and Christopher Pincock. Each of these authors points in different ways beyond the direction- 
and unity problems, but each of them also emphasizes, I believe, some important aspects of 
what was going on in the Russell-Wittgenstein debate. I will begin by summarizing each 
interpretation before going on to explain, with reference to these views, what I consider to be 
at the centre of Wittgenstein’s criticism. 
(a) Hanks – Truth and Falsity 
According to the interpretation put forward by Peter Hanks, Wittgenstein’s objection to 
the multiple relation theory was, in effect, “essentially the same one that was fatal for Russell’s 
theory of propositions”, namely the familiar problem of propositional (and later judgmental) 
unity.302 However, while it initially seems that Hanks will go on to assert that the central 
difficulty resides in this unity problem (now of the unity of terms – apart from a judging subject 
– within a judgement complex), he eventually ends up insisting that the Russell-Wittgenstein 
dispute essentially revolves around the problem of judgment’s truth and falsity. To be more 
specific, Wittgenstein has shown to Russell, according to Hanks, that his multiple relation 
theory does not produce any truth-bearer which may be true or false.303 
What is Hanks’ point here? On Russell’s theory of judgement, when one judges he 
produces a judgement complex whose constituents (e.g. those of a judging subject, a, love and 
b in “a loves b”) are mutually connected by means of the judgemental relation. In the Theory 
                                                 
301 This may be suggested by the fact that Wittgenstein replied to Russell, after going through his manuscript 
of the Theory of knowledge, that “it was all wrong” (Russell’s letter to Morrell, 28 May 1913 reports Wittgenstein’s 
visit on 26th May, see Russell, 1913, Introduction, xix). It is not that the new introduction of the form is problematic 
in itself but rather that the multiple relation theory as a whole is “all wrong”. 
302 Hanks, 2007, p. 122. 
303 Ibid., p. 138ff.  
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of Knowledge, Russell also introduced the notion of a form – in that case, in the judgement that 
“a loves b”, a, love and b are put by means of the judgemental relation into the proper places 
within the form of a dual relation (xRy). 
Hanks proposes that the central objection Wittgenstein raised against this theory is that 
within Russell’s description of judgement, a judgement cannot be either true or false, since the 
elements a, b and R are within it merely collected, but not unified. However, Hanks goes on, 
merely “a collection of items, even if they are of right number and variety of types, is not the 
sort of thing that can be true or false and hence not the sort of thing that can be judged”.304 
These terms within a judgement are in Hanks’ words “disunified and separate”, meaning they 
are brought together in nothing more than a “disunified collection”.305 
 According to Hanks, this is itself the consequence of the fact that within the judgement 
complex, the terms are merely associated with respective positions in a logical form – for 
instance, in the judgement that “a loves b”, a is paired with x, love with R and b with y of the 
logical form xRy. This pairing alone, Hanks claims, will not produce anything which can be 
true or false.306 To achieve something to which we can ascribe truth or falsity, “[s]ome further 
act of predicating or applying [relating term] to the pair [of non-relating terms] seems 
necessary”.307 However, Hanks is persuaded that nothing of this kind is present in Russell’s 
theory. 
This objection is applicable to Russell’s multiple relation theory quite generally, i.e. to 
all its various formulations (also if it does not contain the notion of a form).308 It is therefore 
independent of any particular formulation of the theory and it is directed against any theory 
which accounts for a judgement as an act in which subject stands in a multiple relation to terms 
which are unified by judgemental relation either with or without the help of a form.309 
To persuade us that Wittgenstein targeted precisely this issue of truth or falsity of 
judgement, Hanks quotes and comments upon a remark found in Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic: 
                                                 
304 Ibid., p. 138. 
305 Ibid. 
306 Ibid., p. 127. 
307 Ibid., emphasis in the original. 
308 Whether or not judgement includes the form, it still will be true, according to Hanks, that it consists 
merely of mutually associated, not predicated elements. 
309 Ibid. 
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“When we say A judges that etc., then we have to mention a whole proposition 
which A judges. It will not do either to mention only its constituents, or its 
constituents and form, but not in the proper order. This shows that a 
proposition itself must occur in the statement that it is judged; however, for 
instance, ‘not-p’ may be explained, the question, ‘What is negated’ must have 
a meaning.”310 
Here, Wittgenstein emphasizes that if we negate a statement, the question “what is 
negated” must be meaningful. The same then holds for a judgement – when we ask “what is 
judged?”, our answer must have a meaning. Wittgenstein’s point then is, Hanks asserts, that it 
is exactly this requirement which is not met by Russell’s theory of judgement: on Russell’s 
theory, if asked “what do you judge?”, one’s answer may only be that I judge a, R and b, i.e. 
several disunified elements. This does not amount to a meaningful answer since what I really 
judge, and what can be true or false, needs to be unified (in our case it is judged that aRb, not 
that a, R and b). When Wittgenstein criticises Russell for not ruling out the possibility of 
nonsensical judgement, he contends, according to Hanks, that any collection of terms present 
in the judgement complex cannot be true or false, since it amounts merely to a “disunified 
collection” of elements. Thus, Hanks in effect claims that on Russell’s theory, any judgement 
would be nonsensical, since no judgement which contains a disunified collection of elements 
can be true or false: “When R is a term, ʻa R’s b’ is just as nonsensical as ʻthe table penholders 
the book’.”311 
(b) Johnston – Synthesis in Thought 
Let’s turn our attention now to another interpretation that considers Wittgenstein’s 
objection to go beyond the direction- and unity problem. In his rendering, Colin Johnston 
proposes that the objection’s key purpose is to demonstrate that Russell “fails to explain an 
atomic judgement’s representation of entities as combined”.312 This failure is alleged to result 
from the fact that Russell’s multiple relation theory is based on the general theory of complexes 
which Russell elaborated in the Theory of Knowledge. A complex, like a proposition in the 
                                                 
310 Wittgenstein, NL, B21, C29. 
311 Hanks, 2007, p. 138. This expression suggests that, in Hanks’ view, the incapacity of terms within a 
judgmental complex to form a unified whole is related to the problem of non-relating relation: it seems to follow 
from the fact that an initially relating relation is non-relating within a judgment. What is missing is an act of 
predication of the relation to related terms. However, one may ask why this act of predication cannot be realized 
by a judgmental relation. It seems that Hanks presupposes that if it is not produced by the relation as a term, a 
judgmental relation cannot realize it either.  
312 Johnston, 2012, p. 15.  
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Principles of Mathematics, is anything which has constituents.313 These constituents have 
“modes of occurring” in complexes, meaning that each constituent (term) occurs in a complex 
in a particular way. The way a constituent may occur in the complex is determined by its 
“logical type” and the term’s capacity to occur and function in complexes in certain ways may 
be dubbed as its “logical possibility”.314 
What Johnston considers essential, since it will lay the ground for Wittgenstein’s 
criticism, is that within the theory of complexes, Russell is committed to the so called “principle 
of substitutability” which claims that:  
“if there is a logically possible complex A in which entity e1 appears in a mode 
m (e.g. as a term, as dual relating relation) and a logically possible complex B 
in which a second entity e2 appears in the same mode m, then there is a 
logically possible complex A’ which is the result of substituting e2 in for e1 in 
any position in which it occurs in A in mode m.”315 
Thus, when we substitute, within a logically possible complex, an entity which appears 
there in a given mode with another entity with the same mode (same possibility of appearance), 
we will again obtain a logically possible complex.  
Drawing on this general theory of complexes, a certain entity (e.g. a relation) can occur 
in a judgment complex (as term) in a way in which it cannot occur in the putative corresponding 
complex (where it would have to be relating). When the entity occurs in this way, which goes 
against its logical nature, in the judgment complex, the judgment is nonsensical. Since Russell’s 
general theory of complexes allows this occurrence, it cannot prevent the occurrence of these 
nonsensical judgements. This, in turn, results from the relation within a judgment complex 
being treated as non-relational. When relation is treated as non-relational, its mode of 
appearance within the complex is not distinguishable from that of other terms (e.g. a and b in 
aRb). Thus, a relation can be substituted within that complex by any other term and it is 
possible, in consequence, to carry out a nonsensical judgement, e.g. replace “love” by 
“Sheldon” in the judgment complex “S (subject) judges that Penny loves Leonard” and end up 
with the nonsense judgement that “Penny Sheldons Leonard”. 
                                                 
313 “A ‘complex’ is anything analyzable, anything which has constituents” (Russell, 1913, p. 79, emphasis 
in the original). 
314 Johnston, 2012, pp. 16-17. Russell himself does not use this terminology (“logical type” and “logical 
possibility”) in the Theory of Knowledge.  
315 Johnston, 2012, p. 19. 
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The essential lesson Wittgenstein gave Russell thus lies, according to Johnston, in 
reminding him that if he faithfully adheres to his own principle of substitutability, he is forced 
to accept the possibility of nonsensical judgements.316 It may indeed seem that Russell forgot 
his own adherence to this principle since he “spends considerable effort in his 1913 work 
Theory of Knowledge theorizing about complexes in ways which contravene precisely this […] 
version of (S) [principle of substitutability]”.317 Johnston here directs our attention to Russell’s 
discussion concerning non-symmetrical permutative complexes and his attempt to get rid of 
their ambiguity. These complexes are those in which there is more than one way their 
constituents may be arranged – the classic examples are “_ is bigger than _”, “_ is on the left of 
_” etc. In those cases, two complexes may arise – a is bigger than b or b is bigger than a; a is 
on the left of b or b is on the left of a. 
What Russell attempts to do in the Theory of Knowledge is analyse this ambiguity away 
by introducing the molecular complexes in which each term is in possession of a determined 
position (e.g. the complex “a is bigger than b” is to be analysed into “there is a complex in 
which a is bigger and b is smaller”). By doing this, however, Russell’s proposed remedy 
addresses only a narrow kind of ambiguity (the direction problem), and neglects altogether other 
rearrangements that principle of substitutability allows (the unity problem). Moreover, already 
the attempt to prevent the problem of direction, however, goes against Russell’s own principle 
of substitutability.  
While Russell was persuaded, in 1913, “that he had the right to disallow certain 
substitutions that (S) [principle of substitutability] would allow”, i.e. to “disallow certain 
unwelcome looking substitutions in his multiple relation judgement complexes”,318 
Wittgenstein’s objection resides, according to Johnston, in pressing upon Russell his own 
commitment to the principle in question. As evidence for his interpretation, Johnston reminds 
us of the fact that in 1918, when Russell returned to his work on the theory of judgement (in his 
lectures The Philosophy of Logical Atomism), he engaged only in the considerations which were 
in line with the principle of substitutability, i.e. he did not introduce ad hoc arrangements which 
would help him to exclude unwelcome substitutions.319 Thus, the attempted analysis of non-
                                                 
316 Ibid., pp. 21, 24. 
317 Ibid., p. 21. 
318 Ibid., p. 22. 
319 Ibid., pp. 22-23; Russell, B. (1972). The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. Reprinted in 2010, London: 
Routledge. 
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symmetrical permutative complexes is missing and after Russell’s shelving the Theory of 
Knowledge manuscript in 1913 was, in fact, never attempted again. Johnston’s eventual 
conclusion is that Wittgenstein’s claim about the possibility of nonsensical judgements within 
Russell’s adherence to the principle of substitutability can be understood as a “demonstration” 
of the inability of Russell’s multiple relation theory to account for the synthesis in thought”.320 
What does this objection amount to? 
By introducing the notion of a “form” in the Theory of Knowledge, Russell endeavoured 
to explicate the possibility of a subject’s unifying terms within a judgement even where it 
happens that the judgement is false, i.e. that the terms are actually (in the world) not related in 
the way judgement unites them. To combine terms in thought amounts for Russell to having 
them together with the form, i.e. with their mode of combination. This account, Johnston 
contends, is offered by Russell as an explanation of the synthesis in thought, i.e. of the fact that 
terms are mutually combined in the mind to form a unity and thus may represent the terms they 
are about as being combined in the same way.321 The point of Wittgenstein’s objection then 
lies, according to Johnston, basically in arguing that synthesis in thought may amount to 
something quite different than the terms’ being related, within a judgment, to the form: 
“We might worry here that simply including the way things are represented [i.e. a form] 
as standing amongst the constituents of a judgement does not obviously do the required work – 
it is not obvious how this explains the fact that the judgement represents things as standing 
together in the included way. A thought’s synthesizing certain things might seem rather different 
from its containing both those things and a mode of synthesis.”322 
Wittgenstein’s famous objection concerning the possibility of judging nonsense is 
therefore for Johnston the reformulation of his view that Russell’s account of judgement is not 
capable of explaining the synthesis of terms in thought. If so, however, it still remains to ask 
what a more accurate explanation of this “synthesis in thought” might be. 
 
 
                                                 
320 Johnston, 2012, p. 31. 
321 Ibid., p. 25ff. 
322 Ibid., p. 28; emphasis mine. 
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(c) Pincock – Correspondence 
The last interpretation I would like to discuss in more detail is that offered by 
Christopher Pincock.323 Pincock argues that while almost all interpreters of the Russell-
Wittgenstein dispute over the nature of judgement suppose that it eventually concerns either the 
unity- or the direction-problem, there is actually another difficulty which is the only one to 
explain Russell’s abandonment of the multiple relation theory: the problem of correspondence 
between the judgement complex and the complex in the world which is judged (“corresponding 
complex”). In this claim, Pincock’s interpretation is indeed unique – I do not know of any other 
commentator who would so straightforwardly claim that neither the unity- nor direction-
problem plays any role whatsoever in Wittgenstein’s criticism while the problem of 
correspondence is crucial. Let us look therefore at how Pincock’s unusual interpretation 
unfolds. 
Pincock, like Johnston, claims that Russell’s theory of judgement rests upon his general 
theory of complexes. However, while their interpretations in this respect converge, the authors 
eventually disagree over what the theory of complexes as applied to the theory of judgement 
actually obliges Russell to adhere to. For Pincock, the vital part of the theory of complexes – 
which will be then related to the problem of correspondence – is “a distinction between 
descriptions that pick out a logically possible complex and those which fail to do this”.324 
Russell’s intention is that a judgement complex will be logically possible just in case there is a 
logically possible corresponding complex whose existence it would assert. (But it is an open 
question whether his theory delivers this result.)325 
The distinction between logically possible and impossible complexes is sufficient, 
                                                 
323 Pincock, C. (2008). Russell’s Last (And Best) Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgement. Mind, 117(465), 
pp. 107-139.  
324 Ibid., p. 114. 
325 As Pincock notes (Ibid.), Russell defines what “logically possible” complex is only very late in the Theory 
of Knowledge manuscript when he claims that complex is logically possible if there is a proposition which has the 
same verbal form (Russell, 2013, p. 111). And, as Pincock adds (Ibid.), it cannot be Russell’s last word since it is 
the notion of a proposition which is to be explained: “When we were discussing relations, we said that, with a 
given relation and given terms, two complexes are ‘logically possible’. But the notion of what is ‘logically 
possible’ is not an ultimate one, and must be reduced to something that is actual before our analysis can be 
complete. Now although we do not yet know what a proposition is, it is obvious that what we had in mind, when 
we said that a complex was ‘logically possible’, may be expressed by saying that there is a proposition having the 
same verbal form” (Russell, 2013, p. 111; emphasis in the original). Precisely because the notion of what is 
logically possible needs to be reduced to something actual, it eventually needs to be defined based on the 
correspondence of a judgement complex with the worldly complex. 
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according to Pincock, to elucidate why Russell didn’t need to be worried about the problem for 
whose discovery Wittgenstein is generally credited, i.e. about the possibility of judging 
nonsense. The reason for this is that the theory of logically possible complexes already makes 
apparent the impossibility of nonsensical judgement precisely because nonsensically arranged 
complexes are not logically possible. A judging subject thus cannot judge, for instance, that 
“Cassio desdemonas love” since “such understandings are ruled out because there is no 
logically possible complex with [this] form”.326 Pincock is therefore convinced that Russell can 
solve the unity problem merely by relying on his general theory of complexes. 
However, Pincock admits, even if the unity problem is rendered irrelevant, there is still 
the need to tackle the narrow-direction problem, i.e. the question of how to distinguish the 
judgement that “a loves b” and that “b loves a”. As we have seen, the complexes which are 
liable to this complication are called, in the Theory of Knowledge, non-symmetrical 
permutative.327 Russell proposes, in order to rule out the unwelcome substitutions, to analyse 
these initially atomic complexes into more complicated, molecular complexes in which the 
notion of a position of terms within a complex comes to the fore. To be specific, we can analyse 
the atomic complex “a loves b” into the molecular complex “there is a complex in which a 
loves b and b is loved by a”. Or, to make use of the example Russell himself offers on this 
occasion, the complex “a is before b” must be interpreted as meaning “there is a complex in 
which a is earlier and b is later”.328 
This solution seemed unsatisfactory, however, even to Russell – for one thing, he never 
finished the part of the Theory of Knowledge concerning the theory of molecular complexes 
and it therefore remains unanswered how one should further account for the constitution of 
those complexes. It may be that they would need to contain some “molecular” logical forms in 
order to be properly united. Based on the uncertainty concerning the precise constitution of 
permutative non-symmetrical complexes, there arises in their case a problem with the 
correspondence (of these complexes with their referents). This difficulty resides in a lack of 
clarity concerning what properties the judgement complex must have in order for the judgement 
to be true. In the case of permutative non-symmetrical complexes, Pincock holds, Russell did 
not successfully show that for each logically possible judgement complex, there is “a complex 
                                                 
326 Pincock, 2008, p. 119. 
327 For the distinction between non-permutative, permutative symmetrical and permutative non-symmetrical 
complexes see footnote 300.  
328 Russell, 2013, p. 145ff. 
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whose existence is necessary and sufficient for [this (judgemental) complex’s] truth”.329 
This, in turn, is because “the ultimate constituents of the belief complex cannot be 
univocally mapped to a logically possible complex”330. Let’s demonstrate this on one specific 
example: in the judgement complex “a loves b”, its ultimate constituents are not only a, love 
and b, but also those constituents which describe the existential quantification and conjunction 
contained in the complex “there is a complex in which a loves b and a is loved by b”. If, 
however, we have after analysis these disunified elements (a, love, b and expressions for 
existential quantification and conjunction), the analysis still leaves us with two logically 
possible complexes: “a loves b” or “b loves a”. The only option to sidestep the ambiguity would 
be to retain, after analysis of the complex, the whole propositions “a loves b” and “b is loved 
by a”. However, this would amount to the danger of reintroducing false propositions since the 
judgement may also be false.331 But this would contradict the core idea of the multiple relation 
theory. As a result of this problem the correspondence between a judgement complex and its 
referent remains an unresolved mystery in the Theory of Knowledge. 
To back up this interpretation and to make it compatible with the influence on Russell 
of Wittgenstein’s criticism, Pincock interprets Wittgenstein’s objection as also being concerned 
with truth and correspondence and not with the unity problem.332 The actual point on which 
Wittgenstein puts the strongest emphasis is according to Pincock the judgement’s necessity of 
its always being either true or false. This is allegedly expressed by Wittgenstein’s claim that 
“from the proposition ‘A judges that (say) a is in a relation R to b’, if correctly analysed, the 
proposition ‘aRb v ∼ aRb’ must follow directly without the use of any other premiss”333, i.e. 
from “A judges that aRb”, it must directly follow that aRb  is a meaningful proposition which 
is either true of false.334 However, this is not guaranteed by Russell’s theory owing to the above-
                                                 
329 Pincock, 2007, p. 125. 
330 Pincock uses here the notion “belief complex” for what I call “judgement complex”. They do not differ 
in any important respects. In the Theory of Knowledge, Russell also uses both terms interchangeably, he only 
mentions that, according to him, the word “belief” is more fitting since “it has much more definitely the suggestion 
of a particular dated event which may be studied empirically by psychology” (Russell, 2013, p. 136). However, I 
prefer the notion “ judgement complex” precisely because it is more indicative of the fact that Russell’s discussion 
is part of the broader philosophical context of disputes concerning the nature of judgment.  
331 Pincock, 2008, p. 123. 
332 Ibid., p. 130. 
333 Russell’s letter to Morrell, 19 June 1913. In Griffin, 2002, p. 448; emphasis in the original. 
334 The interpretation according to which the proposition ‘aRb v ∼ aRb’ is the expression of the 
meaningfulness of a proposition (and therefore of its being either true or false) is present in the Principia 
Mathematica (Whitehead, A. N. and Russell, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica I. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. Reprinted in 1997, Principia Mathematica to *56, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 
129); see also Potter, 2008, p. 127 and Johnston, 2012, p. 30. 
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discussed difficulties with the correspondence relation in permutative non-symmetrical 
complexes. In the following subsection, I will analyse all three interpretations presented here 
and attempt to provide, based on this discussion, my own evaluation of Wittgenstein’s 
objection.   
4.2 What Was the Objection Then? 
The commentaries examined above all share the belief that the main point underlying 
the Russell-Wittgenstein debate is more basic than both the problem of direction (the narrow 
direction problem) and the problem of unity (the wide direction problem). For Hanks, the major 
topic is the contention that a Russellian judgement complex is incapable of asserting that 
something is true or false. Johnston identifies as the core of the dispute Wittgenstein’s insistence 
that Russell did not successfully describe the synthesis of the elements in thought. And Pincock 
supposes that even though the unity problem can be successfully addressed, there remains a 
further unresolved complication, namely the nature of correspondence relation between the 
judgement complex and the worldly complex whose existence the judgement asserts. 
According to Hanks, the judgement complexes described in Russell’s multiple relation 
theory cannot serve as bearers of truth or falsity because their elements are merely associated. 
If this is the case, Russell is not in a position to account for judgement’s ability to assert 
something about its referent, i.e. about the complex the judgement is directed toward. Hanks 
draws our attention to Wittgenstein’s claim in Notes on Logic that in stating that someone 
judges something, we need to mention a whole proposition, not merely its elements.335 The 
emphasis put on the meaningfulness of the judgment, which must be formulated in the form of 
a whole proposition, suggests that Wittgenstein reacts to a theory in which what is judged is not 
accounted for as a whole proposition, but rather as “only its constituents”. And it is not hard to 
guess that the theory discussed is Russell’s multiple relation theory. 
However, I don’t think that Russell’s theory is susceptible to Hanks’ objection. True, it 
may be that a conception of judgement as an act in which judgemental relation takes several 
terms and assembles them together may seem in danger of propounding that what we judge 
amount merely to several disunified elements. But even if we are in doubt as to whether these 
elements are assembled so that they constitute a unity which can be true or false, it remains 
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certain that they are assembled by judgemental relation to create, together with a judging 
subject, the judgment complex. There is some truth in Hanks’ diagnosis that there is a difficulty 
with judgement’s truth or falsity, but it does not reside in the absent unification of the judgement 
complex. Rather, the question to be posed is whether the judgmental unity has a power to 
represent something external to the judgement and whether, therefore, truth or falsity may be 
ascribed to judgment. This query concerning the representational capacities of judgement may 
be construed, I believe, as the topic lying behind both Johnston’s and Pincock’s interpretations. 
These interpretations differ in their eventual diagnosis of the crucial point of 
Wittgenstein’s objection, but they are similar in their emphasizing that Russell’s theory of 
judgement rests upon his general theory of complexes. In Johnston’s description, Wittgenstein 
is reminding Russell to be faithful to his own principle of substitutability, which has the adverse 
effect of allowing the formation of nonsensical judgements. On my understanding, Johnston’s 
interpretation may still be rendered as focusing particularly on the unity problem, i.e. the fact 
that elements within a judgemental complex may be arranged in a nonsensical way. However, 
Johnston’s rendering of the objection suggests Wittgenstein intended to allude to yet another 
issue, namely synthesis in thought. The synthesis-in-thought topic, transcending the unity 
problem, supposedly represents the core of Wittgenstein’s objection. As Johnston claims, “[o]ur 
story finds Wittgenstein presenting his nonsense judgement objection to Russell precisely as 
the objection that Russell’s Theory of Knowledge version of his theory of judgement still does 
not account for the synthesis in thought”.336 
If so, we need to understand exactly why, according to Johnston, Russell’s theory is 
unable to give an account of synthesis in thought and, for that matter, what this synthesis is 
supposed to achieve. From Johnston’s rendering, the synthesis does not amount to our 
judgemental complex having, besides their constituents, the added component of a form: “We 
might worry here that simply including the way things are represented [e.g. a form] as standing 
amongst the constituents of a judgement does not obviously do the required work”.337 “The 
required work” then, the aim of the synthesis in thought, is to make comprehensible the fact 
that judgement represents things as combined in the way it asserts them to be combined.338 
Thus, the central objective of judgement is to represent things as being combined in a 
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337 Ibid., p. 28.  
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certain way. For instance, if I unify within my judgement the constituents to make a judgement 
that “a loves b”, the proper task of this judgement is to present the things in the world as being 
so combined. However, Johnston believes that this representation would not be realized if 
judgement merely amounted to putting together judgemental constituents and the additional 
form. While Johnston puts a great emphasis on the unresolved issue of the synthesis in thought, 
though, the question remaining unanswered throughout his article seems to be why exactly 
judgement, in this rendering, is incapable of representing things in the required way. 
In the first part of his article, Johnston illuminates how Wittgenstein confronted Russell 
with the impossibility of going against his own principle of substitutability and, consequently, 
with the inability of his multiple relation theory to rule out the formation of nonsensical 
judgements.339 This is equivalent to the unity problem. However, from Johnston’s discussion 
of synthesis in thought, it seems that even if the unity of the terms within judgmental complex 
is guaranteed, judgement may not be able to represent things as being combined. Where does 
the additional difficulty reside? 
One way to answer this question is to employ Pincock’s ideas. He is emphatic that the 
unity problem does not present a critical obstacle for Russell’s theory given that nonsensical 
judgements may be avoided thanks to the notion of the “logically possible complex”. Be that 
as it may, Pincock’s description of the decisive and fatal objection to Russell’s theory is of 
importance now: he locates it, as we have seen, in the fact that for permutative non-symmetrical 
complexes, Russell’s account of the make-up of the judgement complex does not suffice to 
determine unambiguously the condition for its truth. 
I believe there is some truth in Pincock’s account, particularly in his contention that the 
major obstacle for Russell’s theory resides in its inability to properly account for the 
correspondence relation (between the judgement complex and the worldly complex). But I am 
persuaded, contra Pincock, that this difficulty is more general: it is not merely the case of non-
symmetrical permutative complexes where the correspondence relation is not convincingly 
accounted for. Rather, I suggest, Wittgenstein’s point is to the effect that no judgment, on 
Russell’s theory, has intrinsically a determinate condition for its truth. The essential question 
then is as to why it is so. I believe, contra Pincock, that it is not due to the unresolved issue of 
a correspondence relation (merely) in the case of non-symmetrical permutative complexes, but 
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due the lack of explanation, in the case of any judgement complex at all, of the nature of a 
correspondence relation of a judgment to its referent. This, in turn, is due to the fact that Russell 
did not clarify, within his multiple relation theory, the specificity of judgment which resides in 
his representational character, i.e. he did not explain how any judgment is capable to relate to 
something other than itself.  
Russell was apparently persuaded that to account for the fact that judgement has an 
intentional character (i.e. that it is related to a referent external to it), it suffices that objects 
contained within the judgemental complex are the same as the objects to which judgement 
relates. However, this account does not provide a sufficient explanation – it rather conceals the 
problem. The fact that judgement is intentional cannot be given merely by containing the same 
elements as its referent. By merely describing judgement complex as being composed of 
objects, Russell does not provide us with an answer of how the judgement actually says that 
such a complex exists. 
I suspect that this omission is a consequence of the fact that Russell’s complexes are not 
designed to explain the intentional character of judgement. Russell’s theory of complexes (as 
both Johnston and Pincock also emphasize) is a general theory, i.e. a theory about any 
complexes whatsoever, and not only – or even primarily – judgement complexes. What Russell 
did in building up his theory of judgement is take his ontological theory of complexes and use 
it as a foundation for an epistemological theory about the nature of judgement. In other words, 
he embarks on the elaboration of a judgement theory with the ontological account of complexes 
situated at its heart. The main difficulty, then, seems to me to reside in Russell’s inability to 
explain why judgement complexes have a special status (i.e. are intentional) among all other 
complexes. It is not explicated how they succeeded in having such an important property. And 
it may be suspected that it is not explicable if an attempt is made to resolve this issue within the 
ontological theory (of complexes).  
Interpreted this way, the fundamental message Wittgenstein wished to convey to Russell 
was this: your multiple relation theory, in whatever form, necessarily misses its target because 
you took your general theory of complexes in an attempt to explain the nature of judgement. 
But in doing this, you fell prey to an elementary misunderstanding: the representational nature 
of judgment cannot be explained with the ontological theory of complexes in its centre. It must 
be approached with an appropriate theory designed for explaining an intentional entity. 
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Wittgenstein’s objection, as generally summarized, is that we “cannot judge nonsense”. 
How does this formulation fit into my interpretation? A judgement is nonsensical if it does not 
meet the essential requirement that a judgement makes an assertion about the way things are in 
the world. From this point of view, however, all judgements described by Russell are in danger 
of being nonsensical since Russell did not provide us with an explanation of judgment’s ability 
to represent complexes external to it. However, the extra step needed to prevent a theory of 
judgement from suffering this defect is not to come up with additional restrictions which 
disallow certain “suspicious” combinations of judgemental elements. Instead, one must deliver 
a theory which takes the intentional character of judgement into account from the very 
beginning. And this, I believe, is exactly what Wittgenstein took pains to offer in his own 
gradually evolving theory of judgement, which will be the topic of the next chapter. 
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5. Wittgenstein’s Theory of Propositions and Judgements 
 
In the previous chapter, I proposed that the core of Wittgenstein’s objection to Russell’s 
multiple relation theory of judgement was that it could not account for the representational 
character of judgement, given that it was founded on the ontological theory of complexes. This 
non-epistemological grounding meant that Russell was not in a position to explain how 
judgement complexes, in contrast to all other complexes, are able to represent things other than 
themselves. My goal in this chapter will be to explain how Wittgenstein attempted, firstly in 
the Notes on Logic, and then, most importantly, in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, a theory 
of judgement which had the issue of representability at its centre.  
In the first section of this chapter (5.1), I will outline both the core of Wittgenstein’s 
tentative account of propositions and judgements in the Notes on Logic and the reasons for his 
eventual abandonment of this conception. I will emphasize that Wittgenstein strived to account 
for the complexity and intentional character of judgement, though he ceased to believe that the 
theory sketched in the Notes accounted for them adequately. After summarizing Wittgenstein’s 
dissatisfaction with the Notes, I will move on to the main topic of the chapter, namely the 
account of propositions as facts with representational capacities provided in the Tractatus. 
Initially, in 5.2, I will pay attention to Wittgenstein’s elegant notion of a proposition as a picture 
which may be considered a fact which represents another fact. Based on that, I will elucidate 
how Wittgenstein’s conception of the ascriptions of judgement serves as a further way to 
emphasize the specific nature of the proposition as a representing fact. And finally, in 5.3 and 
5.4, I will turn my attention back to the overall topic of the thesis, namely to the Kantian 
influence on the discussed theories of judgement, and will investigate whether there is a 
specifically Kantian influence present in the Tractatus.  
5.1 Proposition and Judgement in the Notes on Logic 
Wittgenstein’s remarks called Notes on Logic are chronologically the first surviving text 
from the young Wittgenstein, from which we may gather information both about Wittgenstein’s 
early philosophical ideas in general and about his reaction to Russell’s theory of judgement in 
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particular.340 Although Wittgenstein eventually abandoned many of the suggestions made in 
the Notes, he developed in that work a tentative account of propositions and judgments that 
may be considered his first criticism of Russell’s multiple relation theory. He introduced there 
his important principle that the proper epistemological account of judgement must be grounded 
in the appropriate theory of propositions: “the epistemological questions concerning the nature 
of judgement and belief cannot be solved without a correct apprehension of the form of the 
proposition”.341 Thus, to come to terms with Russell’s multiple relation theory and its supposed 
inability to account for the intentional nature of judgment, it seemed necessary to Wittgenstein 
to firstly properly elaborate the notion of a proposition. 
 Wittgenstein’s guiding thought was in some ways a recovery of a central theme in 
Russell’s early (dyadic) theory, according to which we are, when we judge, related to the whole 
proposition, namely that a proposition must be in possession of a complexity based on which it 
may represent a complex in the world. It seems that it is exactly this issue of complexity which 
Wittgenstein had in mind when he contrasted a proposition and a name. He emphasized that a 
proposition, even if it may seem simple (due to its being symbolized as “p”), cannot be 
compared with a proper name, since the way each represents is essentially different.342 While a 
name signifies its referent merely by indicating or standing in for it, a proposition has two ways 
in which it can relate to what it represents: it can be either true or false.343 Wittgenstein attempts 
to explicate this twofold way of propositional representing by describing propositions as 
bipolar. To emphasize this bipolarity, he writes a proposition p with two poles on its sides: a-
p-b. This denotes that a proposition has – or rather is related to – a true-pole and a false-pole, 
designated respectively by the letters a and b. The bipolarity entails that “each one of these 
propositions can only be true or false, not both”.344 
To further explicate propositional bipolarity, Wittgenstein uses a metaphor of an 
arrow.345 While a name may be pictured as a point, a proposition’s capacity to represent either 
truly or falsely may be imagined as a proposition’s and its referent pointing (as arrows) to one 
                                                 
340 As Michael Potter suggests (2008, p. 1), Notes on Logic provide the summary of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical views from the period from 1911 (when Wittgenstein arrived at Cambridge to study under Russell) 
to his departure to Norway in 1913. 
341 Wittgenstein, NL, B55. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid., B23, C37. 
344 Ibid., B48. 
345 Ibid., B23, C37. 
  
98 
 
or the other direction. If both propositions and their referents are identified with arrows, it 
follows that they may point in the same or opposite directions.346 Within this picture, a 
proposition may be claimed to be a “standard to which facts behave”347 – if the fact points in 
the same direction, it is of the same sense as a proposition; if it points in opposite direction, it 
is of the opposite sense. In the first case, a proposition is true, in the second, false. 
We may understand that Wittgenstein wished to emphasize, by writing a proposition 
with a and b on its sides, that it must be either true or false. But it still may seem surprising why 
he opted for such a non-traditional way of symbolizing this. One explanation of why he might 
have insisted on his ab-notation is offered by Michael Potter.348 He suggests it may lie in the 
fact that Wittgenstein wished to assure that truth and falsity of a proposition will not be 
“reified”, i.e. considered as particular “logical objects”, as might occur if they were labelled as 
T and F.349 
But there may be even more to this special ab-notation, namely a connection with the 
above-emphasized notion of propositional complexity. One thing that is particularly striking 
about Wittgenstein’s ab-notation is its resemblance to Russell’s often-used example of a 
relational proposition – “aRb”. It is as if Wittgenstein just replaced “R” with “p”, arriving at “a-
p-b”. Of course, both expressions convey different meanings – Russell’s “aRb” depicts that a 
proposition consists of terms a, b and a relation R, while Wittgenstein’s “a-p-b” does not specify 
any particular internal complexity in the proposition ‘p’, but instead emphasizes the 
proposition’s being related to its true- and false-pole. Still, it is tempting to guess that 
Wittgenstein wished to accentuate precisely the fact about propositions that Russell stressed 
when writing “aRb”, namely that propositions are composite, consisting of several elements 
assembled in a particular way, since it is precisely due to this complexity that proposition may 
be capable of being true or false (in opposition to a mere name which points to an object). 
Before examining why Wittgenstein eventually abandoned this attempt to account for 
                                                 
346 As Hanks notes, Wittgenstein must have worked only with the picture of arrows running parallel to one 
another, see Hanks, P. W. (2012). Early Wittgenstein on Judgement. In: J. Zalabardo, ed., Wittgenstein's Early 
Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 37-63, p. 42.  
347 Wittgenstein, NL, C37. 
348 Potter, 2008, pp. 173-174. 
349 Ibid., p. 174. If this interpretation is correct, the preference for ab-notation would represent a special case 
of Wittgenstein’s overall persuasion that logic does not deal with any special entities, logical objects. Potter notes 
(2008, p. 174) that this may be the reason why Wittgenstein, in the Notes dictated to Moore, put emphasis on “a” 
and “b” not being names for the poles, describing them instead as “scratches” (Ibid.); see Wittgenstein, L. (1914). 
Notes Dictated to G. E. Moore in Norway. In: G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, eds. (1984). Notebooks 
1914-1916, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 108-118, p. 114. 
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propositional complexity, let’s remain a moment longer with the Notes on Logic conception, to 
see how Wittgenstein used the notion of a bipolar proposition as the basis for his (at least 
schematic) theory of judgement.  
The central difficulty here is accounting for a judging subject’s relation to the 
proposition with its two poles. To tackle this issue, Wittgenstein comes up with a picture that 
is intended to symbolize the relation of a subject A to a proposition p and its two poles.350 He 
says that “A believes p” is most correctly expressed by using the ab-notation, i.e. “by making 
ʻA’ have a relation to the poles ʻa’ and ʻb’ of a-p-b”: 
“[…] we shall only be able to express the proposition ʻA believes p’ correctly 
by the ab-notation; say by making ʻA’ have a relation to the poles ʻa’ and ʻb’ 
of a-p-b.”351 
 
 
And to the same topic, he adds that: 
“The proposition ʻa judges p’ consists of the proper name a, the proposition p 
with its 2 poles, and a being related to both of these poles in a certain way. 
This is obviously not a relation in the ordinary sense.”352 
In a nontrivial sense, this theory of judgement performs the role Wittgenstein assigned 
to it, i.e. it is merely an application of his above-presented analysis of the proposition (as 
bipolar) to the analysis of judgement. What we judge is a bipolar proposition a-p-b. When we 
employ again the suggested comparison with Russell’s “aRb”, we may see that what 
Wittgenstein’s proposal here might be understood as preserving a central thought from the 
multiple relation theory: when someone judges, he has to have some relation to the several 
components of a complex, and not merely a simple (dyadic) relation to a single (complex) 
object. Since Wittgenstein did not, in fact, write “aRb”, but “a-p-b”, he did not end up 
considering whether a judging person relates singularly to each element of the complex.  His 
substitution of the mysterious “poles” a and b in a-p-b for the related terms a and b in Russell’s 
aRb effectively insulated him from that question. 
                                                 
350 Wittgenstein, NL, B55. 
351 Ibid., C41. 
352 Ibid. 
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In Wittgenstein’s conception, A’s judging a proposition p means that the judging subject 
is related to both proposition’s poles “in a certain way”.353 Wittgenstein emphasizes that this 
relation of the subject to the two poles of the proposition “[i]s obviously not a relation in the 
ordinary sense”.354 It is indeed not. But to know what it is not is hardly to have a theory of the 
special kind of relation it is: how, we may ask, is a judging subject related to both true and false 
pole of a proposition? This issue is, unfortunately, never explicitly tackled in the Notes on 
Logic. 
It is well known that Wittgenstein eventually abandoned the theory of propositions and 
judgements presented in the Notes on Logic. As Hanks observes, the first indication of the shift 
from the account of judgement presented in the Notes to the one presented in the Tractatus 
appeared in the final remarks in the Notes dictated to Moore in Norway from 1914.355 Here, we 
see in effect the first mention of a claim which later brought Wittgenstein fame in the Tractatus: 
“The relation of ʻI believe p’ to ʻp’ can be compared to the relation ʻʻp’ says 
p’ to p: it is just as impossible that I should be a simple as that ʻp’ should 
be.”356 
Even though I will leave the more detailed exegesis of the famous Tractarian 
counterpart of this claim for later,357 it may be noted here at least that Wittgenstein obviously 
paid attention to the issue of complexity here: under the presupposition that the relation of ʻI 
believe p’ to ʻp’ resembles that of ʻʻp’ says p’ to p, neither “I” nor the proposition (ʻp’) can be 
simple. There probably have been several reasons why Wittgenstein abandoned the theory 
sketchily elaborated in his Notes on Logic and set out to search for a new conception.358 
However, it seems to me persuasive to believe that the crucial reason did not reside in the 
unclear nature of the subject’s relation to a proposition, but rather Wittgenstein’s more general 
persuasion that his sketched theory was not fitted for providing an adequate account of 
propositional complexity. Peter Hanks pinpoints a similar motivation, claiming that what 
Wittgenstein found faulty about his theory was that “the representation of facts requires logical 
complexity. Something simple and non-composite does not have the capacity for presenting a 
                                                 
353 Ibid. 
354 Ibid. 
355 Hanks, 2012, p. 49. 
356 Wittgenstein, L. (1914). Notes Dictated to G. E. Moore in Norway. In: G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. 
Anscombe, eds. (1984). Notebooks 1914-1916. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 108-118., p. 118. 
357 For the analysis of this claim from 5.542 of the Tractatus see section 5.2.2 of the thesis. 
358 More detailed account with several suggestions regarding Wittgenstein’s reasons for abandoning the 
theory is presented in Hanks, 2012, pp. 50-57. 
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standard to which the facts behave”.359  
The problem is not that the theory in the Notes on Logic did not pay attention to the 
propositional complexity at all: on the contrary, it attempted to underscore it precisely by 
presenting the proposition with its a- and b-poles, indicating thereby that a proposition, in 
contrast to a name, is a complex entity which may have two different relations to reality (either 
corresponding or not corresponding with it). However, Wittgenstein might have been persuaded 
that even if the notion of complexity is tackled, his theory of propositional bipolarity does not 
come much closer than Russell’s multiple relation theory (which clearly inspired it) to shedding 
some light on the central mystery of the proposition’s intentional, representational character. 
And it is exactly this character which may be claimed to be more successfully accounted for 
within the Tractarian conception of propositions as pictures. Let us therefore move on to 
Wittgenstein’s picture theory to see how Wittgenstein attempted to account both for 
proposition’s complexity and its representational character.  
5.2 A Picture Theory 
It seems a mere platitude to say that the central topic of the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus is the so-called “picture theory” from which Wittgenstein, later in the book, 
derives several consequences (about the notions of judgements, causality, the nature of logic 
and mathematics etc.). However, as Michael Potter notes, each commentator may conceive of 
the so-called picture theory quite differently – some “use the phrase very broadly as a sort of 
catch-all for the logical doctrines of the book”, while “others much more narrowly for the 
specific proposal that propositions are pictures of reality”.360 For my part, I will initially begin, 
in line with the narrower approach, with the explication of which bearing the notion of a picture 
(in general and as applied to a proposition) has as related to our representation of reality. And 
based on that, I will broaden my account by illuminating how the notion of the proposition as 
a picture is applied in the theory of judgement-ascriptions and how we may, based on it, decide 
whether there are some similarities in the Tractatus to Kantian epistemology.  
Since we attempt to answer, by means of a picture theory, the question of how a 
proposition as a picture can represent reality, we may presume this theory should consist of two 
                                                 
359 Hanks 2012, p. 50 We may read this consideration as a foreshadow of the Tractarian claim that judgement 
ascriptions amount to the correlations of two facts, not to the ascriptions of judgment to judging subject. 
360 Potter, 2008, p. 224. 
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“layers” – one account of what represents (a proposition) and another of what is represented 
(reality).361 On this basis, we will expect the theory to include an account of representation and 
some kind of ontology describing that to which a proposition as a representation refers. To some 
extent, this expectation is indeed fulfilled in the Tractatus: Wittgenstein opens it with very 
general considerations concerning the nature of that which is pictured: a reality, which he claims 
is composed of facts (1.1). Immediately afterwards (in 2.1ff), he moves on to elucidating the 
nature of pictures in general and then (from 3 onward) of propositions and thoughts as pictures. 
But a caveat is necessary: the image that Wittgenstein unfolds in the Tractatus is not 
that of two independent realms one of which (reality) is represented by the other (propositions 
as pictures). Rather, reality and its representation are conceived of as two realizations of one 
phenomenon: reality as represented by us. From the beginning (1.1ff), the Tractatus claims that 
reality is not composed of things, but facts. We may wonder what reason Wittgenstein had for 
this particular description of the world – and one way to shed some light on it would be to 
emphasize that being composed of facts is the feature of reality salient for its representation in 
language. In other words, our speaking about reality is carried out by our claims that (it is a fact 
that) something is so and so. When we subsequently encounter Wittgenstein’s Tractarian 
ontology and the picture theory, we may notice that the one is always developed with respect 
to the other: description of the world is offered in order to manifest features describable by 
language and language, in turn, is always construed as a tool for providing an adequate 
description of reality. 
5.2.1 The Notion of a Picture 
As said above, the picture theory describes both the picture and the pictured (reality) 
only in so far as the features essential for this representation are concerned (in both picture and 
the pictured). In the case of represented reality, it is the notion of facts (Tatsachen) from which 
the world is said to be composed (1.1). After the introduction of facts, the notion of a state of 
affairs (Sachverhalt) is brought in: the fact is defined on its basis as the existence of states of 
affairs (das Bestehen von Sachverhalten) (2). When Wittgenstein wishes to talk about more 
complex combination of states of affairs without deciding on its existence or non-existence, he 
employs not the notion of a fact (existing states of affairs), but a “situation” (Sachlage). 
                                                 
361 Since Wittgenstein did not conceive of a proposition as including the objects about which it is judged, as 
Russell did in the case of a judgement. 
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Only after introducing the notions of facts and states of affairs does Wittgenstein offer 
the notion of an object (Gegenstand). Objects are elements from which states of affairs are 
composed – a state of affairs is a combination (2.01) or configuration (2.0272) of objects. 
Objects in the state of affairs “stand in a determinate relation to one another” (2.031). Or, in 
other words, they are connected such that “they fit into one another like the links of the chain” 
(2.03). On this view, there is no relation distinct from objects themselves which “glues” objects 
into a state of affairs.362 Rather the objects are mutually related without the need of any “glue” 
– in this sense, we can imagine them as the links of the chain which hold together without any 
additional help. The way in which objects are combined in a state of affairs is the structure of 
this state of affairs (2.032), while the possibility of this structure is its form (2.033).  
In section 2.1, Wittgenstein moves from this outline of an ontology to the theory of the 
picture as something which is capable of representing a situation (an existence or nonexistence 
of states of affairs: “A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-
existence of states of affairs” (2.11). Firstly, he introduces the theory as a theory of pictures, 
without further qualification (2.1ff). Later, he identifies the proposition (4.01) and the thought 
(3) with the picture, and it therefore becomes obvious that his picture theory is designed to serve 
as a theory of how propositions and thoughts represent situations actually occurring or those 
which may occur in the world. The notion of a “picture” (ein Bild) made its first appearance in 
the Notebooks, where Wittgenstein referred to it initially as a “logical portrayal” (ein logisches 
Abbild) of a situation.363 At several places, he described a picture as a “model” (Modell) of a 
situation.364 Here, I agree with Michael Morris’ suggestion that the notion of a picture might be 
misleading while the notion of a “model” represents for an English reader more fittingly what 
Wittgenstein had in mind.365 This is, I presume, because we usually take a picture to be compact 
and indivisible (we imagine a picture as a drawing hanging immutably on the wall). However, 
this is the exact opposite of Wittgenstein’s conception – for Wittgenstein, a picture or model is 
supposed to be an experimental composition of elements which represents – correctly or 
incorrectly – the elements (objects) which compose the situation to which the picture is related. 
In the Tractatus, the notion of a picture emerges immediately after the opening ontology 
                                                 
362 Thus, it seems that Wittgenstein needed to count relations amongst objects as well.  
363 Wittgenstein, L. (1914-1916). Notebooks 1914-1916. In: (1984). G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. 
Anscombe, eds., Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Further quoted as NB. 
364 Wittgenstein, NB, 15. 10. 1914; TLP, 2.12. 
365  Morris, M. (2008). Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Tractatus. Abingdon: 
Routledge, p. 119. 
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in which Wittgenstein emphasized that the world consists of facts. In 2.1, he then proceeds to 
claim that “[w]e picture facts to ourselves” or that we “[m]ake to ourselves pictures of facts” 
(Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen).366 Already from this sentence, we may guess that these 
pictures of facts should themselves be considered as facts. And it is indeed what Wittgenstein 
wishes to claim – in 2.141, he explicitly states that “[t]he picture is a fact”. But what kind of 
fact is it? While there are to be found in the world many facts, they do not represent anything 
other than themselves, while a picture as a fact is supposed to do precisely this. How does it 
happen that a picture is a special kind of fact which has a capacity to represent other facts or 
situations which may occur in the world? 
To this query, Wittgenstein offers an answer by explicating, in 2.14, that “[t]he picture 
consists in the fact that its elements are combined with one another in a definite way”. This 
connection of a picture’s elements is called the structure of the picture (2.15). The possibility 
of this structure is the pictorial form (die Form der Abbildung) (2.151).367 However, 
Wittgenstein immediately adds that the pictorial form is not only the possibility of picture’s 
elements being combined in a definite way, but also, essentially, the “[p]ossibility that the 
things are combined with one another as are the elements of the picture” (2.151).368 Thus, the 
pictorial form expresses the possibility of elements of the picture and those of the pictured being 
combined in the same way.  
This form is subsequently famously labelled as that which the picture must have in 
common with the depicted situation so that it can picture it at all (2.16). This “something in 
common” amounts to “something identical” (etwas identisch) which must be shared by both 
the picture and the pictured (2.161).369 That what must be shared by the picture and the pictured 
so that the first can represent the second is thus the possibility of their elements being combined 
in the same way. In both picture and pictured situation, it is necessary that their elements may 
be combined with one another in a definite way – and this possibility of the combination must 
be the same in picture and the pictured.  
                                                 
366 The first translation is Pearls and McGuiness’, the second one Ogden’s.  
367 This account is analogous to that of the structure and form of a state of affairs.  
368 Emphasis mine.  
369 This demand for something identical in the picture and the pictured appeared as early as the Notebooks, 
where Wittgenstein noted that “[t]he theory of logical portrayal by means of language says – quite generally: In 
order for it to be possible that a proposition should be true or false – agree with reality or not – for this to be 
possible something in the proposition must be identical with reality” (Wittgenstein, NB, 20. 10. 1914; emphasis in 
the original).  
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The pictorial form is the link that is formed between the picture and the pictured 
situation by which the picture “reaches up” to reality (2.15121). However, since Wittgenstein 
compares a picture’s way of reaching up the reality to the measurement by the scale applied to 
reality (2.1512), we should be careful not to imagine that the picture and the pictured are 
completely identical. The reality which is to be represented is touched only “by the end-points 
of the graduating lines” on the scale (2.15121). Using this metaphor, Wittgenstein wishes to 
claim that it is (merely) the elements of the picture which touch reality, not the picture as a 
whole. Wittgenstein describes the “touching” by which the picture’s elements reach reality as 
the “pictorial relationship” (die abbildende Beziehung). While the pictorial form (die Form der 
Abbildung) referred to above is that which is identical in the picture and the pictured, the 
pictorial relationship amounts to the coordination of the elements of the picture with the 
elements of the represented situation (2.1514).370 This coordination may be imagined, 
according to another famous metaphor, as “the feelers with which the picture touches reality” 
(2.1515). 
Let’s now return to our initial inquiry into how to account for the special status of a 
picture as a fact with representational capacity. Based on the presented exposition, we may say 
that a picture is a fact which may represent something other than itself because as a fact whose 
elements are related to one another in a particular way, it represents (vorstellt) that the things 
are so combined (2.15), i.e. combined in the same way. In the fact which is a picture it is 
included that the organization of its elements says something about the organization of the 
elements of the represented situation. And, it can represent that the things are so combined, in 
turn, given that the picture has “something in common” with the pictured (pictorial form) and 
that the picture’s elements are coordinated, i.e. reach to the elements of the pictured.  
Let us try to imagine all this by using a particular example. Suppose, for instance, that 
we make ourselves a picture which is the fact that the names “the dog”, “is sitting on” and “the 
sofa” are connected so that the final whole has a form of “the dog is sitting in the sofa”. How 
does it happen that this particular fact represents another fact, namely that the dog is sitting on 
the sofa? The picture may represent, firstly, by virtue of being in possession of its particular 
                                                 
370 Wittgenstein tackled this issue first in the Notebooks, where he noted that “[t]he general concept of the 
proposition carries with it a quite general concept of the coordination of proposition and situation […]” (NB, 29. 
9. 1914) and that “[t]he coordination of the picture and the pictured is possible merely by means of the correlations 
of their elements” (Ibid., 25. 9. 1914). In the Notebooks, Wittgenstein labelled this coordination the “method of 
representation” (Ibid., 30. 10. 1914) or “the way of representing” (Ibid.) and claimed that it is only with this 
“method” or “way” that a picture can represent a situation. 
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pictorial form: this form is the possibility of the picture’s elements (here the expressions “the 
dog”, “sitting on” and “the sofa”) being combined in a definite way, along with the possibility 
that the objects (the dog, the relation of sitting on and the sofa) are combined with one another 
as the elements of the picture are (2.15). Secondly, it is necessary that picture’s elements (names 
“the dog” etc.) are correlated with the objects to be represented (the dog etc.).371  
So far, I have been discussing a picture and it may therefore be imagined that each single 
picture may represent – thanks to its above analysed features – on its own, without the relation 
to other pictures. However, it is also essential to Wittgenstein’s account of the representation 
of the world by means of pictures that we cannot account for this representation in this way. On 
the contrary, Wittgenstein puts forward a conception of representation according to which each 
picture may represent a particular situation since it is located within the context of other pictures 
– and since the represented situation is similarly located in the context of other situations. This 
context is provided using the notion of “logical space”. Each picture - and each represented 
situation - is located in the particular place within the logical space by means of its 
“coordinates” (3.41).  
What, however, are the coordinates in the case of pictures and pictured situations and 
how do they “allocate” to each picture or situation a particular position within the logical space? 
One may claim that this allocation is given by the form which every single picture or situation 
exhibits. This form amounts to the possibility of the structure of a picture or situation. This 
structure, in turn, amounts to the way in which elements are connected in a picture or situation. 
Thus, the exhibited structure is determined by the way in which the elements of a picture of a 
pictured situation are connected to each other. To the nature of every element, it belongs that it 
may occur in many situations or pictures and these possibilities of occurrence are essential for 
each element (2.0123).372  
Employing the metaphor of the logical space and coordinates, we may imagine that the 
elements from which a picture or a situation pictured is composed (names or objects) are the 
coordinates which allocate a particular position to that picture or situation. Subsequently, we 
may consider each particular place of the logical space to either include the actualized situation 
or not – supposing, if not, that it is an empty space in which this situation however may occur. 
                                                 
371 I will discuss the possibility of this correlation later in the sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. 
372 Wittgenstein formulates this principle expressly only for states of affairs, but it may be claimed that the 
same holds for pictures (as representations of situations) as well.  
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Within this metaphor of logical space, it is to be explained what Wittgenstein means by his 
claim that by any single proposition, the whole of logical space must be given (3.42). I presume 
it is intended to express the thought that the knowledge of one proposition implies that we may 
understand all other propositions which are or may be located in the logical space (although we 
cannot know whether these propositions are true or false). And similarly, we may claim that 
from the occurrence of one situation, we cannot infer about all other situations, whether they 
occur or not, but we understand that they may either occur or not in particular places within the 
logical space.373 
Logical space thus forms a specially interconnected net in which we cannot be in 
possession of a priori knowledge of whether any situation occurs or any proposition is true, but 
by grasping of which we do know which situation may occur in any given place, and understand 
the meaning of any proposition which may be formulated. I will refer further to the significant 
role of these considerations in subsequent sections.374  
5.2.2 Proposition and Judgement 
As I said in the previous section, pictures are, for Wittgenstein, representational facts. 
The same holds also for propositions and thoughts: a proposition (or a thought) is a picture in 
so far as the fact that its (verbal or psychic) elements are combined in a certain way represents 
that the elements of the represented situation are combined in the same way. Even if the 
transition from the picture in general to propositions and thoughts might thus seem 
unproblematic, there is a difficulty in that, as Anthony Kenny noted, there seems to be two 
meanings of a “thought” present in the Tractatus.375 On the one hand, a thought is a 
psychological fact that there is a relation between several psychic elements. On the other hand, 
it amounts to a proposition with a sense. It is therefore necessary to proceed by clarifying what 
“a thought” actually means for Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. 
                                                 
373 Since states of affairs, from which any fact is composed (besteht aus) (TLP, 2.034), are mutually 
independent according to Wittgenstein (2.061) and thus from the (non)existence of one of them, we cannot infer 
either the existence or non-existence of any other (2.062), the determination of the existence or nonexistence of a 
state of affairs in any particular point in the logical place is independent of the determination of existence or 
nonexistence of other states of affairs in other places within the logical space. With facts and situations which may 
occur, it is more complicated since they are connected by various mutual relations (e.g. of mutual exclusion, 
conjunction, consequence etc.). From the occurrence of one fact, I definitely cannot say about all other situation, 
whether they occur or not; but I understand which situations may occur.  
374 Especially in sections 5.3.2 and 5.4. 
375 Kenny, A. (1981). Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophy of Mind. In: I. Block., ed., Perspectives on the 
Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, pp. 140-147; pp. 140-141. 
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Wittgenstein opens the third section of the Tractatus by asserting that a thought is a 
logical picture of a fact (3), an assertion from which nothing specific about the nature of thought 
follows yet.376 In 3.1, a thought is presented in the first, psychological sense, being described 
as something which is expressed in a proposition: “In a proposition a thought finds an 
expression [sich ausdrückt] that can be perceived by the senses.” This suggests that a thought 
is not identical to a proposition, but can be expressed by means of one. The same point seems 
to follow from 3.2, which claims that a thought is expressed by a proposition in such a way that 
elements of both correspond to each other: “In a proposition a thought can be expressed in such 
a way that elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought” (3.2). 
However, following the introduction of the notion of a “propositional sign”, it begins to 
appear that a thought is a proposition. In 3.12, a propositional sign is defined as “the sign with 
which we express a thought” and a proposition is identified with “a propositional sign in its 
projective relation to the world”. This still indicates that a thought is different from a proposition 
since a thought is expressed by means of a propositional sign. However, in 3.5, a thought is 
described as “a propositional sign, applied and thought out”; and in 4, a thought is explicitly 
defined as “a proposition with a sense”. In this account, the notion of a “thought” serves to draw 
a distinction between a (mere) propositional sign and a proposition. A proposition is a 
propositional sign plus its projective relation to the world.  
This propositional sign is merely a theoretical construction, a proposition considered 
without this projective relation, i.e. without its method of projection (a coordination of a 
proposition with a situation based on the correlations of their elements). It is merely a theoretical 
construct since, as I have pointed out above, there is no picture without this projective relation 
because the notion of a pictorial form implies the presence of a pictorial relationship. To 
emphasize that a proposition does include this projective relation and that it is thus able to 
express its sense, it is called a “thought”.377 Or, in other words, when a propositional sign is 
“applied and thought out” (3.5), it becomes a proposition which expresses its sense and which 
                                                 
376 A picture is called “logical” by Wittgenstein when it shares with the pictured situation at least the “logical 
form”, i.e. the minimum which is necessary for a picture to be a picture of this situation (see TLP, 2.18 and 2.181).  
377 In this context, Candlish and Damnjanovic assert that one of the central claims made about propositions 
in the Tractatus is that they are not on their own essentially representational or significant (Candlish, S. and 
Damnjanovic, N. (2012). The ‘Tractatus’ and the Unity of the Proposition. in: J. Zalabardo, ed., Wittgenstein’s 
Early Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 64-98, p. 81ff). However, it seems to me that the precise 
opposite is the case – as facts, propositions are essentially representational. It might be that they had in mind the 
“propositional sign”; however, even about it, Wittgenstein claims that it is a fact (TLP, 3.14ff).  
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may also be called a “thought”. 
A thought thus seems to be both something expressed by a proposition and this 
proposition itself. There are several comments, mostly from the Notebooks and letters to 
Russell, from which it is evident that Wittgenstein intended to use the expression “thought” to 
draw attention to the fact that there occur psychic elements in the mind of a judging person. 
Most famously, there is a letter to Russell from 19 August 1919 in which Wittgenstein responds 
to Russell’s queries about the Tractatus.378 To Russell’s question of whether a thought consists 
of words, Wittgenstein answers with radical “no”, as if bored with the silliness of the question: 
“‘Does a Gedanke consist of words?’ [Russell’s question] No! But of 
psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as 
words.”379 
Thus, it is undoubtedly true that Wittgenstein allowed a notion of a “thought” to describe 
the fact that there are psychic elements somehow assembled together in the mind of a thinker. 
Even in this event, I don’t think that it would enable us to claim that there are two 
distinguishable meanings of a thought in the Tractatus. For one thing, Wittgenstein holds that 
“[t]hinking is a kind of language” and that “a thought too is, of course, a logical picture of the 
proposition, and therefore it just is a kind of proposition”.380 In this sense, a thought might also 
be labelled as “a proposition”. What is essential is that the thought, as a mental fact, has the 
same kind of relation to the pictured situation as a linguistic proposition does, i.e. it is a fact 
which asserts that elements of that situation are combined in the same way as are the mental 
elements: both linguistic and mental propositions are logical pictures of situations. And 
moreover, a thought as a mental proposition is always related to its linguistic expression, i.e. to 
the proposition by which it is expressed in language and thus in this sense, it does not make an 
essential difference whether we examine a proposition as linguistic or mental entity.381 “A 
thought” is thus a proposition with sense, i.e. with the relation to the represented situation, 
whether it is composed of mental or linguistic elements. When the notion of a thought is used 
for a linguistic proposition, Wittgenstein’s aim is to underscore the fact that this proposition is 
                                                 
378 Wittgenstein. L. (2008). Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 1911-1951. In: B. F. 
McGuinness, ed., London: Routledge, p. 99. 
379 Ibid.  
380 Wittgenstein, NB, 9. 12. 1916. 
381 Anthony Kenny describes the close relatedness between a thought as a mental occurrence and a 
proposition as a linguistic entity by claiming that the first is so intimately related to the second that they may be 
considered identical: “thought seems to be related so closely to a proposition as to be capable of being identified 
with it […]” (Kenny, 1981, p. 141).  
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not merely a propositional sign, i.e. something which is not in possession of a projective relation 
to the world.382 
After this elucidation, we may move on to consider Wittgenstein’s account of judgement 
or, more precisely, judgement ascriptions (expressions which claim that someone judges that 
something is the case). It is no exaggeration to say that the features essential to it have been 
mostly already brought into the fore within the discussion of propositions as facts. This is by 
no means a mere coincidence – as we have seen, Wittgenstein insists that a correct theory of 
judgement must be grounded in a proper theory of propositions. It is this theory of propositions, 
as offered in Wittgenstein’s treatment of propositions as pictures (in sections 3 and 4 of the 
Tractatus), which already provided us with the answer to our query of how something may be 
representational: propositions may represent something other than themselves by being facts 
which share the pictorial form and pictorial relation with their referents (pictured situations).  
The famous section, in which Wittgenstein mentions explicitly the theory of judgement 
(section 5.54) serves, I am persuaded, as a further demonstration of the correctness of this 
account of propositions. What we encounter in the section 5.54 is an application of the picture 
theory of propositions to the account of judgement ascriptions. Like Russell, Wittgenstein 
brings forward the expressions of the form “A judges/believes that p”, which he introduces as 
an apparent counterexample to his persuasion that “[i]n the general propositional form 
propositions occur in other propositions only as bases of truth-operations” (5.54): 
“At ﬁrst sight it looks as if it were also possible for one proposition to occur 
in another in a different way [than as a basis for truth-operations]. Particularly 
with certain forms of proposition in psychology, such as ‘A believes that p is 
the case’ and ‘A has the thought p’, etc. For if these are considered 
superﬁcially, it looks as if the proposition p stood in some kind of relation to 
an object A. (And in modern theory of knowledge (Russell, Moore, etc.) these 
propositions have actually been construed in this way.)” (5.541) 
“It is clear, however, that ‘A believes that p’, ‘A has the thought p’, and ‘A 
says p’ are of the form ‘‘p’ says p’: and this does not involve a correlation of 
a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the 
correlation of their objects.” (5.542) 
Wittgenstein thus contends in 5.541 that it really seems that there are propositions in 
which other propositions may appear in another way than as bases for truth operations, most 
                                                 
382 As I pointed out in my discussion concerning the notion of a picture, there is in the strict sense no picture 
without this projective relation, since the notion of a pictorial form already implies the existence of the pictorial 
relationship, see section 5.2.1. 
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prominently “certain propositions in psychology”, such as judgement- or belief-ascriptions “A 
believes that p”, “A judges that p” etc. Then, he makes a decisive move, asserting that, against 
all appearances, we cannot analyse these psychological propositions as propositions in which a 
“p” stands in a relation to the subject A.383  
This claim is, however, by no means obvious. It is not that Russell (or Moore), whom 
Wittgenstein explicitly mentions here, committed in their theories of judgement some 
elementary philosophical mistake – rather, it seems to be a presupposition of all theories of 
judgement I know about that there is a subject (variously conceived) which has some (variously 
conceived) relation to that about which it is judged (variously conceived). Wittgenstein goes 
expressly and radically against this generally held, basic presupposition about the form of 
judgement ascriptions when he claims in the famous paragraph 5.542 that when properly 
analysed, propositions of the form of “A believes (thinks, judges etc.) that p” have actually quite 
a different form, namely “‘p’ says p” and that what is involved in this proposition is not “a 
correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation 
of their objects” (5.542).  
It is at this point that the already emphasized dependence of this account on the previous 
analysis of propositions as facts becomes obvious. In the proposition “‘p’ says p”, there are two 
occurrences of ps  – the first one with the quotation marks, the second without them. Of course, 
the essential question is what these two ps amount to. Since we are dealing with the ascriptions 
of beliefs and judgements, it seems reasonable to suppose that the first p, the one with the 
quotation marks, stands for a thought (a mental proposition) conceived of as a picture. Since it 
is a picture, the second p, the one without quotation marks, will be an expression of what this 
thought presents, the situation that is thought (judged, believed etc.) to obtain.384 The judgement 
ascription, initially having the form “A believes (or judges) that p”, thus after Wittgenstein’s 
analysis looks as follows: 
“‘p’ (a thought) says p (state of affairs)” 
                                                 
383 Instead of a “subject”, Wittgenstein employs here the notion of “an object”: “[…] if these [propositions 
of psychology] are considered superﬁcially, it looks as if the proposition p stood in some kind of relation to an 
object A” (TLP, 5.541). By this choice of words, Wittgenstein probably wished to emphasize that propositions of 
the type “A believes p” cannot be understood as residing in the relation between two entities – a proposition and 
an object of any kind. 
384 This interpretation is shared with most of the commentators (e.g. Potter, 2008, pp. 221-222; Hanks, 2012, 
pp. 59-61; Glock, H.-J. (1996). A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 59). 
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“The correlations of facts” Wittgenstein discusses here is the coordination between a 
thought and a situation by means of correlations between their elements, i.e. a one-to-one 
correspondence of the elements of the thought and the objects in the situation. Based on this 
analysis of judgement ascriptions, it follows that in ascribing judgement to someone, we claim 
that his judgement consists in correlating the elements of his thought with the elements of that 
what it is about (a particular situation). This account may be considered a further development 
of the theory of representation provided in the notion of a proposition as a representational fact: 
in a judgement ascription, we put on display the fact that when someone judges (that something 
is the case), the elements of her thought are correlated with the objects of particular situation. 
As I mentioned, Wittgenstein officially introduced his theory of judgment ascriptions 
as an attempt to provide an explanation in line with his principle that if one proposition occurs 
in another proposition, it must do so as a basis of truth operations (6.001). This principle follows 
from even more general one according to which “[a]ll propositions are results of truth-
operations on elementary propositions” (5.3). It is true that Wittgenstein analysed away the 
proposition with a clearly intentional context “A believes that p” into “‘p’ says p”. But it does 
not seem that this alternative form of the proposition scores any better: “‘p’ says p” seems to 
include an intensional context as well. A possible way out may reside in conceiving the 
expression “‘p’ says p” as a mere pseudo-proposition which does not really assert anything. In 
this case, we may claim that the expression “‘p’ says p” shows, rather than says, something, 
namely that in our ascriptions of beliefs or judgements, it is put into view that a thought 
represents a situation. Whether this “way out” is satisfactory is at least debatable.385 But 
resolving this debate is not essential to our central purpose, which is to consider how exactly 
Wittgenstein intended his proposed analysis to provide a response, or a more appropriate 
alternative, to Russell’s theory of judgement. 
Since Wittgenstein intended to provide an improvement on Russell’s explanation for 
judgements’ possibility of being representational, it is appropriate to ask why precisely he may 
have considered himself succeeding where Russell had failed. I suggested in the previous 
chapter that his objection to Russell’s multiple relation theory was its apparent failure to explain 
                                                 
385 There have been debates over the nature of the expression of “‘p’ says p”; Anscombe, for instance, 
asserted that it is a possible form of a proposition (see Anscombe, G. E. M (1959). An Introduction to 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press. Second, revised edition in: (1965). New York: Harper 
& Row, pp. 88-90) while Kenny was persuaded it is a pseudo-proposition which is always true, since it identifies 
“p” precisely as a proposition which says (that) p (Kenny, 1981, p. 145).  
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how a judgement comes to have a representational, intentional character. Informed by this 
criticism, Wittgenstein’s contribution to the theory of judgement resides primarily in his notion 
of a proposition as a fact with representational capacity, while the theory of judgement 
ascriptions adds to this conception that this representational power of a proposition becomes 
significantly visible when we describe that someone judges – we observe there the correlations 
of two facts (a thought and a represented situations).  
Moreover, the analysis of judgement ascriptions also reveals that when considered in 
this way, the judging subject seems to lose its importance, since the essential task of the 
proposition (its representational capacity) is fully explained by its being a fact which represents 
a fact; the formulation “‘p’ says p”, which omits mention of any judging subject, emphasizes 
this. However, as we will observe in the next section, many commentators are unsatisfied with 
this rendering of Wittgenstein’s theory of judgement: they attempt to argue that a judging 
subject is indeed essential to account for the proposition’s representational capacity. Let’s thus 
look at their argumentation.  
5.3 The Role of Transcendental Subject 
As I emphasized in the previous section, it is possible that for Wittgenstein the analysis 
of judgement ascriptions is intended not only to demonstrate how two facts are correlated in the 
ascriptions of judgements, but also how the subject is unimportant for this analysis. 
Wittgenstein indeed claims in the paragraph following the analysis of judgement ascriptions 
(5.5421): 
“This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul – the subject, etc. – as 
it is conceived in the superﬁcial psychology of the present day. 
Indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul.” 
It is reasonable to assume that the demonstrative pronoun “this” at the beginning of the 
sentence develops the claim 5.542 about which it makes a further remark. If so, Wittgenstein 
states that from the fact that the judgement ascriptions have the form of “ʻp’ says p”, i.e. that 
they express correlations of two facts, it follows that “there is no such thing as the soul” 
(subject), “as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day”. To this, he finally 
adds that “a composite soul would no longer be a soul”. 
What are the inferences Wittgenstein draws here? Firstly, if in judgement ascriptions 
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the correlations of two facts (a thought and a situation judgement is about) are expressed, there 
is no soul – or, in other words, a subject of a judgement. The last sentence seems to be 
explanatory – if judgement is of this form, there cannot be any soul since a composite soul 
would be no proper soul. The core claim of the argument is that for a judgement, it is essential 
that a fact with a complex structure (that our mental or verbal elements are combined in some 
way) represents another fact (occurring situation or that which may occur). If so, then, there is 
no need to presuppose any role for the judging subject (a “soul”). Moreover, if this soul were 
to play any role in judgement, it would need to be composite, since only composite entities can 
represent situations. But “a composite soul would no longer be a soul”, presumably because it 
is (imagined by us as) something single, non-composite.   
5.3.1 Glock’s and Kenny’s Accounts 
The account sketched above may be labelled “the subjectless theory of judgement”. 
However, many commentators are not satisfied with the rendering in which a judging subject 
seems utterly irrelevant, even to the extent that it can simply disappear or amount merely to a 
series of psychical processes, not to any substantial unity behind them.386 They thus set out – 
in various ways – to argue that there is indeed room for the significance of a subject in 
Wittgenstein’s account, so long as we reconsider its nature: it is not an empirical, but a 
transcendental subject, supplying the conditions for the meaningfulness of language. They 
conscript to this end the Tractarian concluding considerations about the transcendental, willing 
subject into Wittgenstein’s account of judgement presented in 5.541-5.542, arguing that on a 
deeper level, this transcendental subject has a crucial role to play in providing language with 
meaning. 
One of the commentators who elaborates on this account is H.-J. Glock, whose A 
Wittgenstein Dictionary repeatedly recurs to the link between a judgment and a subject. His 
contention is that the transcendental subject confers the meaning on words and sentences: “[i]t 
is the mind which gives meaning to language by breathing life into sounds and inscriptions that 
would otherwise be ‘dead’”.387 Glock summarizes Wittgenstein’s account of judgement using 
                                                 
386 This account resembles Humean account of judgment in that the thinking subject (distinguishable from 
the empirical subject) is considered a philosophical fiction. As Hume comments in his Treatise: “For my part, 
when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of 
heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a 
perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception” (Hume, D. (1738-1740). A Treatise of Human 
Nature. Reprinted in: 1975, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 252.  
387 Glock, H.-J. (1996). A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 358. 
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Wittgenstein’s conception of the thought–fact coordination, proposing that their relation 
“depends on the metaphysical subject, a linguistic soul which breathes life into mere signs”.388 
Even if Wittgenstein relegates the description of the constituents of our thoughts to empirical 
psychology, in the background of his theory of judgement, there still lingers, Glock is 
persuaded, a silent persuasion that a transcendental subject is responsible for conferring 
meaning both to thoughts (mental propositions) and linguistic propositions: 
“Although, under the pretext of anti-psychologism, the Tractatus relegates to 
empirical psychology the question of what the constituents of thoughts are, it 
incorporates the mentalist idea that it is the mind which gives meaning to 
language.”389 
The transcendental subject is portrayed as supplying language with meaning by means 
of “acts of meaning”. Correlations link names with objects through these acts of meaning which 
are effected by some kind of an ostensive definition: “the connection between words (names) 
and their meanings (referents) is established by ostensive definition, which establishes a mental 
association between word and object”.390 According to Glock, the correlations between names 
and objects thus rest on our carrying out the act of ostensive definition, i.e. pointing at the 
objects with the intention to call them by particular names. This act of pointing gives meaning 
to the names and, subsequently, the whole of language. It, however, cannot be performed by an 
empirical subject which is “merely a complex of the psychic elements that are to be correlated 
with objects”.391 Therefore, it is “[a]rguably performed by the will of the metaphysical self”.392 
Glock quotes Wittgenstein’s assertion from the Notebooks to the effect that correlating 
words with their referents is something we do393: “By my correlating the components of the 
picture with objects, it [the picture] comes to represent a situation and to be right or wrong”.394 
This means, according to Glock, that forging the correlations amounts to our thinking the sense 
of a proposition. This, in turn, implies that the use of a meaningful proposition produces a 
thought which must incessantly accompany speaking.395 
Before commenting on this nontrivial claim, let’s consider one other author who draws 
                                                 
388 Ibid., p. 350. 
389 Ibid., p. 249. 
390 Ibid., p. 41. 
391 Ibid., p. 250. 
392 Ibid., p. 350. 
393 Ibid., p. 278. 
394 Wittgenstein, NB, 26. 11. 1914; emphasis in the original.  
395 Glock, 1996, p. 358. 
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a link between the account of a judgement and transcendental subject, namely Anthony Kenny. 
In his article Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophy of Mind he, like Glock, highlights Wittgenstein’s 
emphasis on us conferring meaning to language. True, Wittgenstein also repeats that this 
meaning is a matter of mere convention.396 However, Kenny argues, there must be some “acts 
of will that confer the meaning, that set up the conventions”.397 
These acts cannot, Kenny argues, be located in the empirical subject – because if they 
were, he claims, they would be susceptible to the study of natural science and therefore 
“incapable of the ineffable activity of conferring meaning”.398 Therefore, it must be the 
metaphysical subject, whose activity is ineffable in a meaningful language, but whose proper 
functioning is presupposed by this language, and who is the ultimate source of the meaning-
attribution within the domain of language. This argument which Kenny employs is, however, 
circular: the conclusion which Kenny draws (that the empirical subject, studiable by empirical 
psychology, is incapable of ineffable meaning-conferring activity) is presupposed already in 
the initial notion of the “empirical subject” – it is a subject studiable by empirical psychology 
in the notion of which it is already included that it cannot account for the explanation of 
meaning. 
Kenny, in common with Glock, refers to Wittgenstein’s discussion regarding the subject 
of the will as providing further details about the transcendental subject which provides language 
with meaning – it amounts to the metaphysical subject and a “pure will of the extra-mundane 
solipsistic metaphysical self” which provides our thoughts with meaning.399 Pursuing the 
distinction between empirical and metaphysical (willing, transcendental) subject, Kenny 
reminds us that we need to pay particular attention to properly distinguishing psychological 
considerations which can merely describe thoughts as particular configurations of psychic 
elements and the transcendental inquiry into the sources of meaning of these thoughts: 
“In the thought itself, perhaps, we can distinguish between the particular 
mental configuration, studiable by psychology, and the significance or 
intentionality of that configuration, conferred by the metaphysical self.”400 
While the considerations regarding the configuration of psychic elements relate merely 
                                                 
396 Wittgenstein emphasizes the arbitrariness of correlations in the Notebooks, e.g. 15. 10., 22. 10. and 3. 11. 
1914. 
397 Kenny, 1981, p. 146. 
398 Ibid. 
399 Ibid., p. 147. 
400 Ibid., p. 146. 
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to empirical, contingent facts about our thinking, Wittgenstein’s interest is, under Glock’s and  
Kenny’s interpretations, directed towards the sphere of the “logical and intentional” (as Kenny 
formulates it), represented by the meaning-conferring acts carried out by the transcendental 
subject.401 To summarize, both Glock and Kenny assert that behind Wittgenstein’s account of 
meaning, there is the presupposition of a metaphysical subject who supplies names with 
meanings, i.e. sets up meaningful correlations between names and objects and, by doing this, 
provides the language as a whole with meaning. We may call this subject “transcendental” in 
the sense that it represents a necessary condition for the meaningfulness of language – without 
the transcendental subject’s correlating names and objects, language would not be intentional 
and would not represent anything external to itself. 
5.3.2 Correlations, Signs and Symbols 
Both above-presented authors are thus persuaded that, as Glock expresses it, 
Wittgenstein employs in the Tractatus the “mentalist idea that it is the mind which gives 
meaning to language”.402 Elaborating on this idea, Glock repeatedly makes use of the metaphor 
of the mind which breathes life into signs: “it is the mind which gives meaning to language by 
breathing life into sounds and inscriptions that would otherwise be ‘dead’.”403 Mind is identified 
with metaphysical subject or soul: “the metaphysical subject, a linguistic soul which breathes 
life into mere signs” or a “metaphysical subject invoked by solipsism sets limits to language by 
infusing words with life”.404 Breathing life into signs amounts, according to Glock, to “giving 
meaning to language”.405 However, to breathe life into signs or to infuse words with life are 
metaphors, so we should inquire what exactly they endeavour to convey. Specifically, what 
does it mean that signs are dead without mind breathing life into them and what kind of action 
is this breathing life into signs (or infusing them with life)? 
It seems that the dead signs into which meaning has to be injected or “breathed” are 
names in propositions which are not yet correlated with objects. Names and objects can be 
linked (correlated) only “through acts of meaning”406 which Glock apparently identifies with 
                                                 
401 Ibid. 
402 Glock, 1996, p. 249. 
403 Ibid., p. 358. 
404 Ibid., p. 250. 
405 Ibid. p. 358.  
406 Ibid., p. 350. 
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the carrying out of an ostensive definition.407 We need to know the name to be used for the 
thing and point at the thing, proclaiming: “I mean that thing by this name”. Glock’s “act of 
meaning” thus amounts here to intentionally endowing a thing with a particular name that we 
choose for it. Similarly, Kenny suggests there are “acts of will that confer the meaning that set 
up conventions”.408 “Acts of will” amount here to the acts of mind in Glock’s vocabulary and 
these mental acts are again meaning-conferring acts. Then, this conferred meaning is claimed 
to set up conventions. The idea is thus similar to Glock’s – behind conventions (i.e. 
conventional correlations of names and objects) there need to be some mental acts which enable 
these correlations to take place.409  
Apart from the establishment of correlations between names and objects, there is yet 
another step, somehow hidden, yet present in the accounts of Glock and Kenny that is necessary 
for establishing the meaningfulness of language, namely the act of transforming mere signs into 
symbols. This transformation is the topic tackled by Wittgenstein in the section 3.32 of the 
Tractatus. A sign is, in general, what we can perceive of a symbol (3.32). A sign amounts either 
to a propositional sign (“a sign with which we express a proposition” (3.12)) or to the parts of 
a proposition – words. Wittgenstein discusses the difficulties arising from the fact that our 
language is not a perfect sign-language in which the signification of all signs would be 
unambiguous – we may encounter the same sign which however signifies two (or even more) 
different objects (3.322). The way in which the sign signifies is its “mode of signification” 
(3.322). Thus, what Wittgenstein asserts is that one sign may be used with two (or more) 
different modes of signification. 
So, for instance, the sign “is” possesses three different modes of signification: it may be 
used as a copula (“A is green”), as a sign for identity (“A is A”) or as an expression for existence 
(“A is” meaning that “A exists”). Or, to adduce another example, in the sentence “Green is 
green”, the first use of the “green” amounts to the proper name and the second to the adjective 
which describes the object named. In both cases, we have one word signifying in different ways. 
These words have different meanings and they amount to, Wittgenstein emphasizes, different 
                                                 
407 “[T]he connection between words (names) and their meanings (referents) is established by ostensive 
definition, which establishes a mental association between word and object” (Ibid., p. 41). 
408 Kenny, 1981, p. 146. 
409 Only Kenny does not specify whether he considers these underlying acts as being based on the ostensive 
definitions.  
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symbols (3.323) even if as signs, they look the same. 
In the case of such signs, the task to be done is to carry out the transition from this sign 
to a symbol that possesses merely one mode of signification. Thus, when we encounter the word 
“is” in a sentence, we have to decide how it will be employed – will it be used as a copula, as a 
sign of identity or as an expression for the fact that something exists? In other, unambiguous 
cases, the transformation of the sign into symbol still needs to be undertaken, even though we 
then proceed from one sign (e.g. “dog”) to a symbol (a sign “dog” used within a proposition). 
In both cases, moving from sign to symbol requires applying the sign within a proposition.  
To put all this into several words, Wittgenstein postulates that “in order to recognize a 
symbol by its sign we must observe how it is used with a sense” (3.326) and that “[a] sign does 
not determine a logical form unless it is taken together with its logico-syntactical employment” 
(3.327). The above-presented considerations regarding the signs “is” serve as the examples of 
our using a sign with a sense, transforming it thus into a meaningful symbol. The particular way 
a sign is used is its “logico-syntactical employment”, i.e. the realization of the rules which 
govern the way the sign may be used within a language. The notion of an “application” of signs 
is of special importance here: “What signs fail to express, their application shows. What signs 
slurs over, their application says clearly” (3.262). 
Both Glock and Kenny depict this transition from a mere sign to a symbol with a 
particular use as something the transcendental subject needs to carry out (even if they both 
emphasize primarily the role of this subject in forging the correlations between names and 
objects). Kenny makes use, as I had, of Wittgenstein’s example of the sign “is”, reminding us 
that it may signify in various ways and that what makes the difference between sign and symbol 
is the significant use of the sign.410 In addition, Kenny alleges that a logical multiplicity of a 
proposition is determined by rules of logical syntax which are tacit conventions relating the 
sign and symbol.411 
To summarize, there are two essential roles assigned to the metaphysical subject within 
the picture Kenny and Glock put forward: to make a sign into a symbol and to forge the 
correlations between names and objects. Let us investigate both these roles. As for the 
                                                 
410 Kenny, 1981, p. 144; TLP, 3.3.22, 3.326, 3.327. 
411 Kenny, 1981, Ibid. 
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realization of the correlations between names and objects, we may wonder whether the role of 
transcendental subject in conferring meaning to language is indeed necessary and whether we 
couldn’t do merely with the empirical subject studiable by psychology. As I pointed out above, 
Kenny’s argument supposedly ruling out this possibility is circular: he presupposes the 
conclusion of his argument, namely that endowing language with meaning cannot take place 
within the empirical subject studiable by empirical psychology. 
Glock interprets Wittgenstein’s claim from the Notebooks to the effect that correlations 
are something we do412 as a statement that realizing the correlations amounts to our thinking 
the sense of a proposition which means that in using meaningful propositions, there is also 
produced a thought which must incessantly accompany speaking. However, I do not consider 
this reading necessary. When focusing, together with Glock, on the quotations from Notebooks 
as proof, we may wonder why Wittgenstein so often emphasized there that correlations are 
arbitrary.413 If he had wished to underscore the significance of transcendental subject behind 
the correlations, it is hard to see why he paid such extensive attention to their arbitrary nature. 
As I see it, another reading suggests itself: Wittgenstein may be interpreted as never 
suggesting that there has to be transcendental subject to forge the name-object correlations. 
Rather, these correlations can be located into the field studiable by empirical psychology. The 
correlations would in this case amount to particular cases of the psychical processes psychology 
is interested in. Since the empirical subject is to be conceived in the Humean fashion as 
amounting merely to psychological processes (and not any substantial entity behind them), 
these correlations would be special instances of the psychological occurrences labelled as the 
“empirical subject”. 
In addition to this, we should also take into account that name-object correlations always 
take place within the context of the whole language. For one thing, as I have pointed out earlier, 
every single proposition determines the whole of logical space, i.e. by understanding that it is 
                                                 
412 “By my correlating the components of the picture with objects, it comes to represent a situation and to be 
right or wrong” (Wittgenstein, NB, 26. 11. 1914, emphasis in the original).  
413 This line of thought is supported by Wittgenstein’s repeated emphasis, both in the Notebooks and in the 
Tractatus, on correlations being arbitrary, i.e. their being set by us, but by means of arbitrary stipulations. “The 
proposition is supposed to give a logical model of situation. It can surely only do this because objects have been 
arbitrarily correlated with its [situation's] elements” (NB, 15. 10. 1914); “Assignment of names must take place by 
means of arbitrary stipulation. Every prop[osition] must contain features with arbitrarily determined references” 
(NB, 22. 10. 1914.); “That arbitrary correlation of sign and thing signified which is a condition of the possibility 
of the propositions […] in the elementary proposition […] occurs by means of names” (NB, 3. 11. 1914.). Further 
e.g. NB, 22. 8. 14, 26. 11. 14; TLP 3.322, 3.342, 3.315, 5.473, 6.124. 
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either true or false, we are able to understand all other propositions formulable in language. If 
so, no single name-object correlation happens without informing us about many other possible 
connections within language.414 At this point, we may return to Kenny’s claim, which seems to 
me to point in a similar direction, namely that the proposition’s multiplicity is determined by 
rules of logical syntax (tacit conventions relating a sign and symbol).415 We may get some 
inspiration from this description even if we disagree with Kenny’s view that these conventions 
need to be supported by the meaning-providing acts of transcendental subject. What Kenny 
presumably wishes to claim is that no single proposition alone may determine the correlations 
of its elements (signs) with the objects of the represented situations since this determination 
always takes place within the whole of language which is already governed by many tacitly 
presupposed rules and conventions. Thus, every single proposition determines the whole of 
logical space but it may do so merely because it is located in this space which, in turn, 
determines this proposition’s relation to the represented situation. 
Might the transcendental subject instead play a role in the transformation of signs into 
symbols? I am persuaded that it is not to be postulated here either. Rather, as in the case of 
name-object correlations, sign-symbol transformations always take place within a language in 
which an immense number of tacit, implicit conventions are already in place. It is never the 
transcendental subject itself that arbitrarily confers meanings to words and propositions within 
the realm of his own “private” language. Quite to the contrary, language is something we share, 
together with all those tacit conventions which orient us in it. Thus, both name-object 
correlations and sign-symbol transformations are susceptible to the empirical studies 
concerning the rules governing usage of common human language(s). To postulate, in addition, 
the role of the transcendental subject providing language with meaning would be not only 
superfluous, but also misleading, since it would amount to the claim that we cannot do simply 
with the empirical meaning-conferring acts.  
If there is, however, no role for the transcendental subject to be played in the Tractarian 
conception of the meaningfulness of language, is Wittgenstein any closer to (or at least less far 
away from) Kant’s epistemological enterprise that young Moore or Russell were? This is 
something I will attempt to answer in the following section. 
                                                 
414 See the the end of section 5.2.1, pp. 106-107. 
415 Kenny, 1981, p. 144. 
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5.4. Wittgenstein as a Kantian Philosopher?  
I stated in the previous section that I am persuaded there is no significant role to be 
played by the transcendental subject in providing language with meaning. If so, can we claim 
that Wittgenstein’s theory of judgement is in some sense influenced by Kant’s epistemology? 
There are several authors who argue that Wittgenstein may be indeed considered a Kantian 
philosopher on account of philosophical similarities unrelated to the notion of transcendental 
subjectivity. Thus, according to Eric Stenius, Wittgenstein was, in contrast to the Viennese 
circle of logical positivists, “in essential respects a Kantian philosopher”.416 His anti-
Kantianism, if any, allegedly amounted merely to his transformation of the Kantian system, 
something which does not prevent Wittgenstein from adhering to “a Kantianism of a peculiar 
kind”.417 Where, according to Stenius, does this transformed Kantianism reside? 
In the acceptance of the metaphysical, transcendental subject, but not merely in that. 
According to Stenius, Wittgenstein, like Kant, employs transcendental deductions to account 
for the meaningfulness of language. As Stenius describes it, while Kant strove, using 
transcendental arguments, to delineate the limit of theoretical Reason, Wittgenstein wishes to 
delineate, by means of the same method, the limits of meaningful language. What is possible 
for theoretical Reason in Kant is in Wittgenstein changed into that what is describable in 
meaningful language.418 Despite this difference, the task of both philosophers is for Stenius 
identical: to indicate the limit of theoretical discourse.419 
According to Peter Hacker, another commentator who describes the general common 
features he found in the Kantian and Tractarian projects, Wittgenstein was certainly 
“sympathetic to Kant’s critical method”.420 The similarity between both philosophers is 
however according to him very general, with many dissimilarities or even contradictory 
opinions. What is eventually essential is that they both shared the concern about the nature of 
philosophy and the same idea of what philosophy should concentrate on. The goal of proper 
philosophical investigations supposedly resided for both in the investigation of the “bounds of 
                                                 
416 Stenius, E. (1960). Wittgenstein’s Tractatus – A Critical Exposition of Its Main Lines of Thought. Oxford: 
Blackwell, p. 214. 
417 Ibid. 
418 Ibid., p. 218. 
419 Ibid. 
420 Hacker, P. M. S. (1972). Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p.  206. 
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sense”.421 Hacker’s Kant and Wittgenstein would agree that many claims of traditional 
philosophy (metaphysics) transgress these bounds of sense by misusing concepts and making 
nonsensical claims.422 With reference to the nature of philosophy, Hacker presents these two 
philosophers as particularly eager to shed some light on the proper task and limitations of 
philosophical endeavours. Both of them attempted to “curb its [philosophy’s] metaphysical 
pretensions by clarifying its status and circumscribing what one may rationally hope for in 
philosophical investigation”.423 
And finally, H.-J. Glock – who, as we saw in the earlier discussion of “breathing life 
into dead signs” is generally inclined to detect transcendental-idealistic notions in the Tractatus 
–  claims that “Wittgenstein’s logic of representation” is a direct successor of Kant’s project of 
transcendental logic since they “both deal with the preconditions for the possibility of symbolic 
representation […] and thereby [Wittgenstein] puts the relation between language and reality 
at the core of analytic philosophy”.424 
Hacker detects the similarity between Kant and Wittgenstein in very general features of 
their philosophical enterprises – for our purposes probably too general. It is true that both Kant 
and Wittgenstein took an interest in the nature of philosophy, striving to unveil where the limit 
between the sense and nonsense rests (between proper transcendental philosophy and 
metaphysics for Kant and meaningful representation of the world and nonsense for 
Wittgenstein). More pressing, however, is the question concerning their ideas on how to draw 
these limits. Stenius and Glock emphasize that both philosophers share their concern with the 
transcendental conditions underlying the distinction between meaning and nonsense. They both 
make an inquiry into the possibility of meaningful representation of the world. 
One reading of Stenius’ and Glock’s interpretations is that they assert that the 
transcendental nature of the Tractatus may be discovered in Wittgenstein’s employment of the 
“transcendental method” of inquiry, being realized mainly by using transcendental arguments. 
Both Stenius’ “transcendental deductions” and Glock’s “logic of representation” concerning 
the transcendental preconditions suggest that it is precisely the transcendental kind of 
                                                 
421 Ibid. 
422 Ibid., p. 207. It should be noted that Hacker reassessed his approach in the second edition of Insight and 
Illusion in 1987, see pp. 206-214.  
423 Ibid. 
424 Glock, H.-J. (2010). Vorsprung durch Logik: The German Analytic Tradition. In: O’Hear, A., ed., 
German Philosophy Since Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 144. 
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argumentation which Stenius and Glock consider essentially “Kantian” in the Tractatus. The 
transcendental kind of argument points out certain facts about our cognition and endeavours to 
demonstrate that these facts are possible merely owing to the underlying – transcendental – 
conditions. And it is indeed true that there are some arguments with a transcendental shape 
present in the Tractatus. For instance, the argument for the necessary existence of the substance 
of the world presented in 2.0211-2.0212 may be regarded as transcendental. It points out that 
we are able to make a picture of the world, insisting that this is possible only due to world’s 
having a substance. If it hadn’t, then whether proposition has a sense would depend on whether 
another proposition is true (2.0211) – and that is, according to Wittgenstein, unacceptable.425 
Another argument of a similar, i.e. transcendental, form may be discovered within 
Wittgenstein’s discussion regarding “general propositional form”. In 4.5 of the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein holds that we can foresee which form any meaningful proposition has. This is 
possible only owing to the transcendental condition that all propositions share the same form, 
i.e. the general propositional form. However, even if we go on to analyse these arguments in 
greater detail, it is doubtful that the presence of transcendentally shaped arguments in the 
Tractatus is sufficient to make Wittgenstein a “Kantian” philosopher. A more promising 
approach reveals itself, I believe, if we ask whether the Tractatus as a whole, with its overall 
structure and construction, exhibits some features that imply Kantian influences. We will see 
in a moment, though, that by looking for this more general, overall approach, we arrive again 
at the general propositional form, which has been introduced as a result of the transcendentally 
fashioned argument (in 4.5). 
Searching for this overall approach, a valuable inspiration may be derived from Adrian 
Moore’s book Points of View.426 There, Moore claims that the central aim of the Tractatus is to 
disentangle the puzzling question over the unity – not, as the Russell-Wittgenstein debate might 
suggest, primarily the unity of particular propositions, but the unity of the world as a whole and 
the body of our thoughts and propositions. This is, Moore asserts, one unity manifesting itself 
in two ways: unity of the world on the one side and unity of the body of thoughts and 
propositions on the other. This two-sided approach to unity accords with my previous 
                                                 
425 Obviously, this argument stays in need of further elaboration to be comprehensible. Most importantly, 
one would need to explain what it means that the sense of one proposition depends on the true of another. However, 
I use this argument here merely to demonstrate the presence of the transcendentally shaped arguments in the 
Tractatus and will thus not delve in further exegetical details. 
426 Moore, A. (1997). Points of view. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
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contention that Wittgenstein’s opening Tractarian ontology and his picture theory may be 
regarded as two aspects of one single phenomenon: our representation of the world.427  
The unity which Moore is interested in is the “unity in which everything is held 
together”428, to be characterized as “an abstract, logical unity which contributes nothing to what 
the world is like but constrains what it could be like”429  and which also has its form on the 
subjective side – amounting there, Moore suggests, to the unity of consciousness.430 While 
Moore provides a rather general account, I will here attempt to fill it with more details. When 
we approach the Tractatus with this overall unity issue in mind, we indeed uncover several 
claims, running through it, that suggest the issue bears a special significance for Wittgenstein. 
As Moore points out, it is noteworthy that, beginning with the sentence that “the world is all 
that is the case”, Wittgenstein proceeds with the second one, claiming that the world is “the 
totality of facts” (die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen) (1.1).431  
The importance of the world’s being composed of facts has been already emphasized – 
the world is described as composed of facts because it is this kind of composition that is 
especially salient for world’s representation in language.432 Apart from this, we may notice that 
emphasis is also laid on world’s being the totality (die Gesamtheit) of facts. It is highly 
significant that Wittgenstein chose to open the Tractatus by discussing this totality. If he had 
followed Russell or Moore we would expect him to begin with the description of particular, 
single referents of our judgements. But Wittgenstein uses a top-down approach: he proceeds 
from the overall structure of the world to particular facts (Tatsachen) – or situations (Sachlagen) 
which may occur in the world – and only thereafter to the states of affairs (consisting of objects) 
from which facts and situations are composed.433 
Wittgenstein further expands on the topic of the world as a totality in 1.13, where he 
claims that the world is to be identified with the facts in logical space (Die Tatsachen im 
                                                 
427 See section 5.2, p. 102. 
428 Moore, 1997, p. 150. 
429  Ibid.  
430 “It [this abstract, logical unity] is also the unity of self-consciousness. I recognize it when I view the 
world self-consciously from my own particular point of view, and come to see everything as being how it is from 
that point of view” (Ibid.).   
431 Ibid., pp. 149-150. 
432  See section 5.2, p. 102. 
433 The philosophical importance of this top-down approach will be brought forward at the end of this chapter 
where it will be grasped based on its similarity with Kant’s treatment of the overall unity of judgements, see. p. 
133. 
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logischen Raum sind die Welt). The totality of facts are thus facts as organized within the logical 
space. As I see it, it is precisely this notion of logical space which is substantial for grasping 
the kind of unity that world exhibits. Logical space is the space of possibilities of the existence 
or non-existence of states of affairs: all states of affairs which may ever occur must be locatable 
within the logical space. On this basis, more complex situations – either occurring (facts) or 
non-occurring, but with the possibility to occur – are located in this all-encompassing space. 
In this sense, the logical space may be understood as that which holds everything 
together: every fact and also every possible situation which may become actual must be located 
somewhere in this all-embracing space. On this basis, the logical space also constrains what the 
world could be like: the world may be composed merely of those actualized situations which 
already have, even only as possible ones, their places within the logical space. The unity on the 
objective side, the unity of the world, may be thus conceived of as being given by means of all 
possible and actual states of affairs being located within this space. The over-arching nature of 
the logical space, which includes all the possible and actual states of affairs, strikes me as a 
reason why this space is called “logical” at all – it includes all basic elements (objects and states 
of affairs composed of them), based on which more complex situations (both possible and 
actually occurring) may be composed. As such, the space as a complex unity delineates the 
whole realm of what is possible; any situation which could not be located in this space is 
“illogical” and cannot belong into the world as a unity.  
Let's now turn our attention to what Moore calls the “subjective” side of the unity. While 
Moore characterizes it as the unity of our viewpoint on the world434, it seems to me essential to 
emphasize that it is the side where the unity of world’s representation takes place. There, we 
notice immediately that the notion of logical space is employed once again. While any 
particular (occurrent or non-occurrent) situation is located at some particular place within 
logical space, so every picture (of whatever form) “represent a possible situation in logical 
space” (2.202). And similarly, a proposition as a picture determines one place in the logical 
space (3.4). This similarity of the account of the objective and subjective perspective of the 
overall unity is hardly coincidental: there still is one unity as realized at both sides of 
representation (that what is represented and what represents it).  
As for our representation of the world by means of propositions, any proposition (as a 
                                                 
434 Moore, 1997, p. 151.  
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logical picture) not only represents one possible situation in the logical space, but it also, by 
doing this, depicts (abbildet) the whole reality: “A proposition can determine (bestimmen) only 
one place in logical space: nevertheless the whole of logical space must already be given 
(gegeben sein) by it” (3.42). As I pointed out earlier, the idea that the entire logical space is 
“given” by every individual proposition is derived from the idea that understanding the meaning 
of one proposition – located at one place in logical space – is sufficient for understanding the 
meaning of any other proposition, located at any other position in logical space.435 As I also 
emphasized earlier, the representation by means of a proposition is embedded in a complex 
representational system in which each single proposition pictures one situation by means of 
employing the “grammar” (conventional rules) governing the whole space.436 If this is the case, 
we may say that the unity provided by the logical space resides not only in delineating the realm 
of possible propositions to propositions which may occur within it. It also interconnects all 
propositions into a whole where the putting forward of any single proposition entails the 
understanding of all propositions which occur or may occur within the rest of the logical space. 
Still, it seems to me that we may say even more about the overall unity as it is realized 
in our representation of the world. With the reference to the overall unity of propositions, there 
seems to be yet another issue relevant in accounting for the essence of the proposition: the 
general propositional form. This form is first introduced within the context of the above-
mentioned argument (from 4.5): there has to be a general propositional form, for all propositions 
must have a form which we can anticipate. This general propositional form is intended to serve 
as “a description of the propositions of any sign language whatsoever […]”.437 It is “what all 
propositions, by their very nature, have in common with one another” (5.47).438 
What, however, does this general propositional form amount to? Wittgenstein 
formulates it as “es verhält sich so und so”, i.e. “this is how things stand” or “such and such is 
the case”.439 The proposition, which has as its essence the general propositional form (5.471), 
thus claims that in the world, situations occur in some particular way: it is claimed that “this 
                                                 
435 Especially in sections 5.2.1 and 5.3.2. 
436 See section 5.3.2. 
437 Ibid; emphases in the original. 
438 Emphasis in the original.  
439 The first translation is Pearls and McGuiness’, the second one Ogden’s. We may notice from the German 
formulation of the general propositional form (Es verhält sich so und so) that it has a close relation to the world’s 
being composed of facts. The verb verhalten sich is the one from which the name for states of affairs, 
Sachverhalten, is derived. (In a state of affairs, Sachverhalt, objects stand in a determinate way to one another: 
“verhalten sich in bestimmter Art und Weise zueinander”.)  
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[the occurrence or non-occurrence of particular situation] is how things stand”. And the general 
propositional form reappears once again, in a more technical shape, in the fifth section of the 
Tractatus where it is depicted as a fact that each proposition is either an elementary proposition 
or a complex proposition formed from elementary propositions by the successive application 
of truth-functional connectives (5.32, 6ff). Thus, each proposition has a foreseeable structure: 
it is either an elementary proposition or a complex one which is formed from elementary 
propositions in a predictable manner. If I am given all elementary propositions, I can use them 
to construct all complex propositions (4.5). Elementary propositions describe the most 
elementary level of reality, i.e. the occurrence or non-occurrence of states of affairs. And all 
more complex levels of situations which (may) occur in the world can be then accounted for by 
more complex propositions which are constructed using elementary propositions in a 
predictable way. 
However, why are there two ways to account for the unity within our representation of 
the world if the objective unity is comprehensible merely by means of the notion of the logical 
space? Wittgenstein never tackled this issue explicitly, but we can try to make an interpretative 
guess. As Wittgenstein pointed out in the discussion concerning the space where particular 
objects, which compose states of affairs, are located, we may imagine this space as being similar 
to, say, a colour space; or, since he also mentions “tones” and “objects of the sense” (2.0131), 
a tonal space or space of sensibly perceivable objects.440 Such metaphors seem to allow that 
there may be various spaces in which some “sections” of reality are localizable, but others aren’t 
(we cannot locate a tone in the colour space, for instance). In the case of the unity of the world, 
the unity of the space is guaranteed by the fact that everything may be considered an “object” 
(in a very general sense in which Wittgenstein uses the word).441 But what guarantees that all 
propositions are located within one space and that they are thus all mutually interconnected in 
a comprehensible manner (and that I may derive one from the other and make various logical 
                                                 
440 The metaphor of the space of states of affairs, where objects are located, differs from the metaphor of 
logical space.  Apart from the logical space, there are also spaces of states of affairs in which objects which occur 
or may occur in various states of affairs are located. Employing the metaphor of the space, we may imagine each 
thing, “as it were, in a space of possible states of affairs” (TLP, 2.013). Similarly to imagining spatial object being 
surrounded by the colour-space, we may imagine the Tractarian simple objects as being surrounded by the space 
which entails all states of affairs in which these objects may appear. Based on this simile, we may picture the 
overall logical space as being composed of all spaces of states of affairs in which all the objects in the world may 
occur. And similarly to each object occupying a particular place in the space of states of affairs, each state of affairs 
occupies “its” space in the overall logical space. If the state of affairs occurs, it actually exists at this place, if not, 
it however at least may occur there. 
441 For Wittgenstein, an “object” is everything from which states of affairs are (or may be) composed. 
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operations with them)?  
It seems to be here that the significance of the general proposition form comes to the 
fore: it is this form, which makes all propositions the occupants of one space, since it is the 
form which all propositions have in common (5.47). Wittgenstein did not provide us with the 
information as to what precisely the objects look like, but we know at least that it is essential to 
them to combine within states of affairs with other objects. Similarly, we may say that what 
makes the proposition as a combination of words representational is that these words are 
assembled in a particular way so that the proposition says that “such and such is the case”. 
Thus, I have attempted to provide one possible way of accounting for the overall unity 
within the body of propositions. However, it is striking that so far I have been concerned merely 
with the overall unity of all propositions. Even if it were of the central interest to Wittgenstein, 
we shouldn’t forget that he was also, at least with the same intensity, interested in the unity of 
each single proposition. How then do these two enterprises, the search for the unity of a single 
proposition and an inquiry into the unity of the body of all propositions, hang together?  
As for the general propositional form, its formulation (“this is how things stand”) gives 
us a clear hint as to how to comprehend the nature of each single proposition: the general 
propositional form may be read as another formulation of the claim that a proposition is to be 
considered a fact: a proposition is a picturing fact which represents the pictured fact: the 
proposition with the form “this is how things stand” (or that “such and such is the case”) 
represents that the pictured situation is in the way in which the proposition depicts it.  
And as the logical space is concerned, the account of a single proposition is based on 
the fact that each proposition may determine one particular place within this space only because 
it has a special structure, i.e. it determines its place within a logical space by means of its 
coordinates: and it is done by providing information about the way the objects within the 
situation, to which it refers, are combined. The notion of a proposition as a fact whose elements 
are combined in a particular way (thus representing that the elements within the situation 
referred to are so combined) thus again plays an essential role here.  
The connection between the tasks of accounting for the unity of one proposition (or one 
situation occurring in the logical space) and all propositions (or the world as a whole) is not 
coincidental. On the contrary, it is precisely in this connection between the provision of both 
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unities that the similarity to Kant’s project may be discovered. Let’s begin by considering the 
unity as realized, in Wittgenstein, in proposition(s) and, in Kant, in judgement(s). For Kant, 
every single judgement unifies various perceptions by subsuming them under concepts and then 
determining them through the various forms of judgements (categorical, singular, assertoric 
etc). However, Kant's account of judgement is not merely an account of the unity of single 
judgements, but at the same time of the unity within the body of all judgements: every 
judgement, as a unification of representations in various judgemental forms, is also a way of 
bringing these representations into the highest unity in consciousness, i.e. into the unity of 
apperception.  
Kant presents the transcendental unity of apperception as a demand for unity within 
consciousness. If there were not such a unity, we would be unable to account for the fact that 
all representations, which (may) occur in me, are my representations. Their belonging to me 
may be explained merely by their all belonging to the unified consciousness, i.e. to the unity of 
apperception. If there weren’t this unity, i.e. if I couldn’t comprehend all representations I (may) 
have in one consciousness, I would only be in possession of empirical consciousness, i.e. that 
consciousness which singularly accompanies representations in the inner sense.  
However, this empirical kind of consciousness is “itself dispersed and without relation 
to the identity of the subject”.442 If I had only this empirical consciousness, “I would have as 
multicolored, diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious”.443 To account 
for the fact that all representations are mine, I must not only accompany them by particular 
(empirical) consciousness, but also be able to combine their manifold in one consciousness.444 
Thus, the existence of the unity of transcendental apperception is conceived by Kant as a 
demand that there is an overall unity within a consciousness based on which I may conceived 
of all representations which may occur as mine.  
Within this picture, a judgement is conceived of as an essential tool by which 
representations are brought into this highest unity of apperception. As noted above, within each 
judgement, perceptions are subsumed under concepts which are, in turn, put into the particular 
forms of a judgement. How, though, is this account of the unification of perceptions within 
single judgements related to the issue of the overall unity within the body of all judgements? 
                                                 
442 Kant, CPR, B133. 
443 Ibid., B134. 
444 Ibid., B133. 
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We may say that this unity is secured by the fact that each judgement is a way of bringing 
representations into the unity of apperception. If so, judgments, to be considered by me as 
“mine”, must be not only directed to the objects (as appearances), but also mutually non-
contradictory. Moreover, the judgments are mutually interrelated by various logical relations 
due to the logical forms which they exhibit. 
And, finally, we may add that the importance of the concept of the overall unity within 
the body of all judgements is eventually also emphasized in Kant's treatment of reason 
(Vernunft) which also serves a unificatory function: while understanding (Verstand) is the 
source of categories, it is the reason (Vernunft) whose aim is to “bring the greatest manifold of 
cognition of the understanding to the smallest number of principles (universal conditions), and 
thereby to effect the highest unity of the manifold”.445 Thus, the unificatory function, 
substantiated in the understanding by the means of the categories, is brought to its fulfillment 
by reason’s subsuming the whole of our cognition under the smallest number of universal 
conditions.446 
Now redirecting our attention back to Wittgenstein, we may contend that it is the 
general propositional form which plays the same unificatory role as the forms of judgement 
and transcendental apperception play in Kant's epistemology. If there weren’t this form, my 
representations could be “multicoloured” in that they may have various unpredictable forms, 
they may not be locatable in one single space and they may not be related to one another in a 
comprehensible way. And, similarly to Kant’s accounting also for the unity of single judgement, 
the general propositional form also accounts for the unity of each single proposition since it 
claims that each single proposition (with the form “this is how things stand”) is a picturing fact 
which represents the pictured fact. 
Apart from the unity of proposition(s), there is also, in Wittgenstein, the objective unity 
emphasized, i.e. the unity of the world enunciated by the notion of logical space where all 
possible and actual situations must be located. Now even if Kant’s transcendental project is 
mostly focused on the subjective conditions of our cognition, we may also find an emphasis 
                                                 
445 Ibid., A305/B361. 
446 To provide a detailed account of Kant’s notion of Reason (Vernunft), I would need to introduce his 
concepts of “ideas of Reason”. However, this would lead us too far to the practical implications of Kant’s treatment 
of Reason. For the present purposes, I thus emphasize merely the fulfillment of the unificatory function which 
Reason provides, without going into further details.    
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laid on the necessity of the unification of the world as the totality of appearances. Due to the 
categories, under which the whole of our experience falls, the world is constructed as a unity 
governed by laws. The whole of all appearances is called “nature” by Kant447 and it stands 
under the laws given by understanding via the application of categories: we are thus the true 
lawgivers of nature.448  
Also, as we have seen in the first chapter, Kant defines object (as an appearance) as 
“that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united”449. An object as 
perceived by us is thus a singular unity within the world as represented by us. Due to the work 
of categories, each perceived object is considered as having some property (based on the 
application of the category of a substance and attribute) and as being located within the causal 
chain of causes and effects (due to the category of causality). Thus, we may say that Kant pays 
attention both to the notion of the world as a whole of appearances as unified and governed by 
the forms of understanding, and to the unity of objects within the world which have attributes 
and which are interconnected by the causal laws.  
It is to be admitted that the approaches to objective unity differ in Wittgenstein and 
Kant, since while Wittgenstein resists giving any explanatory priority to the subjective or the 
objective side of the unity, Kant always directs our attention to the transcendental unity of 
consciousness – nature is always the sum of appearances for us and all objects with their 
properties and relations to other objects are objects as unified for our perception and cognition 
of them. However, the striking similarity in both philosophers’ accounts lies in their persuasion 
that to provide an account of objects and their properties and relations is essentially intertwined 
with the account of the overall unity of the world. For Kant, the application of categories, by 
means of which representations are adduced to the unity of apperception, explicates both the 
unity of appearances within the world (as perceived and judged by us) and of the unity of this 
world as a whole. Similarly for Wittgenstein, the notion of the logical space is explanatory both 
as regards the unity of the world as a whole (since every state of affairs must be locatable within 
                                                 
447 Nature “regarded materially” (natura materialiter spectata), i.e. nature in the sense of its material, is for 
Kant “the sum total of all appearances” (Kant, CPR, B163); regarded formally, i.e. with regard to its form (natura 
formaliter spectata), nature is the “lawfulness of appearances in space and time” (Ibid., B165).  
448 “The understanding is […] not merely a faculty for making rules through the comparison of the 
appearances; it is itself the legislation for nature, i.e., without understanding there would not be any nature at all, 
i.e., synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances in accordance with rules […]” (Ibid., A126-127).  
449 See Ibid., B137 and chapter 1, pp. 18-19. Kant does not refer to the nounena, objects in themselves, since 
these are unattainable to us, see §26 of the “Transcendental Deduction” (B 164). 
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it) and as regards objects (which are mutually interconnected within states of affairs, located in 
particular places in the logical space). 
Eventually, I am persuaded that it does not matter so much whether Wittgenstein would 
agree with the transcendental-idealistic approach to a philosophical account of judgements (or, 
in his words, propositions).450 True, he employs some transcendental arguments – which I have 
summarized above – but as I attempted to show, he does not presuppose or postulate the 
existence of a transcendental subject to explain the meaningfulness of language (which may be 
accounted for within the confines of a psychological explication of meaning).  
The crucial point of agreement with Kant eventually seems to reside not in the 
transcendental provision of meaningfulness to language but in Wittgenstein’s persuasion that 
the way in which we attempt to explain the particular unity of a proposition (or a singular 
judgement in Kant) must be, at the same time, explanatory to the notion of the overall unity of 
the body of propositions (judgements). Earlier, I labelled Wittgenstein’s approach, in 
opposition to that of early Moore and Russell, a top-down approach.451 This label is justified 
since in Wittgenstein’s treatment of both the unity of the proposition(s) and of the world, it is 
the notion of an overall unity which is explanatorily primary, in the sense that the account of a 
single entity (a proposition, object, state of affairs) must from the very beginning be embedded 
in an account of the overall unity (of all propositions, objects, states of affairs).  
Thus, to provide particular examples, Wittgenstein’s concept of a single proposition as 
a fact which says something about a situation external to it is embedded in the account of 
propositions in which knowing the truth or falsity of (this) one proposition amounts to the 
understanding of all other propositions which may be formed within the whole of language. 
Here, we may detect a striking similarity to Kant’s approach in which one single judgment is 
always treated as a part of an overall web of all judgments which all need to be adduced into 
the unity of apperception. The similarity, however, does not reside in the notion of 
transcendental apperception – as the core notion of transcendental epistemology – but rather in 
this reliance of an account of a single judgment (proposition) on the whole of judgments 
                                                 
450 We may dispute what the “transcendentalist account of judgment” necessarily includes. For Kant, it 
resides in comprehending a judgment as a way of bringing perceptions under the unity of apperception. Interpreted 
more generally, we may see it as a kind of approach which attempts to determine the conditions of possibility of a 
judgment (either as an act of judging or as its product). 
451 In the section 5.4 of the thesis.  
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(propositions).  
Analogously, in the case of a unity of the world, no object and no state of affairs is 
treated as a self-standing entity, independent of the other objects or states of affairs. Quite to 
the contrary, every object is characterized as a part of the states of affairs in which it may occur. 
To know the object amounts to knowing its possible occurrences in states of affairs (2.0123). 
Even if states of affairs are claimed to be mutually independent (2.061), it is essential to them 
that they form more complex situations amongst whom there are various logical relations. 
Eventually, every object and every state of affairs form a part of the world whose compositional 
possibilities are determined by the notion of the logical space in which every state of affairs 
which may occur must be locatable. Again, a similarity to Kant’s approach may be traced here 
since Kant operates with the notion of the world as a unity of all appearances in which every 
single object (with all its properties and relations to other objects) is located. In the conclusion, 
I will argue that it is precisely this top-down approach which marks the most crucial difference 
between the approach shared by Kant and Wittgenstein on the one side, and Moore and Russell 
on the other.  
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Conclusion 
 
Many philosophers after Kant (for example, Bolzano, Brentano and his followers) 
criticized Kant’s project of transcendental-idealistic epistemology for amounting, as they saw 
it, to merely psychological investigations. They were persuaded that Kant’s supposed 
epistemology concerning the conditions of our cognition is nothing more than a psychological 
theory describing our mental acts and incapable of accounting for their truth or falsity. I 
attended particularly to Moore’s endeavour in his Dissertation to denounce Kant’s 
epistemology from a similar perspective. To be specific, Moore claimed that proper 
epistemology should not be concerned with our mental processes but merely with that to which 
truth or falsity may be ascribed – for which he coined the term “propositions”. 
In addition to introducing propositions as mind-independent bearers of truth or falsity, 
Moore insisted that they are proper parts of the world – which itself consists of propositions. I 
paid special attention to two arguments Moore introduced to ground this contention (one against 
abstractionism and another against the possibility of defining truth) and concluded that neither 
is completely convincing. Apart from the fact that Moore’s intriguing understanding of a 
proposition is not argumentatively well grounded, it is plagued with other difficulties, 
specifically with the vagueness of its account. Moore proposed in the Dissertation that a 
proposition consists of concepts and a relation binding these concepts together. However, he 
did not provide any definite account of the rules according to which concepts are supposed to 
be combined. 
At that point Moore’s friend Bertrand Russell took over the initiative and endeavoured, 
in his Principles of Mathematics, to give a more well worked-out and elaborate account of 
propositions and their composition. He further elaborated there the notion of a proposition as a 
worldly entity consisting of non-relating terms (things) and at least one relation which binds 
the proposition together. However, his account still included several difficulties: the concept of 
an analysis after which a relation loses its relational character, the all-encompassing notion of 
a “term”, and that we need to accept curious “objective falsehoods” – false propositions. All 
those difficulties eventually led Russell away from the theory of propositions as worldly entities 
towards his multiple relation theory of judgement. Multiple relation theory (throughout all the 
changes it underwent) states that when we judge, the terms from which the worldly complex (a 
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referent of judgment) is composed are present in the judgemental complex where they all have 
a non-relational nature and are assembled together by the judgemental relation, i.e. the relation 
produced by a judging person. The proposition as self-standing worldly entity thus disappeared 
and truth and falsity were moved back into judgement.  
The above-mentioned direction- and unity problems are generally agreed to be the main 
difficulties for Russell’s multiple relation theory. A direction problem resides in the fact that in 
non-symmetrical permutative complexes – in which non-relational terms can be replaced with 
a change of meaning – it is not obvious how it is guaranteed for me to end up with one 
judgement rather than another. The unity problem then has an even broader scope – it lies in 
the fact that terms within a judgement complex may be assembled, since the relation does not 
retain its relational nature, even in a way which ensues in forming a nonsensical judgement. 
The unity problem directed us right into the centre of Russell’s disputes with young 
Wittgenstein, since it is precisely this difficulty which is considered to form the centre of 
Wittgenstein’s objection to Russell’s theory of judgement. The core of this objection is often 
summarized as that it is possible to judge nonsense under Russell’s multiple relation theory. In 
the interpretation I have put forward, there is a more pressing, yet rarely addressed issue that 
Wittgenstein wished to turn our attention to. Wittgenstein’s key insight resided, I have 
contended, is his observation that Russell’s multiple relation theory hinges on his general (not 
primarily epistemological, but rather ontological) theory of complexes which, in turn, accounts 
for Russell’s inability to explain how the judgement complex differs from any other complex 
in the world and, thus, how it comes to have a special characteristic of being representational.  
Given that Wittgenstein pointed this difficulty out to Russell, we might presume that he 
also provided his own solution to it. And he indeed did. In the Tractatus, he explicated the 
intentional character of propositions by their being facts which share the pictorial form and 
pictorial relation with the represented situations. Turning my attention back to the overarching 
topic of the thesis, the influence of Kant’s epistemology to the discussed philosophers, I called 
attention to the role which some commentators claim the transcendental subject plays in 
Wittgenstein’s account of propositions, namely providing language with meaning. However, I 
opposed that we may account for this meaningfulness merely by taking into account the 
psychological notion of an empirical subject which may be understood to carry out both name-
object correlations and sign-symbol transformations. However, my account is then confronted 
with a question of whether Wittgenstein’s approach to judgement may have been positively 
  
137 
 
influenced by Kantian approach at all.  
I attempted to answer this question by exploring the relation between the notion of a 
unity of a single judgment (in Kant) and proposition (in Wittgenstein), and the overall unity of 
thought (Kant) or the body of propositions (Wittgenstein). Both Kant and Wittgenstein were 
persuaded that elucidating the unity of a single proposition or judgement requires taking into 
account the fact that this particular proposition or judgement is located within the whole of 
propositions and judgements – and we should also provide the account of the unity of this 
whole. And it is just this connection between both unities that is missing in both Moore’s and 
Russell’s theories of propositions and judgements. We may assume that both Moore and Russell 
had to tacitly presuppose that to illuminate the nature of propositions, it suffices to pay attention 
to particular propositions, disregarding the fact that propositions also form a totality whose 
unity need also be accounted for.  
As for Moore, he made a revolutionary move towards the notion of a proposition as 
mind-independent worldly entity but left all difficulties regarding both the composition of a 
single proposition and relations among propositions unanswered. As regards any single 
proposition, he merely claimed that it consists of any number of terms and a relation. And as 
for the unity of all propositions, he did not consider the question at all. He took himself to have 
refuted the idealist (Bradleyan) conception, according to which every judgement is a 
predication of, and thus aims to capture one aspect of, a single all-embracing reality. As to what, 
when that single point of reference is removed, will then hold those judgements (or 
propositions) together, it seems that he never asked himself the question. 
Russell placed at the centre of his philosophical account of propositions in the Principles 
of Mathematics the concept of the unity of a proposition. However hard he tried to solve the 
intriguing problem of the unity of a single proposition, though, he did not attend to the second 
issue of the unity within the body of propositions. Moreover, we have observed that even the 
concept of the unity of any single proposition proved problematic for him: any proposition 
consists of nonrelating terms and (at least one) relating relation, but Russell was, as he admitted 
unsure how to clarify the relational nature of relation included in the proposition.452 The 
explication of his uncertainty may also serve, I am persuaded, to shed more light on his inability 
to account for the overall unity. As I pointed out, Russell put forward in the Principles of 
                                                 
452 For further details, see section 3.2.2 of the thesis.  
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Mathematics his notion of a “term” under which everything which may form a part of a 
proposition falls. Thus, it is not only non-relational entities (things) which are terms, but also 
relations, which are at the same time assigned the function of providing a proposition with unity.  
As I see it, it is precisely this atomistic conception of terms, which are each self-
subsistent and independent of other terms, which is responsible for Russell’s difficulty throwing 
light both upon the unity of single proposition and his blindness to the issue of the overall unity 
of propositions.453 When it is questionable how to account for the unity of any single 
proposition, since it is composed of several self-subsistent terms, how should it be possible to 
explain how the unity within the whole body of propositions is formed? 
The same difficulty subsequently plagued Russell’s multiple relation theory of 
judgement as well: each judgement complex is composed of the judging subject and the objects 
which are all related together by the judgemental relation. Again, the problem of the unity, this 
time of the unity of a judgement, comes to the fore since, if the only relating relation is the 
judgmental relation, it is not guaranteed that the objects within judgmental complex will be 
assembled in a meaningful way. Thus, it may be doubted whether the unity of any single 
judgment is properly explicated. And, moreover, in all Russell’s renderings of the multiple 
relation theory of judgement, he explicitly analyses merely elementary judgements consisting 
of one relation (apart from a judgmental relation): e.g. A loves B, A is on the right of the B etc. 
It remained an unfinished task of the manuscript on the Theory of Knowledge to provide further 
details concerning the composition of more complicated judgement complexes. 
We may doubt whether Russell would have had sufficient resources to provide a 
comprehensible account even if he had managed to finish the manuscript. I pointed out that 
both Kant and Wittgenstein were persuaded from the beginning that the correct theory of a 
singular judgment (proposition) must at the same time entail the explanation of how it comes 
about that there is also an overall unity within the body of all judgements (propositions). 
Russell, on the contrary, drawing on his atomistic ontology of terms and complexes built from 
them, elaborated first in the Principles of Mathematics, did not have this issue of overall unity 
in sight. He might have attempted to provide a theory concerning the building up of more 
complicated judgements on the basis of the elementary ones – for instance the judgment that 
                                                 
453 This conception, in turn, probably has been Russell’s reaction to British absolute idealism in which no 
single judgment and no single entity can be comprehended without taking into account the reality as a whole (“the 
Real” as Bradley calls it; see e.g. Bradley, 1883, p. 15ff.). 
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“A loves B and C hates D” might be conceived of as a judgment in which two judgement 
complexes are related – but then it would remain to be explained what the connection “and” 
between those two complexes amounts to.  
However, one may still ask whether this “bottom-up” approach, in which the overall 
unity is to be reached by gradually building up the more and more complicated judgements onto 
single ones, could eventually account for the overall unity of either propositions or judgments. 
Neither Wittgenstein nor Kant conceived of the overall unity in this way, opting instead for 
what I called a top-down approach in which any particular element (be it a proposition, 
judgment, object or state of affairs) is treated in relation to the role and place it has within an 
overall totality (of judgments, propositions, objects or states of affairs). Kant explicated, within 
his general logic, how judgments are interconnected by the logical relations and he also 
attempted to provide the proof (in the Transcendental deduction of categories) of how every 
possible experience must stand under categories and how, thus, principles (synthetic a priori 
judgements considering the application of categories to sensible manifold) are applicable to the 
whole of possible experience. Moreover, he never paid attention, on the side of the referents of 
our judgments, merely to singular objects with their properties or relations, but focused also on 
their place within the nature as a whole of all appearances.  
Wittgenstein introduced the notion of logical space as an encapsulation of how every 
single state of affairs, which may occur in the world, is located in one all-embracing space of 
possibilities (of occurrences or non-occurrences of states of affairs). And, on the side of 
propositional unity, he introduced the notion of a general propositional form which poses a 
demand that everything that is to be counted as a proposition must be in possession of this form. 
By doing so, he was able to delineate the realm of propositions as a whole with the certainty 
that he included everything which may bear a name of a proposition. Russell and Moore, on the 
other hand, did not have these resources at hand. Beginning with the notion of a single 
proposition, they were not in possession of means by which they could ascertain that they enlist 
all propositions, however far they may proceed with the enumerations of both simple and more 
complex propositions. Speaking quite generally, if you begin with some elements and attempt 
to build up the totality based on them, you will never reach this totality of elements. For one 
thing, you cannot be sure that won’t miss some elements out, and, for the other, you cannot be 
certain to recognize that you have already reached this totality. On the other hand, if you begin, 
as Kant and Wittgenstein did, with the concept of a whole, you may be sure that you will not 
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miss some elements and that you are at least potentially able to enumerate them all.  
Thus, it seems to me that we may say that, by attempting to put an end to idealistic 
thinking, Russell and Moore, so to say, threw the baby out with the bathwater. By contrast, 
Wittgenstein acknowledged the interconnection of both queries and provided his account of 
states of affairs and the world as a whole on one side, and of single propositions and their overall 
connection on the other. In this essential respect, Wittgenstein can be legitimately described as 
a Kantian philosopher – or at least “a philosopher influenced by Kant's epistemology”, even if 
his conception of propositions and judgements differs from Kant’s in many other important 
ways.
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